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ABSTRACT
BARGAINING AND PRICING
IN
NETWORKED ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
Tanmoy Chakraborty
Supervisors: Michael Kearns and Sanjeev Khanna
Economic systems can often be modeled as games involving several agents or players
who act according to their own individual interests. Our goal is to understand how various
features of an economic system aﬀect its outcomes, and what may be the best strategy for
an individual agent.
In this work, we model an economic system as a combination of many bilateral economic
opportunities, such as that between a buyer and a seller. The transactions are complicated
by the existence of many economic opportunities, and the influence they have on each
other. For example, there may be several prospective sellers and buyers for the same item,
with possibly diﬀering costs and values. Such a system may be modeled by a network,
where the nodes represent players and the edges represent opportunities. We study the
eﬀect of network structure on the outcome of bargaining among players, through theoretical
modeling of rational agents as well as human subject experiments, when cost and values
are public information.
The interactions get much more complex when sellers’ cost and buyers’ valuations are
private. We design and analyze revenue maximizing strategies for a seller in the presence of
many buyers, when the seller has uncertain information or no information about the buyers’
valuations. We focus on developing pricing strategies, and compare their performance
against truthful auctions. We also analyze trading strategies in financial markets, where a
player quotes both buying and selling prices, again with uncertain or no information about
future price evolution of the financial instrument.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Economic interactions are ubiquitous. They happen whenever we visit a store, physical
or online, to buy items that range from our regular grocery needs to the latest electronic
gadgets. They also include trading on equities exchanges, auctions for rare goods such
as the wireless spectrum and auctions for dynamically generated goods such as internet
advertisement space. They also happen when an employer hires an employee to work at a
mutually agreed salary. These are but only a few examples of economic interactions.
The most commonly occurring interactions involve the seller posting a price for each
item, and a buyer has to make a choice of whether to buy the item at the posted price. Often
sellers announce more complex pricing schemes, such as oﬀering discounts on bulk purchases.
In contrast, in many auctions, such as that of art and antiques, internet advertisement space
and wireless spectrum, the buyer quotes the maximum price he is willing to pay, known
as a bid, and the seller chooses to sell the item to one of the buyers based on the bids
received. Prices are negotiable in some markets, where a buyer can come back with a quote
that the seller may accept or reject, or come back with yet another quote. Such bargaining
commonly occurs when the buyers and sellers are in live communication during the economic
interaction. For example, prices are often negotiable in small shops, where the shopkeeper
has the authority to alter prices as he wishes. Similarly, prices are negotiated when one is
looking to buy or even rent a house, or when a football or baseball player negotiates and
signs a contract with a club.
The goal of this work is to understand the outcomes of interactions and strategies of
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players in various economic systems. We can model these economic systems as a combination
of multiple bilateral economic opportunities, each of which may yield a surplus or profit to
the players involved, depending on their actions. To elaborate, consider a prospective seller
who holds an item that was perhaps acquired at a certain cost, and a prospective buyer
who has a certain value for that item. If the seller and the buyer can agree on transfer
of the item at a negotiated price, then the surplus generated is the valuation of the buyer
minus the cost for the seller. The buyer receives a share of the surplus that is equal to its
valuation minus the price, while the seller makes a profit equal to price minus cost. In all
the above examples of economic systems, one can identify buyers and sellers, and represent
every possible pair of agents who can trade between themselves (on an item of common
interest) as an economic opportunity.
We can model an economic system as a game, where the payoﬀs to the agents are a
combination of the profits realized from the economic opportunities they are involved in.
The exact structure of the payoﬀ of a player can be simply the sum of payoﬀs obtained
from the diﬀerent opportunities, or it can be a more complex non-linear function of these
payoﬀs, as seen in the well-known phenomenon of diminishing marginal utility. It can even
involve parameters such as some measure of fairness in comparison to the fortunes of other
players and social welfare. We can then consider equilibria of such a game as a reasonable
outcome of the economic system. There are many sellers and many buyers for the same or
similar items, with possibly diﬀering costs and valuations. Further, the market place can
have multiple distinct items, and a buyer or seller may be interested in trading multiple
items. Payoﬀ of a player can be a complex function; further, the set of feasible actions is
often constrained by the inventory size of a seller or the budget of a buyer. So outcome of
an economic interaction is influenced by other economic opportunities too, and we focus on
understanding these mutual eﬀects.
1.1 Expectations from a Good Model
Modeling every feature of a complex economic system is often impossible, since many fea-
tures can hardly be measured. Modeling a player’s responses to various situations is also
hard to model precisely, since it varies over time and the human components in a decision
2
process vary from person to person. So we often impose some intuitive rationality on the
players. We assume that the players can find a better strategy when there exists one, and
analyze the eventual outcome of the system under this assumption. The goal of modeling
players’ behavior and parameters of the economic system is to obtain an accurate enough
model so that the outcomes in the model match those in the real world. At the same time,
the model of player’s behavior should be realistic, that is, it should intuitively match what
players might actually do. A somewhat simpler but related objective of a model can be to
propose an outcome that can be deemed to be fair to the participants given their resources
and capabilities. This notion of fairness often needs to be guided by what happens in the
real world.
Often, for simplicity, players are assumed to be always capable of identifying the best
strategy, and Nash equilibrium is proposed as a solution concept. This assumption often
puts the onus of an extremely diﬃcult decision on individual players. This is especially
true for games played over a long period of time, since the action space of the player grows
exponentially with time. This contradicts our common intuition that an average buyer does
not solve complex optimization problems but instead takes simple, and often myopic, steps
that appear to be beneficial. Moreover, the optimization problems are often so complex that
it is diﬃcult to even design algorithms that will run suﬃciently fast on modern computers,
so even automated agents with significant computational power may not be able to identify
their optimal strategy. So it is not surprising that the equilibrium outcomes often do not
match with real world outcomes. Further, when the model has many equilibria, its value
as a predictive model gets severely diluted.
A complex model also has a negative impact on theoretical analysis, since we are less
likely to find succinctly characterized equilibrium. Further, finding an optimal strategy or
an equilibrium may become computationally intractable. In such a situation, the model
would hardly provide any useful insight. If we are not even able to simulate the model and
observe what an equilibrium may look like, what purpose would the model serve? Thus, a
fairly basic necessity of a good model is that it should be tractable – players should have
simple enough decisions to make, and the outcome of the system, which we shall refer to as
a solution concept, should also be easy to compute.
3
To complicate matters, the amount of information available to the players have a strong
eﬀect on the outcomes. For example, if both the buyer and the seller are aware of each
other’s cost and valuation, then they both know that they are simply negotiating on how to
share the mutually known surplus. If the seller knows his cost but not the buyer’s valuation,
the basic notions of defining equilibrium start to crumble, since the seller’s best strategy is
not well-defined. Such a game is often referred to as an incomplete information game, and
a standard solution concept here is the Bayes-Nash equilibrium, where it is assumed that
each player has Bayesian information or belief, which is a probability distribution, over all
parameters that are relevant but unknown to it. In a game played over time, each player
gathers information about the unknown parameters by observing actions of other players.
Of course, this adds heavily to the complexity of the decision that an individual has to
make, and also makes it necessary to model the distributions. Further, it is commonly
observed in many simple systems that there are too many Bayes-Nash equilibria, which are
also hard to compute.
An alternate concept rose in the context of mechanism design. In a model involving a
single seller and several buyers, a seller is restricted to choosing a strategy (an auctioning
rule) so that the best response of the buyers is to simply communicate their true valuation
to the seller, irrespective of the information available to the buyers. Such auctioning rules
are referred to as truthful or incentive compatible mechanisms. The design of truthful
mechanisms is popular because only the seller has to make a complex decision, and can
then convince the buyers that they should simply report their true valuation. So it can be
viewed as restriction to a natural class of equilibria. Again, tractability of a model remains
crucial to its usefulness, so we shall keep an eye on the computability of revenue or welfare
maximizing mechanisms.
With this background information on what we expect from a theoretical model of an
economic system, we now proceed to describe the models that are presented in this work.
1.2 Networked Bargaining
Along the lines of the discussion above, an economic system can be modeled by a network,
where the nodes represent players and the edges represent economic opportunities. We
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study a networked bargaining game, where a population of players simultaneously negotiate
bilateral opportunities that yield a known surplus if the two players agree on how to share
it – we shall refer to this agreement as signing of a deal. We also place a limit on each node,
which is the maximum number of deals that the player at that node can sign. This models
the demand volume of a buyer or the inventory size of a seller, and induces competition
among the players.
1.2.1 Behavioral Experiments
In Chapter 2, we report on a series of highly controlled human subject experiments in
networked bargaining. Results in this chapter were published in collaboration with Stephen
Judd, Michael Kearns and Jinsong Tan [23]. Behavioral experiments allow us to design
toy economies with diﬀerent structures that can test our hypothesis – in contrast, we often
get a single or few snapshots of a real economic system, with little data to make direct
comparisons, or create and test the accuracy of a predictive model. They also provide us
with a direct insight into the collective behavior of human players under various economic
tensions.
We designed networks with up to 36 nodes, and recruited human subjects to play these
games in a laboratory, where the only communication occurred through computer interfaces
designed by us. The basic interaction between two players is the decision of how to share a
mutual payment; the players simultaneously negotiate on all incident edges by sending oﬀers
and counter-oﬀers on each edge. Various theories predict, to diﬀerent levels of uniqueness,
what the shares will be. We analyze our experimental results from three points of view: so-
cial eﬃciency, nodal diﬀerences, and human diﬀerences; and contrast our behavioral results
with the theories.
Our experiments show that human subjects can consistently find solutions that are so-
cially more eﬃcient than random solutions, but loses this advantage due to local disagree-
ments that lead to under-consumption of resources. We also found that the bargaining
power of a node, measured by the average size of shares received, is enhanced by high de-
gree and low limit, while it is also enhanced by low degree and high limit of its neighbors.
Further, we found that patient players tends to get larger shares on average. These are only
5
some of our findings – a detailed exposition can be found in Chapter 2.
1.2.2 Theoretical Modeling and Non-Linear Utility
We also study networked bargaining through theoretical modeling of rational agents. Our
model extends any two-player bargaining solution concept, such as Nash and proportional
bargaining solutions, to an equilibrium over the networked game. The model is based on a
local equilibrium concept introduced by Cook and Yamagishi [31]. Players are modeled as
making myopic adjustments to the deals, using local but dynamic information about their
neighbors’ accumulated wealth, till every deal appears to be fair given the local information.
Such a model can be viewed as bounded rationality applied to networked bargaining, and
models buyers as simple decision-makers.
We focus on a setting where no limit on the maximum number of signed deals is imposed
on the players. In this setting, there is no network eﬀect on the outcomes when players have
linear utility, that is, the economic opportunities have no eﬀect on each other. However,
we show that non-linear utility causes network structure to have an eﬀect on the outcome.
This may be justified by the following intuition: with no demand or supply constraint, one
may expect the bilateral negotiations to become independent. However, non-linear utility
continues to bind them together, since a player’s marginal utility from a deal may change
depending on the amount earned from other deals.
We show that equilibrium exists in all networks, and is unique in most networks, but not
all. As a consequence of diminishing marginal utility, a node’s bargaining power is enhanced
if it has high degree, its neighbors have low degree, their neighbors have high degree, and
so on. This can be summarized as a ”rich-get-richer” eﬀect. Though players only take
local myopic decisions, the eﬀect of network structure propagates beyond the immediate
neighborhood. Proportional bargaining proposes solutions with greater inequality than
Nash bargaining. We also propose a natural algorithm to compute an equilibrium, based
on asynchronous selfish updates. The algorithm converges quickly in general, and we prove
that a specific variant converges fast on all bipartite networks. These results are presented
in Chapter 3. Results in this chapter were published in collaboration with Michael Kearns
and Sanjeev Khanna [24, 26].
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1.3 Mechanism Design and Pricing
In the study of networked bargaining described above, the surplus on each edge was mutually
known to the players involved. If the buyers’ valuations and the sellers’ costs are private
information, as they often are, then the problem becomes much harder to model – first
because simple modeling as an equilibria gives too many outcomes that are diﬃcult to
compute, and second because it is hard to measure the Bayesian information that each
player is using. Studying such incomplete information bargaining has thus been largely
restricted to a single pair of buyer and seller, and even then obtaining structural results
or eﬃcient computation has required a lot of eﬀort – [35] provides a survey on incomplete
information bargaining. A more popular path has been to study the notion of truthful
mechanisms, and this model incorporates a single seller and multiple buyers. Recently,
extensions to models with more than one seller has been suggested [78], but understanding
of such models is very limited. In this work, we restrict ourselves to the one seller, many
buyers setting, leaving the general networked setting as a suggestion for future work.
As mentioned before, one of the most frequently occurring economic interaction involve
the seller setting prices without (precise) knowledge of the buyer’s valuations, and the buyer
making a decision of which items to buy based on the set prices. This is what we typically
face when buying from a large grocery or departmental store, or from Amazon’s online store.
It is not diﬃcult to see that since the prices are set independent of the buyers’ valuations,
buyers have no incentive to lie about their valuations, that is, pricing mechanisms are
truthful. We focus on designing revenue maximizing pricing strategies for the seller. We
also examine the gap in revenue between an optimal pricing strategy and an optimal auction
(the latter always performs better than the former), and find that it is small in some natural
settings.
1.3.1 Limited Information Setting
We may assume that the seller has no information about the buyers’ valuations and tries to
perform well against whatever valuation they may have – we study this setting in Chapter
4. Results in this chapter were published in collaboration with Zhiyi Huang and Sanjeev
Khanna [22]. We consider the Item Pricing problem for revenue maximization, where a
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single seller with multiple distinct items caters to multiple buyers with unknown subadditive
valuation functions who arrive in a sequence. Subadditive valuation is a natural extension
of diminishing marginal utility to a multi-dimensional domain. The seller sets the prices
on individual items, and we design randomized pricing strategies to maximize expected
revenue.
We consider dynamic uniform strategies, which can change the price upon the arrival
of each buyer but the price on all unsold items is the same at all times, and static non-
uniform strategies, which can assign diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent items but can never change
it after setting it initially. Dynamic strategies can be especially useful in online stores,
where it is easy to show diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent buyers. We design pricing strategies
that guarantee poly-logarithmic (in number of items) approximation to maximum possible
social welfare, which is an upper bound on the maximum revenue that can be obtained by
any pricing strategy or any individually rational mechanism. We also show that any static
uniform pricing strategy cannot yield such approximation, thus highlighting a large gap
between the powers of dynamic and static pricing. Finally, our pricing strategies imply poly-
logarithmic approximation for revenue-optimal incentive compatible mechanisms, in multi-
parameter settings with subaddititve valuations. Even with Bayesian information about
buyers’ valuations, no computationally eﬃcient mechanism with a better approximation
factor is known for such general valuation functions.
1.3.2 Bayesian Information Setting
In the complete absence of information, it is diﬃcult to even define an optimal mechanism.
In fact, it is unlikely that we will get anything better than logarithmic approximation when
competing with a strategy that knows the valuation functions. Alternately, we can assume
that the seller has Bayesian information about the buyers’ valuations, and this allows us to
define an optimal mechanism in terms of expected revenue, where expectation is measured
with respect to the Bayesian distributions. Myerson [76] designed optimal mechanism for
single parameter problems, where each buyer is single-minded, that is, his valuation is a
fixed positive value for a particular set of items or service, and it is zero if this particular
set is not allocated to him. A simple setting where this is applicable is multi-unit auction
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of a single type of good, where each buyer has interest in at most one copy of the good.
However, Myerson’s optimal mechanism is not a pricing mechanism, and asks for bids
from buyers before deciding their payment. So it is applicable in auction settings where
buyers are asked to bid, but not in general stores where pricing is the standard norm.
Further, buyers may find it diﬃcult to precisely measure and quote their value for an item
– on the other hand, pricing simply asks buyers to make a binary decision – whether their
value is above the quoted price or not. Since buyers often uses less computational resources
than sellers, this gives a practical advantage. In Chapter 5, we focus on designing near-
optimal pricing mechanisms for multi-unit settings in a Bayesian environment. Results in
this chapter were published in collaboration with Eyal Even-Dar, Sudipto Guha, Yishay
Mansour and S Muthukrishnan [20].
We design polynomial time algorithms for computing approximately revenue-maximizing
sequential posted-pricing mechanisms (SPM) in K-unit auctions. A seller has K identical
copies of an item to sell, and there are n buyers, each interested in at most one copy, who
have some value for the item. The seller does not know the values of the buyers, but knows
the distributions that they are drawn from. Each buyer’s value is drawn independently from
a distribution associated with that buyer. In an SPM, the seller sets a price for each buyer
(without looking at any bid but only using the distributional information), the buyers are
approached in a sequence chosen by the seller, and a buyer buys the item if its value exceeds
the price posted to it. An SPM specifies the ordering of buyers and the posted prices, and
may be adaptive or non-adaptive in its behavior. A non-adaptive SPM is also equivalent to
oﬀering prices to the buyers in parallel, and choosing to sell the items to up to K of the
buyers who accept their respective oﬀered prices.
Our first algorithm computes prices using a linear program, and we show that if the buy-
ers are approached in decreasing order of prices, the the expected revenue of the computed
SPM is at least (1− KK
K!eK
) ≈ (1− 1√
2πK
) times that of Myerson’s optimal mechanism (which
is an upper bound on any pricing strategy). Thus the gap between an optimal SPM and
an optimal auction vanishes solely as a function of the inventory size is increased, and this
result holds even if the buyers’ pool is chosen adversarially based on K. In other words,
a seller who owns a large inventory may commit to use a pricing strategy instead of an
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auction, and be assured that this commitment can lead only to a small regret, even before
gathering any knowledge about the buyers’ pool.
For constant K, there is at least a constant multiplicative gap between pricing and
auction. We design polynomial time approximation schemes for the optimal non-adaptive
and adaptive SPM respectively.
1.4 Pricing Strategies for a Financial Market Maker
In Chapter 6, we study the profitability of market making in price time series models.
Results in this chapter were published in collaboration with Michael Kearns [25]. In financial
markets, every player can simultaneously act as both a buyer and a seller, buying and selling
stocks by participating in a continuous two-sided auction at an electronic exchange (we
assume that a player can short a stock). In a two-sided auction, a player may quote buy
prices and/or sell prices, and a trade is executed if a buy and sell order can be matched.
Market making refers broadly to trading strategies that seek to profit by providing
liquidity to other traders, while avoiding accumulating a large net position in a stock. In
this chapter, we study the profitability of market making strategies in a variety of time
series models for the evolution of a stock’s price. Typically, a market maker quotes both a
buy and a sell price for a financial instrument or commodity, hoping to profit by exploiting
the diﬀerence between the two prices, known as the spread. Intuitively, a market maker
wishes to buy and sell equal volumes of the instrument (or commodity), and profit from
the diﬀerence between the selling and buying prices. Market makers are common in foreign
exchange trading, where most trading firms oﬀer both buying and selling rates for a currency.
They also play a major role in equities exchanges, and exchanges often appoint trading firms
to act as oﬃcial market makers for equities.
We first provide a precise theoretical characterization of the profitability of a simple
and natural market making algorithm in the absence of any stochastic assumptions on price
evolution. This characterization exhibits a trade-oﬀ between the positive eﬀect of local
price fluctuations and the negative eﬀect of net price change. We then use this general
characterization to prove that market making is often profitable on mean reverting time
series – time series with a tendency to revert to a long-term average. Mean reversion has
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been empirically observed in many markets, especially foreign exchange and commodities.
We show that the slightest mean reversion yields positive expected profit, and also obtain
stronger profit guarantees for a canonical stochastic mean reverting process, known as the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process, as well as other stochastic mean reverting series studied
in the finance literature. We also show that market making remains profitable in expectation
for the OU process even if some realistic restrictions on trading frequency are placed on the
market maker.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
After completing a detailed exposition of the models studied in this thesis and the various
results, we revisit and summarize them in Chapter 7. In Chapter 7, we provide a clear
and detailed contrast of our contributions with previously known work, which serves to
summarize the specific contributions of this thesis to the area of computational economics.
We also outline some work in progress, open problems and future research directions in
the final Chapter 8 that are inspired from the models and results described above. Briefly,
they include
• Study of networked bargaining with incomplete information, through theoretical mod-
eling as well as behavioral experiments.
• Designing eﬃcient algorithms to compute pricing strategies that price bundles of items
as well as single items, and achieve provably greater revenue in the process.
• Analyzing the eﬀect of diminishing marginal utility on the optimal pricing strategy of
a single seller, and computing utility maximizing pricing strategies and auctions. In a
Bayesian setting, diminishing marginal utility is a standard model for capturing risk
aversion. I have been involved in some recent progress on this topic [11].
• Developing more realistic models for a financial market, and the design and analysis
of pricing strategies for a market maker in appropriate market models. This is also a
work in progress.
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Chapter 2
Behavioral Study of Networked
Bargaining
In recent years there has been much research on network-based models in game theory.
Topics of attention include the eﬀects of network topology on the properties of equilibrium
in social and economic networks, the price of decentralized decision-making in networking
problems like routing, game-theoretic models of network formation, convergence to equilib-
rium and computability of equilibrium in networked games, and many others. This large
and growing literature has been almost exclusively theoretical, with few accompanying em-
pirical or behavioral studies examining the relevance of the mathematical models to actual
behavior. In this chapter, we report on a series of highly controlled human subject exper-
iments in networked bargaining. Results in this chapter were published in collaboration
with Stephen Judd, Michael Kearns and Jinsong Tan [23].
Realization of an economic opportunity and the surplus associated with it is usually
contingent upon agreement between participants on how to split the surplus. When multiple
economic opportunities are negotiated simultaneously, they can aﬀect each other. Even
when only local information is available, the eﬀects of one transaction can spread beyond
its immediate neighborhood. We study the nature of these interactions through behavioral
experiments with human subjects.
Specifically, we study a networked bargaining game, where a population of players si-
multaneously negotiate on multiple bilateral economic opportunities. Recall that a bilateral
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economic opportunity can be, for example, a relation between a buyer and a seller for a
particular item, or it can be an opportunity to run a business as partners. Moreover, these
opportunities may not exist between all pairs of players. For example, items are heteroge-
nous, and an economic opportunity exists only between a buyer interested in a particular
item and a seller who possesses that item in its inventory. It is convenient to represent the
players as nodes of a network, where each opportunity is represented by an edge between
two nodes, and interaction between transactions can be captured by the eﬀect of network
structure on the outcome. We shall refer to such a network as a bargaining network, each
edge or transaction as a deal, the participants in the transaction as endpoints of the deal,
and an agreement between its endpoint nodes to share the surplus as closing of the deal.
In our networked bargaining experiments, we impose an exogenous network of economic
opportunities and assign human subjects to these nodes as players of the game.
It is also natural for players to have a limit or budget on the volume of transaction they
can involve themselves in. For example, a seller may have a limit on the inventory which
is less than the demand volume of potential buyers. A buyer too may have a consumption
capacity that is less than the total supply volume of prospective sellers of the particular
product. We impose a limit on each node, which is the number of deals that a player at
that node is allowed to close. This limit is often less than the degree (number of incident
edges) of the node, and cannot be more than the latter. From a game-theoretic point of
view, the imposition of limits create competition between nodes to grab the attention of
their common neighbors.
We were partly inspired by a long line of previous theoretical work among sociologists,
economists and computer scientists on networked bargaining games with limited exchange,
which proposed solution concepts and analyzed the eﬀect of network topology on properties
such as bargaining power of a node and eﬃciency [31, 51, 14, 74, 17, 68, 4, 24, 26, 34, 27, 1, 2,
73]. A notable feature of these theories is the prediction that there may be significant local
variation in splits purely as a result of the imposed deal limits and structural asymmetries
in the network. One can view our experiments as a test of human subjects’ actual behavior
at this game in a distributed setting using only local information. Our experiments are
among the largest behavioral experiments on network eﬀects in bargaining conducted to
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date.
We adopt many of the practices of behavioral game theory, which has tended to focus on
two-player or small-population games rather than larger networked settings. In each of our
experiments, three dozen human subjects simultaneously engage in one-to-one bargaining
with partners defined by an exogenously imposed network. Our work continues a broader
line of research in behavioral games on networks at the University of Pennsylvania [67, 64,
66].
2.1 Overview of Results
In an extensive and diverse series of behavioral experiments, and the analysis of the result-
ing data, we address a wide range of fundamental questions, including: the relationships
between degree, deal limits, and wealth; the eﬀects of network topology on collective and in-
dividual performance; the eﬀects of degree and deal limits on various notions of “bargaining
power”; notions of “fairness” in deal splits; and many other topics.
The networks used are inspired from common models in social network theory, including
preferential attachment graphs, and some specifically-tailored structures.
In all our experiments, the number of deals that were closed was above 85% of the
maximum possible number. This is high enough to demonstrate real engagement, and low
enough to demonstrate real tension in the designs.
Most of the deeper findings can be related to existing network bargaining theory. Al-
though deals are often struck with unequal shares, more than one-third of the deals are
equally shared, thus indicating that people, while behaving as self-interested actors, also
have an aversion towards inequality.
Network topologies have enough of an eﬀect that they can be distinguished statistically
via individual wealth levels and other measures. Higher degree, for example, tends to raise
bargaining power while higher deal limits tend to decrease it. But while local topology
aﬀects bargains, invisible competition also aﬀects it, even when the local topologies are
indistinguishable. We find the expected eﬀects of higher deal limits in the first neighborhood
and higher degrees in the first and second neighborhoods, but neither degree distribution
nor deal limit distribution is suﬃcient to determine the inequality of splits. In summary,
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there is a rich interaction between network and wealth that needs more study.
Other findings that speak to no existing theories but might provoke some new ones are
the following:
• There is a positive correlation between inequality and social eﬃciency.
• Failures to agree on a split (as opposed to failures to find the best global trade con-
figuration) form the greater part of missing eﬃciency. We term this loss the price of
obstinacy.
• In a few of our experiments, we imposed a cost on closing a deal. We found that social
eﬃciency was higher when some uncertainty existed about a partner’s costs.
Finally, there are two curios that seem more about psychological dynamics than eco-
nomics:
• People who are patient bargainers tend to make more money.
• For a closed deal, we can identify the proposer proposer as the player who made the
last oﬀer on the deal, so that its oﬀer was accepted by the other player (the acceptor).
The share of the proposer stochastically dominates the share of the acceptor, with
high statistical significance. In hindsight, we can provide the following explanation:
a player is willing to accept an oﬀer that is few cents lower than what it deems fair,
but is unlikely to propose such an oﬀer.
In the ensuing sections, we review relevant networked bargaining theories, describe our
experimental design and system, and present our results.
2.2 Background
Networked bargaining with deal limits on the nodes, also known in the sociology literature
as networked exchange with substitutable or negatively connected relations (eg. [17]), has
been studied for decades. Several theoretical models have been designed to predict or
propose how wealth should be divided [51, 74, 31, 83], and human subject experiments have
been conducted on a few small graphs (up to 6 nodes) [32, 33, 83], albeit with diﬀerent
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interfaces and mechanisms than ours. Some of the theoretical models are based on limited
experimentation, along with simulated human behavior on slightly larger graphs [33]. A
few models are based strongly on notions of game-theoretic rationality and are natural
extensions of standard economic literature to social networks. Two models that belong to
this class were introduced by Cook and Yamagishi [31] and by Braun and Gautschi [17].
We shall mainly focus on these two models.
The model given by Cook and Yamagishi, sometimes referred to as equidependence
theory, is one of the most recognized theoretical model, that has received a lot of recent
focus from the theoretical computer science community [68, 4]. It proposes an equilibrium
concept based on players using local (both static and dynamic) information only, and it is
hte main theoretical model that inspired our experiments. Though Cook and Yamagishi[31]
considered only unique exchange networks (that is, where each vertex may close only a
single deal), the model is easily extendable to networks with varying deal limits. Every
node is assumed to play strategically with selfish game-theoretic rationality. The outside
option of a node is defined as the highest oﬀer it can rationally receive from any of its
neighbors, such that closing that deal would benefit both parties, compared to the given
state. An outcome is said to be stable if every player’s earning is more than its outside
option. Game-theoretic rationale suggests that an outcome should be stable if the players
act in a myopically selfish manner. Cook and Yamagishi propose that the achieved outcome
must be stable; moreover, they propose that the achieved outcome should be balanced, that
is, two parties that close a deal should have equal additional benefit from this edge, where
additional benefit is measured as the amount by which the earning of a player exceeds its
outside option. Kleinberg and Tardos [68] showed that a stable and balanced outcome exists
on all bipartite networks, but may not exist in all networks, and if it does, the closed deals
in a stable outcome form a maximum matching. This equal division of surplus is stipulated
by standard two-player bargaining solutions such as the Nash Bargaining Solution and
Proportional Bargaining Solution, for players with linear utilities [77, 15]. Recently, we
analyzed the eﬀect of diminishing marginal utility, in the setting where there are no limits
on the number of deals [26] – this analysis is presented as a part of this work in Chapter 3.
In this case, the model predicts that all deals should be closed, and if players have linear
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utility (which is assumed in the Cook-Yamagishi model), all deals should be shared equally.
Unequal splits may occur only if players have non-linear utility.
Though a balanced outcome seems to be the most robust theoretical model, it has
several drawbacks as a predictive model. First and foremost that it does not exist on even
simple networks such as a triangle; and when it exists, there is a balanced outcome for every
maximum matching in the network. This makes it computationally hard to even enumerate
all the balanced outcomes in a network, and non-uniqueness reduces the predictive value
of such a model. Another drawback is that the model often suggests that some edges will
be shared so that one party gets an infinitesimal share, and the other party gets practically
the entire amount. For example, a node that has at least two leaves (nodes of degree 1)
as neighbors always ends up with maximum possible profit, due to competition between
the leaves. However, even previous small-scale experiments [83] have suggested that such
a phenomenon does not happen, and in our experiments, players rarely close a deal that
extremely favors one of the players. Thus, when human subjects are involved, perfect local
rationality seems to be an incorrect assumption.
A model proposed by Braun and Gautschi [17] defines a “bargaining power function”
on nodes that depends only on the degree of the node and degrees of its neighbors. This
function increases with increase in degree of the node, and decreases with increase in degrees
of its neighbors, and is independent of all other network aspects. On each edge, the division
of wealth, if a deal is made, is stipulated to be proportional to the bargaining power of the
adjacent nodes. The bargaining power functions do not distinguish between diﬀerent limits
on nodes, and generally assume that relations are negatively connected: that is, for any
given player, closing one deal reduces the maximum value that can be obtained from other
edges deals. This makes the model quite inadequate as a predictor for our experiments.
The other feature of this model is that network eﬀects are quite local in nature, since even
slightly distant properties such as the degrees of neighbors of neighbors do not have an eﬀect
on the bargaining power function. However, the model attempts to capture the notion that
the earning of a player depends positively on its own degree and negatively on the degree
of its neighbors. We test this notion on fairly large graphs for the first time, and we also
show that the degrees of neighbors of neighbors do aﬀect a node positively. Such alternating
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eﬀects were predicted in previous theoretical models such as that by Markovsky et. al. [74],
which said that odd length paths from a node enhance its earning, while even length paths
reduce it.
A closely related literature is the study of sequential oﬀer bargaining in networked
setting [34, 27, 73, 1, 2], where the surplus shrinks with the passage of time, and the
negotiation proceeds through controlled rounds of alternating oﬀers and counter-oﬀers. This
is in contrast to our experiments, where either player can make an oﬀer at any time on a deal,
and the surplus remains unchanged over time, though there is a deadline at which the game
ends. The equilibrium concept studied here is subgame perfect equilibria in a game where
players have complete information about the entire network, another distinction from our
experiments, in which we only provide local information. This solution concept also suﬀers
from drawbacks as a predictive model similar to those outlined above, such as multiplicity
of equilibria.
The most significant set of previous experiments were done by Skvoretz and Willer [83],
who conducted experiments on 6 small networks (each has at most 6 nodes), with only
unit deal limits in 4 of them. They found that some common intuitions held true in those
networks. For example, players who have deal limit one and multiple leaves as neighbors
gets the bigger fraction of a closed deal, and that this fraction reduces if the limit of the
player is raised. Among other results, we test such hypotheses extensively on much larger
graphs with much more variance in their degree and limit distributions, and establish these
hypotheses with very high statistical significance. Larger graphs also allow us to study the
eﬀects of network topology aspects that are more involved than the degree or limit of the
player.
2.3 Experimental Design
We designed 18 diﬀerent experimental scenarios (consisting of specific choices of networks
and arrangement of deal limits; each such scenario received 3 trials, for a total of 54 short
experiments). These scenarios were based on 8 diﬀerent graphs with a wide variety of
details that is exemplified in Figure 2.1. The sole property they share is that they all have
36 nodes. We are thus casting our experimental nets wide here regarding network topology,
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Figure 2.1: Representatives of all the networks used. (a) the PA graph with positive
homophily. (b) a torus; the edges running oﬀ the top and bottom denote wrap-around
connections, as do those oﬀ the sides. (c) a simple cycle. (d) the 2ndHood graph for testing
second neighborhood eﬀects.
as in much of our previous behavioral work. This section describes all the scenarios, at least
at a high level.
The networks fall into 2 categories: regular graphs (to isolate and explore the eﬀects
of variations in deal limits), and irregular graphs (which contain an assortment of diﬀerent
degrees).
2.3.1 Irregular Graphs
We were interested in how bargaining behavior changes with changes in local network struc-
ture, and especially with diﬀerences in degree. Out of the huge space of such networks, we
chose four. The first three we describe all had a common degree sequence, but diﬀered
in the way that nodes of each degree connected to nodes of other degrees. We generated
a single degree sequence with a distribution that approximately follows a power law, and
used it to build three graphs with diﬀerent patterns of degree-to-degree profiles. We refer
to these graphs as PL (for Power Law) graphs.
Power Law Graphs
Since we suspected that degree might have a large influence on bargaining power (to be
confirmed below), it matters to the success of any node what the degrees are of other nodes
they need to bargain with. Hence it was important to manipulate the degrees of neighbors
as well.
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By connecting nodes in diﬀerent ways, we generated 3 graphs that diﬀer in this manner
but have the same basic degree distribution. In PLP (for Power Law Positive, indicating
locally positive degree correlation) the high degree nodes are connected to other high-degree
nodes. It models a world where nodes of diﬀerent degrees are segregated from each other. In
PLN (for Power Law Negative) the high degree nodes are connected to the low-degree ones;
it models a world where the connection-poor are likely to be ‘captivated’ by the connection-
rich. And PL0 has them all mixed together to disperse such phenomena. It models a world
where nodes mingle freely with other types.
With each of the PL graphs above, we used each of the following 3 deal limit schemes to
obtain 3× 3 = 9 diﬀerent scenarios. The first is the well-studied unique exchange situation
(uniq): all nodes have deal limit 1. The other 2 are neither unique exchange nor unlimited,
but represent two points in another large space of possibilities in between those notions.
They are best thought of as having random deal limits drawn uniformly between 1 and the
degree of the node. We call them limA and limB, and the diﬀerence is just that they are
diﬀerent randomizations.
Identical First Neighborhoods
The final irregular graph was designed specifically to test if structure outside the immediate
neighborhood of a node would aﬀect its behavior. The network used for this test has two
sets of three identical nodes, which are colored blue and red in Figure 2.1d. Both sets
have degree 6, and each of their neighbors have degree 7, so the local neighborhoods are
indistinguishable in our GUI views. Any diﬀerences in behavior must be due to the second
neighborhood or aspects even more distant. The second neighborhood of these two sets of
nodes are drastically diﬀerent; the second neighbors of the red nodes includes the 20 leaves
while the second neighbors of the blues does not. This graph helped us identify the eﬀects
of second neighborhood when the first neighborhoods of two nodes were identical. We used
it only with all nodes having deal limit 1. We refer to this scenario as 2ndHood.
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2.3.2 Regular Graphs
The 8 remaining scenarios were all based on regular graphs. This allowed us to test eﬀects
other than degree, like diﬀering deal limits or large-scale market imbalances. One graph
is the cycle shown in Figure 2.1. Four of them are identical tori with diﬀerent deal limit
schemes. Finally, three other graphs were used to observe the eﬀects of a global supply
imbalance, and are described in section 2.3.2.
Tori
The 4 tori are topologically the same as the 6×6 torus in Figure 2.1b, and are diﬀerentiated
only through deal limits:
• Uniform Torus (torUniq): all nodes have deal limit 1.
• Checkerboard Torus (torChkb): all white nodes have deal limit 1, the others have deal
limit 3.
• Torus Rows (torRows): alternating rows have deal limit 1 and deal limit 3.
• Torus Diamond (torDiamnd): Some vertices have deal limit 1 and some have deal limit
3. See Figure 2.2.
Imbalanced Supply Networks
The supply networks are 3 regular graphs which were designed to study the eﬀect of a
capacity issue which is not apparent at the node, but becomes apparent when contrasting
the deal limits of two groups of nodes. Let the external demand of a group be the sum
of deal limits of the nodes in the group minus the maximum number of deals that can be
closed within the group.
In the supply networks, we defined the groups as the left group and right group as shown
in Figure 2.3. All nodes have degree 4. All vertices in the left group have deal limit 2, and
all vertices in the right group have deal limit 3. In each network, the right group has two
diﬀerent types of neighbors: those that belong to the right group, and those that belong to
the left group. It is their diﬀerential treatment of the two types that was of interest. Nodes
on the left have only one kind of neighbor; they exist just to set up the market conditions
for those on the right.
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Figure 2.2: (a) Diamond torus, and (b) CWC (cycle with chords). CWC was used only in
preliminary session.
The three graphs share the fact that all deal limits are either 2 or 3, and the ones on the
right have both types of neighbours. They are diﬀerent in the ratios of external demands
between the left and right groups; in the Undersupplied case the right nodes are somewhat
starved for deals (seeking 39 when only 30 could be forthcoming), in Equisupplied they are
just balanced, and in Oversupplied they have more oﬀers than they can use.
2.4 System Overview
Experiments were conducted using a distributed networked software system we have de-
signed and built over the past several years for performing a series of behavioral network
experiments on diﬀerent games. This section briefly describes the user’s view of that system
in our bargaining experiments.
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Figure 2.3: Metadesigns for networks studying diﬀerential treatment of nodes under three
global market conditions. The top line is a template for interpreting the others. Xdeals
means external demand.
Like most microeconomic exchange models, the model described in Section 2.2 does
not specify an actual temporal mechanism by which bargaining occurs, but of course any
behavioral study must choose and implement one. At each moment of our experimental
system, and on each edge of the network, each human subject is able to express an oﬀer
that is visible to the subject’s neighbor on the other end of the edge. See Figure 2.4. The
oﬀer expresses the percentage of the benefit that a player is asking for. When the portions
on either end of an edge add up to exactly 100%, one of the players is able to close the deal
by pressing a special button. Individuals can always see the oﬀers made to them by their
neighbors, as well as some additional information (including the degrees and limits of their
neighbors, and the current best oﬀers available to their neighbors). When a deal is closed,
or when one of the partners has used up his limit of deals, the relevant edge mechanisms are
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Figure 2.4: Screenshot of player’s interface for bargaining.
frozen and no further action is allowed on them. Every game is stopped after 60 seconds.
Any money riding on deals not closed within that time is simply “left on the table”, i.e.
the players never get it.
All communication takes place exclusively through this bargaining mechanism. Actions
of a user are communicated to the central server, where information relevant to that action
is recorded and communicated to the terminals of other users.
2.4.1 Human Subject Methodology
Our IRB-approved human subject methodology was similar to that of previous experiments
at the University of Pennsylvania [67, 64, 66].
2.4.2 Session Overview
The main experimental session we shall study, which employed the network structure and
deal limit scenarios described above, consisted of 3 trials each of the 18 scenarios described
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above, making 54 experiments in all. Each edge had a payment of $2 available, and in the
end approximately $2500 was spent on subject payments. Unless mentioned otherwise, this
chapter will always be describing this session of experiments.
Prior to this main session, we ran a preliminary set of experiments that employed many
but not all of the same network structures, but without any deal limits imposed. Some of
these experiments also imposed “transaction costs” on vertices for closed deals. We will
mention results from this earlier session and contrast them with those of our main session
in a couple of places.
2.5 Results
Our results come under three broad categories. The first is about collective performance
and social eﬃciency. The second category examines questions about the diﬀerential fates of
nodes, depending on their position in the networks and the deal limits they each had. The
third category is about the general performance of humans summarizing behavior across all
the games they played. This is an area that no economic theory attempts to cover.
2.5.1 Social Welfare
Humans were quite eﬀective at playing these games, but they paid a surprising price for
their refusal to close some deals.
To quantify how well humans did on this problem, we implemented a greedy algorithm
for comparison. Given a graph and deal limits, it repeatedly draws (uniformly at random)
an unclosed deal, both of whose endpoints have not already saturated their deal limit, and
closes it, until there are none left. To normalize both the human and greedy systems we
divide by the Maximum Social Welfare, which is the maximum number of deals that can
close in each network, subject to both topology and deal limits. The social welfare is the
number actually closed, and the ratio between this and the max is the social eﬃciency.
The observed eﬃciencies are rendered by blue dots in Figure 2.5. In 6 of the networks
(those below the diagonal), the humans did worse than the greedy algorithm. Full eﬃciency
is rare in both systems. One might view this as the behavioral price of anarchy due to selfish
players operating with only local information. The greedy algorithm obtained an average of
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92.14% of the maximum welfare in our networks. In comparison, human subjects achieved
an average social welfare of 92.10% of the maximum welfare when averaged over all 3 trials,
a surprisingly similar figure.
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Figure 2.5: Scatterplot of greedy algorithm eﬃciency versus humans, one dot for each of
the 18 scenarios (averaged over trials). Blue dots are what the humans actually achieved.
Orange dots are the result of applying the greedy algorithm to the final state of human
play, which is what the humans could have achieved without obstinacy. Vertical lines thus
show the price of obstinacy. The dotted line indicates equality of the two scales. The open
circles represent the average values over all scenarios.
There are two parts to this story, though, because solving these problems involves both
selecting edges and closing deals on them. The greedy algorithm does not address the deal-
closing issue and per force never leaves a potential deal unclosed; the humans often did. In
36 of the 54 experiments, the solution found by the human subjects was not even maximal
– there were adjacent vertices that both could have closed another deal. Presumably this
was because they simply could not agree on a split. However, the humans left the system
in a state that could be improved post facto. We started the greedy algorithm in the final
state the humans reached and allowed it to attempt to find more deals, thus producing a
new state with no further unclosed deals. In all cases, this new state had a higher social
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eﬃciency than the greedy algorithm achieved alone. This is shown in the orange dots of
Figure 2.5. A line connects the human performance to the potential human performance,
and we might dub this diﬀerence the price of obstinacy. In total, 7.9% of the money was
“left on the table”, but 4.5% was due to obstinacy (more than half the lost value).
We conclude that the humans found better matchings in the graph, and hence their
behavioral price of anarchy is lower (better) than the greedy algorithm. But due to their
additional obstinacy, their overall performance was no better.
2.5.2 Nodal Diﬀerences
There was much evidence that nodal income depends on its deal limit, its degree, and
properties of the non-local neighborhood.
Unequal Splits
Most theoretical models (for example, the Yamagishi-Cook model) that apply game-theoretic
rationality to bargaining suggest that deals in some networks will be split in an unequal
fashion. We will report the splits using their inequality value (Ineq), defined as the absolute
diﬀerence between the two fractional shares. It ranges from 0 (equal sharing) to 1 (one
player gets everything).
A total of 1271 deals were closed in all the 54 experiments, and 423 of them were split
equally (inequality=0). But most were not split equally, every possible granular division
was used for some splits, and 6 edges even had inequality=1 (which is surprising in itself
since one partner gains nothing by signing the deal). The histogram in Figure 2.6 shows
the inequality values. For comparison, we also show the histogram (in orange) from our
preliminary session, which had no deal limits and produced an overwhelming portion of
deals that split 50:50. The average inequality value over all games in our main session was
0.2097, which is a ratio of about 60:40, It thus seems clear that deal limits are invoking a
significant increase in imbalanced splits.
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Figure 2.6: Histogram of deal splits in all games. The orange distribution was from our
preliminary session, and the bar at 0 (equal shares) goes to 82%. The blue bars are from
our main session, where we obtained a much greater spread of unequal splits.
Inequality and Eﬃciency
There is a significant correlation between average inequality value and the social eﬃciency
achieved in each scenario — that is, when the subjects collectively tolerate greater inequality
of splits, social welfare improves. These data are plotted in Fig. 2.7. The correlation
coeﬃcient is 0.52 with a confidence level of p = .027.
Interestingly, in an earlier session of experiments without deal limits, the same correla-
tion is highly negative.
Degree Distribution and Equality
How well does degree distribution predict wealth distribution? We examined the PL net-
works to answer this. The average inequality value in closed deals is 0.23 over the 3 PLPuniq
games (where nodes tend to be adjacent to nodes of similar degree), while it is 0.36 for both
PLNuniq (where nodes tend to be adjacent to nodes of very diﬀerent degree) and PL0uniq
(where nodes tend to be adjacent to nodes of various degrees).
The inequality values of the PLPuniq experiments are less than the joint PL0uniq and
PLNuniq outcomes with a one-sided p < 0.02. This indicates that nodes that have an
opportunity to bargain with at least one other of similar degree have more power than one
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Figure 2.7: Average inequality value versus Social Eﬃciency. The 9 PL networks are plotted
in orange, and the 8 regular networks are plotted in blue.
that is forced to bargain only with higher-degree nodes. (These are all unique-exchange
games, so deal limit is not playing any distinguishing role.)
These three networks all have the same degree distribution. Hence, degree distribution
is not suﬃcient to predict inequality of wealth, even in unique-exchange networks.
Deal Limit Distribution and Equality
A similar story holds for deal limit distribution. Even if the distribution of deal limits for
two networks are identical, the experimental results can diﬀer widely based on whether a
node bargains with nodes of similar deal limits or diﬀering deal limits.
In Torus-Uniform, all vertices have the same deal limit. In Torus-Rows, all vertices have
two neighbors with the same deal limit (1 or 3) and two neighbors with a diﬀerent deal limit
(3 or 1). In Torus-Checker, all nodes are bargaining with nodes of a diﬀerent deal limit.
The average inequality values are 0.086, 0.13, and 0.36 for Torus-Uniform, Torus-Rows
and Torus-Checker respectively. A means test shows these are all pairwise distinct with
p < .03. These networks all have identical topologies. Thus, when network topology is not
playing any distinguishing role, if vertices bargain with vertices of similar deal limits, the
deals are on more equal terms compared to when vertices with diﬀering deal limits bargain.
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High Degree Confers Power
Over all closed deals in the PL graphs, the fractional take per closed deal of each node has
a correlation of 0.47 with the degree of that node. If, to reduce the confound of diﬀering
deal limits, the study is confined to just the PL*uniq graphs, then the correlation coeﬃcient
is 0.59. Both these correlations are highly statistically significant. Thus, bargaining power
increases with the size of the local market , at least in the setting where deal limits constrain
behavior.
High Deal Limit Undermines Power
While higher degree confers bargaining power, higher deal limits had the opposite eﬀect.
The Torus-Rows graph was designed specifically for testing the eﬀect of deal limit on
a node’s bargaining power. In this graph, all nodes are identical up to relabeling, but
half of them have deal limit 1 and half have deal limit 3. So if there is any systematic
diﬀerence between two nodes’ bargaining power, the diﬀerence in their limits can be the
only explanation.
In the deals closed by limit-1 nodes, their mean fraction of the deal is 0.57. The limit-3
nodes obtained an average of 0.48. The diﬀerence was highly significant. (The two fractions
do not add to unity because not all deals were between the two groups.) If only those deals
between the two groups are considered, the fractions are 0.57 vs 0.43 and the diﬀerence
is even more significant. The summary is that a higher deal limit confers less bargaining
power.
Eﬀect of Global External Demand
The supply networks were designed to study the eﬀect of external demand. This property
is not apparent at the node, but becomes apparent when contrasting the deal limits of two
groups of nodes. In each supply network, the supply of deals from the left group (recall
Figure 2.3) was manipulated to starve or overfeed the right group. How does the split of a
deal depend on that relative supply?
In the Undersupplied case the right nodes must compete among themselves for the
attention of nodes in the left side, so we might expect their shares to be smaller than the
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left side’s. In the Equisupplied case, the external demands are equal, so we might expect
no diﬀerential in bargaining power. In the Oversupplied case, the left nodes must compete
for deals from the right side, so we might expect their share of the deals to be smaller than
the right.
external demand avg shares
left right left right
Undersupplied 30 39 0.57 0.43
Equisupplied 24 24 0.55 0.45
Oversupplied 20 14 0.52 0.48
Table 2.1: External demand imbalances shape bargaining results. The average splits shown
are for edges between left and right nodes. Edges between right nodes have an average
share of 0.5 by definition.
Table 2.1 shows the results. There is a correlation of -0.19 (p = 0.01) between the
external demand ratio and the deal share of the left nodes. The divisions favor the limit-2
nodes in all cases, consistent with the results of the previous section. However, that local
property of relative limits is modulated by the global supply and demand ratio.
First Neighborhood Eﬀects
We examined the three PL*uniq scenarios to find eﬀects attributable to the degrees of first
(one-hop) neighbors. For both nodes in all deals in the PL*uniq games, compute the
fraction of the node’s take and the average of the degrees of its neighbors. The correlation
between these quantities is -0.60 and is highly significant. Similar results occur when the
data are restricted to just those nodes with some fixed degree.
The clear and consistent story in unique-exchange games is that the share obtained
decreases as the average degree of the neighboring nodes increases.
The opposite story holds when the first neighbors have higher deal limits. We compared
the 4-regular networks torRows and torChkb. In torRows, a vertex of deal limit 1 has two
neighbors of deal limit 1 and two neighbors of deal limit 3, while in torChkb, a vertex of
deal limit 1 has all four neighbors with deal limit 3. The mean share of the former was 0.57
31
while the latter obtained 0.68. The diﬀerence is statistically significant with p = .0001. The
bargaining power of a vertex is enhanced when neighboring vertices have higher deal limits.
Second Neighborhood Eﬀects
How does the network eﬀect propagate beyond the immediate neighborhood? The 2ndHood
structure has two sets of 3 nodes, each of which have identical degree and first neighborhood
degrees. The results of the previous section will be mute about how these nodes fare.
However, the second (two-hop) neighborhood of these nodes are drastically diﬀerent:
the neighbors’ neighbors are leaves for 3 of them, and part of a clique for the other 3. The
mean share of the first group was 0.347, the mean share of the second was 0.571, and the
2-sided p value was 0.027. The bargaining power of a vertex is enhanced if its neighbors’
neighbors have higher degree.
2.5.3 Comparison with Theoretical Models
We shall now point out some structural diﬀerences in solutions given by theoretical models
and those found by human subjects. For our main session, where nodes have limits, we
narrow our attention to the PL*uniq networks, since the Cook-Yamagishi model [31] was
originally designed for unique exchange networks, and fails to make a stable prediction
on the 2ndHood network. The model predicts that maximum social welfare (maximum
matching) will be achieved on all the PL*uniq networks, which is rare in the experiments,
as reported in Section 2.5.1.
Further, the model predicts that a node with at least two leaves (nodes of degree 1)
as neighbors always ends up with 1 − ￿ fraction of a deal. This is due to myopic, rational
competition between the leaves, where ￿ is the smallest non-zero amount that can be received
by a node by signing a deal (this is the granularity of oﬀers available in the GUI, and we
let ￿ = 0.02). Accordingly, the model predicts that there should be at least 30 such skewed
deals in our experiments with the PL*uniq networks. In contrast, we find that there is 1
deal where one node gets 100%, 5 deals where one node gets 98%, and only 10 deals where
one node gets more than 90%. Further, all but one of these deals are between a leaf node
and a node of degree 5 or 6. This indicates that extremely skewed deals are much rarer than
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what game-theoretic rationale suggests, and is more likely when the degree diﬀerences are
larger.
In our preliminary session, where nodes have no limits, unequal splits are rare, as re-
ported in Figure 2.6. I, in conjunction with my advisors Michael Kearns and Sanjeev
Khanna, had designed a model for this setting – please see Chapter 3 for a detailed exposi-
tion. It predicts that all deals will be shared equally if the players at the nodes have linear
utility functions, and network eﬀects may arise only due to non-linearity of player’s utility.
So the results of the experiments can be explained in this model if we assume that in our
range of payoﬀs, the players have near-linear utility functions. This is not very surprising,
since a player can make only a few dollars in each experiment.
2.5.4 Human Subject Diﬀerences
Humans were randomly assigned to nodes in each experiment and randomly reassigned in
each replication of a scenario. Hence none of the results above could be ascribed to human
diﬀerences. However behavioral literature is replete with examples of how human subjects
leave their stamp, and some traits emerge in our data too.
Patience
The correlation between the average time for each human to close a deal and the average
gain from closed deals, aggregated over all deals in all games, is 0.6664 (p = 0.00). See data
in Figure 2.8. Apparently, patience pays oﬀ.
Proposer vs. Acceptor
The user interface mechanism involved the following protocol for completing a deal: one
player (proposer) makes an oﬀer, the other player (acceptor) accepts that oﬀer by matching
it, and then the proposer closes the deal. This was not designed to provoke any asymmetry,
but was intended to avoid unintended closed deals due to accidental mouse-clicks. Never-
theless, by looking only at what the shares of the two parties were, can we say which party
is more likely to have been the proposer? We find that indeed we can, and the party which
gets the higher share is more likely to be the proposer. The mean proposer share across all
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Figure 2.8: People with patience win bigger splits. There are 36 dots here, corresponding
to the 36 human players.
experiments was 53.6%, and the acceptor share was 46.4%. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
rejects the hypothesis that these shares come from identical distributions with p < 10−14.
Some psychological eﬀect is clearly being expressed by this subtle asymmetry in protocol.
All possible split ratios in closed deals were at least once proposed by someone (and
accepted by someone), with the sole exception of 0:100%. The six cases where all the
money went to one player were all proposed by the high-share side. It may be “irrational”
for someone to agree to get 0, but it would have been even odder to see someone propose
that he get 0.
The Eﬀect of Uncertainty in Costs
This last section is strictly about our preliminary experimental session, in which there were
no deal limits imposed–so the limit on each node was eﬀectively its degree. Here we found
that social eﬃciency was higher when the players were simply uncertain about a particular
detail regarding their neighbors.
In the latter half of the preliminary session, we imposed varying transaction costs on
nodes, which a node must pay for every deal it closes. The first half of the experiments had
no costs. Occasionally during the latter half, we quietly imposed zero cost on every vertex.
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This allows us to compare those games to the setting without costs.
This cost was specific to each vertex. Only the player at that vertex, but not its
bargaining partners, knew how much this cost was. We varied the costs significantly, from
0 up to 40% of the value of the deal. This generated enough uncertainty that in the few
instances where every vertex had zero cost, no one could infer the costs of his partner. This
0-cost setting can be directly compared to the basic non-costed setting where every player
knows that there are no costs involved. Hence the two situations were distinguished only
by a lack of certainty.
Players closed more deals in the (uncertain) 0-cost case than in the (known) no-cost
case. The eﬃciency columns of table 2.5.4 show the fraction of possible deals that were
closed in the two cases. The fraction went up in all 5 networks; the diﬀerence is significant
with p = .004. Evidently, the level of obstinacy rises when people know for certain that
their partner has no costs.
eﬃciency average
inequality
std. dev. of
inequality
non zero non zero non zero
PLP 0.85 0.96 0.012 0.01 0.033 0.037
PL0 0.84 0.93 0.009 0.009 0.025 0.029
PLN 0.72 0.93 0.027 0.012 0.057 0.051
cwc 0.84 0.95 0.015 0.023 0.035 0.076
2ndHood 0.84 0.97 0.014 0.009 0.040 0.044
Table 2.2: Social Eﬃciency and Inequality Values compared between no-cost case and zero-
cost experiments. The cwc graph was a cycle with chords, shown in Appendix Figure 2.2.
The others were as described for our main session.
Average inequality values of the deals and the standard deviations are also shown in the
table. We expected the splits to be more uneven in the zero-cost case, but no consistent
story was found.
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2.6 Conclusion
The background theory is not yet prepared to describe all the phenomena we have observed
here. Some bargaining theory suggests one party to a deal might get an infinitesimally
small share, but our mechanism does not allow this. Hence our results cannot be exactly
matched, but the scarcity of splits that are 98% or above seems to hint that the notion
of “rationality” used by these theories needs to be adjusted. Other aspects of our results
support theoretical models, notably the finding that phenomena at odd and even-length
distances from a node alternately enhance and detract from the node’s earnings. The
findings peculiar to people –namely the prevalence of obstinacy, the value of patience, the
eﬀect of protocol in the closing of a deal, and the state of knowledge about the partners–
are all in need of theoretical development.
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Chapter 3
Networked Bargaining with
Non-Linear Utilities
In this chapter, we study a networked bargaining game through theoretical modeling of
rational agents, which leads us to an equilibrium concept. Results in this chapter were
published in collaboration with Michael Kearns and Sanjeev Khanna [26].
We shall refer to the network as a bargaining network, each edge or transaction as a
deal, the participants in the transaction as endpoints of the deal, and an agreement between
its endpoint nodes to share the surplus as signing of the deal. We shall also say that a
deal is incident on its two endpoints. An outcome or state in a bargaining network is a
specification of how each deal gets shared, i.e. the amount received from a deal by each of
its two endpoints.
Networked bargaining game has been studied heavily in network economic theory and
networked social exchange theory. Most of these models place explicit constraints, such as
a limit on the number of deals that a player can sign, to induce competition among players.
In the absence of such constraints, virtually all of these solution concepts show zero eﬀect of
network structure – each edge is shared independently. At the same time, all these models
in the literature, that have a game-theoretic formulation, either implicitly or explicitly
assume that players have linear and often identical utility functions. Our primary goal in
this chapter is to understand whether and how non-linear utility among players may aﬀect
the outcome, and in particular, whether it can introduce network eﬀect. So to isolate the
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network eﬀect caused by non-linear utility, we choose not to place any additional constraint
that will have their own network eﬀect. Further, we shall place identical utility functions
on all the players. In the presence of other constraints, network eﬀects due to diminishing
marginal utility will get superimposed with network eﬀects due to the constraints.
As we shall see, non-linear utility among players can introduce its own network eﬀects.
Throughout this chapter, we shall focus on the situation where players have diminishing
marginal utility, that is, the utility function is concave. The nature of this eﬀect can best
be summarized as ”rich-get-richer”, that is, it enhances inequality of wealth. If bargaining
power of a node is measured as the average share it receives from the deals incident on
itself, then we find that the node’s bargaining power is usual enhanced if it has high degree
and its neighbors have low degree. The precise eﬀects are, of course, much more complex.
In the context of networked social exchange, a network where players have concave utility
may be viewed as a negatively connected network. Before describing our results in detail,
it is necessary to discuss the solution concept we use in this chapter.
3.1 Overview of the Model
In our model, we assume that the amount of the surplus of an edge is known to both its
endpoints. We consider a theoretical solution concept that proposes an outcome given a
bargaining network. Naively speaking, the outcome can be viewed as a prediction of what
might happen if human players played the game. Since it is unrealistic to expect actual
human players to follow a precise theoretical model of rationality, it should instead be
viewed as a fair outcome.
Our theoretical solution concept naturally extends any two-player bargaining solution
concept to a corresponding equilibrium concept over the networked game. Before proceeding
to describe our model in detail, let us review the two-player concepts that will be necessary
to understand our model.
Two-Player Bargaining Solution Concepts Bargaining has been studied extensively
in economics and sociology, both theoretically and experimentally. A simple setting that
appears frequently in the literature is when there are only two parties negotiating a single
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deal. The deal yields a fixed total wealth if the two parties can agree on how to share or
divide it; otherwise both parties receive nothing. There may or may not be external pay-
ments (outside options or alternatives) that parties receive, possibly depending on whether
the deal gets signed. Bargaining solution concepts provide predictions about how the wealth
will be shared, or what division is “fair”, which may depend on the player utility functions.
There are several bargaining solution concepts for this two-player setting in economic
theory, and here we shall focus on two of them: Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) and
Proportional Bargaining Solution (PBS). Both these solution concepts (and most others)
predict that the division of wealth is a function of the additional utility (compared to some
outside option or alternative) each player receives by accepting the deal, which we shall
refer to as diﬀerence utility. NBS states that the division of wealth should maximize the
product of the diﬀerence utilities of the two players, while PBS states that the division
should maximize their minimum. When the players have increasing and continuous (in
accrued wealth) utility functions, PBS simply states that the two players should have equal
diﬀerence utility from the deal. We choose to focus on these two concepts because they are
representatives of two broad classes of these solution concepts: NBS represents those solu-
tions that do not allow direct comparison of utility across players, and are thus impervious
to scaling of utility functions; whereas PBS represents those that permit such comparisons.
For a comprehensive discussion of diﬀerent bargaining solution concepts, please see [15].
Network Equilibrium Models We study a natural generalization of these two-player
solution concepts to our multi-party, networked setting. We propose that an outcome of a
bargaining network is an equilibrium if every edge is locally stable. An edge is said to be
locally stable if it satisfies a chosen two-player bargaining solution concept. An outcome
that satisfies the NBS (respectively, PBS) local stability on every edge is called an NBS
equilibrium (respectively, PBS equilibrium). To completely specify our model, we need to
define the notion of local stability.
The key to defining local stability, as a parallel to two-player solutions, is to define the
diﬀerence utility that a player receives by signing a particular deal. When a player has
non-linear utility, diﬀerence utility from a deal in the network setting should depend not
only on the share received on that deal, but also on the amount that a player receives
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from other deals incident on it. Intuitively, if a player with diminishing marginal utility (in
other words, a concave utility function) has earned a lot of money from the other deal, the
additional utility he receives by signing this deal is going to be small. One way to view
diﬀerence utility from a deal is the immediate loss in utility if the player does not sign that
deal. Thus, if a player with utility function U earns a sum of w from all deals incident on it,
and earns x from a particular edge, then the diﬀerence utility that the player receives from
that edge is U(w)−U(w−x). Now, NBS proposes maximization of the product, while PBS
proposes maximization of the minimum, of diﬀerence utilities of the endpoints of a deal, as
local stability concepts.
Our equilibrium concept can be viewed as the fixed points of the following selfish and
myopic dynamics among the players: At each time-step, one (or more) player wakes up,
chooses an edge incident on itself, and evaluates whether it is being unfairly treated on that
deal, given the chosen two-player concept, the utility functions of the other endpoint and
itself, and the wealth that the other endpoint and itself are receiving from all other deals.
An unfair treatment corresponds to receiving a share that is smaller than what is stipulated
by the two-player concept. If the player is indeed being unfairly treated, it wakes up the
other endpoint, and renegotiates the deal to make it fair. This dynamics is also a generic
algorithm for computing an equilibrium on a network.
Our equilibrium concept is very similar to a model of balanced outcomes proposed by
Cook and Yamagishi [31] and later analyzed by Kleinberg and Tardos [68], with two diﬀer-
ences:
• Cook and Yamagishi [31] imposes a limit on the number of deals that a player can
sign, which is often less than its degree (i.e. number of deals incident on the node).
This limit introduced direct competition among nodes to catch the attention of their
neighbors. They specifically considered unit limit on each node, but the model gen-
eralizes to arbitrary limits. Our setting can be viewed as a special case of [31] where
limits are absent, or equivalently, the limit on each node equals or exceeds its degree.
• Cook and Yamagishi [31] implicitly assumed that players have linear and identical
utility functions only, and so their solution concept has zero network eﬀect in the
absence of limits. A consequence of identical linear utility function is that there is
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no diﬀerence between outcomes proposed by Nash and Proportional bargaining. We
consider non-linear utility, in particular concave utility, and show that network eﬀect
occurs even in the absence of limits. We elaborate on this point below in Section 3.1.1.
3.1.1 Overview of Results and Techniques
The first and easily observable point is that if players have linear utility functions, then
network structure has no eﬀect on the outcome – each deal is shared independently, possibly
depending only on the utility functions of the endpoints. This is simply because wealth
accrued from other edges have no eﬀect on diﬀerence utility. A formal characterization
of all PBS and NBS equilibria, when players have linear utility functions, is provided in
Section 3.3.
The main contribution of this chapter is the following observation: network structure
plays an eﬀect simply due to diminishing marginal utility of players. This is true for both
PBS and NBS equilibria. To begin, we establish existence of equilibrium using a fixed point
argument in Section 3.4. The structural observation for a two-player setting that forms the
core reason for the network eﬀects on equilibrium is the bargaining monotonicity condition,
described in Section 3.5. This condition states that on any edge (u, v), if the outside options
of u increases while that of v decreases, then u claims a higher share of wealth on this edge
when it is renegotiated. It is satisfied by all concave utilities when we consider a PBS
equilibrium, and it is also satisfied by natural smooth concave functions such as xp when
we consider a PBS equilibrium.
This monotonicity condition is the reason behind the “rich-get-richer” network eﬀects
that we observe in our model. Consider a star network, where multiple leaves attached
to a center of a star, the center can negotiate some share from all the leaves sequentially,
and then renegotiate all of them for larger shares. This is because a gain in renegotiating
one deal translates to a gain on all other deals when renegotiated, if strict monotonicity is
satisfied. So the center of the star gets the large share on all edges. Dynamics of this kind
is seen in larger networks as well.
We next present a fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) to compute
approximate network bargaining equilibria in bipartite networks when the utility functions
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and the solution concept satisfy the bargaining monotonicity condition. Bipartite networks
are natural in many settings in which there are two distinct“types” of players — for instance,
buyers and sellers of a good. The bargain monotonicity condition is satisfied by all concave
utility functions in the PBS concept, and by natural utility function classes such as xp, 0 <
p < 1 and log(a + bx), a > 0, b > 0 in the NBS concept. The algorithm can be viewed as
iterating best-response dynamics on each edge under a particular schedule of updates; we
show that for this schedule, the algorithm converges to (additive) ￿-approximate equilibrium
in time polynomial in ￿−1 and the size of the input, if the values of wealth on the edges
are polynomially bounded (for multiplicative approximation, we can handle arbitrary edge
values). Whether the particular schedule for which we can prove fast convergence can be
generalized is an interesting open problem.
We also show that NBS equilibrium has less unequal sharing than PBS equilibrium, on
an edge where both endpoints have high degree. This result is proved in Section 3.7.
We also perform simulation and statistical analyses of the eﬀects of network structure on
the wealth distribution at equilibrium for the two solution concepts, on networks randomly
chosen from well-studied formation models (such as preferential attachment and Erdos-
Renyi), and for a range of utility functions. Empirically we find that wealth of a vertex
is highly correlated with degree, but degree alone doesn’t determine wealth. We also find
that bargaining power of a vertex, measured as the average share received by the vertex
on all its edges, appears to increase with degree. Finally, we find stark diﬀerences between
wealth distribution in PBS and NBS equilibrium. We find that the network eﬀect is more
pronounced in PBS equilibrium than in NBS equilibrium, which is manifested in two ways:
first, the variation of bargaining power is larger in a PBS equilibrium than in an NBS
equilibrium; and second, a higher number of edges have a highly skewed split in PBS than
in NBS equilibrium. We also observe how network eﬀects decrease as the utility functions
approach linearity.
Finally, we show that neither PBS nor NBS equilibrium is unique on bargaining net-
works in general. Uniqueness is an important and preferred property, since it can serve as
a prediction of how the wealth will be divided, as well as a measure of fair division. Un-
fortunately, we find non-uniqueness for the class of regular graphs with unit wealth on all
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edges, and the same utility function for all vertices. This class is interesting because every
network in this class has one state which is both an NBS as well as a PBS equilibrium: the
state where every edge is divided fifty-fifty. This state is also superficially fair, given the
symmetry of the opportunities that the players have, as well as their behavior. Further, this
state is the unique equilibrium when utility is linear, so it is natural to ask if the network
has any “unfair” equilibrium for concave utility functions. On a positive note, we recognize
conditions on utility U that makes PBS and NBS equilibrium in this class unique, and
show that natural concave functions such as U(x) = xp for any 0 < p < 1 satisfies these
conditions. These results on uniqueness are presented in Section 3.9.
3.1.2 Related Work
The network setting that we consider falls under the heavily studied field of network ex-
change theory, which was pursued primarily by sociologists in the context of bilateral social
exchanges. Most models consider that every player has a limit on the number of deals it
can get into, which is less than or equal to its degree in the network – that is, there is
no imposed limit other than the degree itself. Note that our setting corresponds exactly
to this limited exchange setting when the limit for every player is equal to or exceeds her
degree. Several models have been proposed to predict what agreements the players will get
into, and how will the wealth on these deals get shared (eg. [31, 74, 51, 14, 17]). Skvoretz
and Willer [83] conducted human subject experiments to practically verify these theoretical
predictions. Most of the focus has, in fact, been on unique exchanges, where every player
can get into only one deal. Recently, Kleinberg and Tardos [68] analyzed the model given by
Cook and Yamagishi [31] in the unique exchange setting, and found an elegant theoretical
characterization, connecting the bargaining solutions to the theory of graph matchings.
All these models assume that all the players have the same behavior, and focus on the
diﬀerences in bargaining power caused by network structure only. They also agree that
these diﬀerences arise from the threat of exclusion, that is, a vertex can get into only a few
deals and so has to ignore the oﬀers of some of its neighbors; so it can ask for a better oﬀer
from its neighbor by threatening to get into a deal with some other neighbor instead. In
absence of limits, there is no threat of exclusion, and all the models predict that there will
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be no network eﬀect, and the wealth is divided into two equal shares on every edge.
However, it is important to note here that all these models implicitly or explicitly assume
linear utility functions. Our model takes into account that players may have non-linear
utility. In particular, we focus on increasing concave utility functions, that is, those with
diminishing marginal utility. Diminishing marginal utility is a well-known phenomenon, and
is also often used in financial theory to capture risk aversion. Our model agrees with these
previous models when the utility functions are linear. In fact, when the utility functions
are linear, the concept of PBS equilibrium is identical to the equi-dependence theory of
Cook and Yamagishi [31]. However, interesting network eﬀects appear when the players
have concave utility functions, even if all players have the same utility function.
As mentioned before, a closely related literature is the study of sequential oﬀer bar-
gaining in networked setting [34, 27, 73, 1, 2], where the surplus shrinks with the passage
of time, and the negotiation proceeds through controlled rounds of alternating oﬀers and
counter-oﬀers. This is in contrast to our experiments, where either player can make an oﬀer
at any time on a deal, and the surplus remains unchanged over time, though there is a
deadline at which the game ends. The equilibrium concept studied here is subgame perfect
equilibria in a game where players have complete information about the entire network.
This is the major distinction of this line of work from our local equilibrium model, in which
players take myopic decisions solely based on local dynamic information. This solution
concept also suﬀers from drawbacks as a predictive model similar to those outlined above,
such as multiplicity of equilibria.
Another group of concepts related to our setting arise in coalitional games, such as
Shapley value, core, kernel, nucleolus and bargaining sets. These concepts often involve
the ability of players to form arbitrary coalitions, which implicitly assumes that the players
have information about the entire network, and are not acting myopically based on local
information. Thus, these concepts assume that players can solve problems that are com-
putationally diﬃcult. In fact, Deng and Papadimitriou [41] showed that many of these
concepts are computationally hard, and suggested that a solution concept is appropriate
only if it is eﬃciently computable. In strong contrast, our model only expects simple selfish
behavior from the players. Perhaps not unrelated to this aspect of our model, we shall show
44
that equilibria in our concept is computable in polynomial time on bipartite graphs, and
natural heuristics perform well in our simulations on random graphs.
3.2 Preliminaries
A bargaining network is an undirected graph G(V,E) with a set V of n vertices and a set
E of m edges, where vertices represent player and edges represent possible bilateral deals.
There is a positive value c(e) associated with each edge e ∈ E, which is the wealth on that
edge. There is also a utility function Uv for each player v. The utility functions are all
represented succinctly and are computable in polynomial time.
Let e1, e2 . . . em be an arbitrary ordering of the edges in E, where ei has endpoints ui
and vi, ∀i = 1, 2 . . .m. A state of the bargaining network is described by the division of
wealth on each edge of the graph. Let x(ui, ei) and x(vi, ei) denote the wealth ui and
vi receive from the agreement on the edge ei, respectively. Since we are interested in
the structure of equilibrium, so without loss of generality, we shall always assume that
x(vi, ei) = c(ei) − x(ui, ei), that is the wealth on the deal has been realized. We shall
represent a state of the bargaining network as a vector s = (s1, s2 . . . sm) ∈ Rm such that
si = x(ui, ei). Note that s uniquely determines the division of wealth on all edges.
Let s ∈ Rm be a state of the bargaining network G. For any vertex u and any edge
e incident on u, let γs(u) denote the total wealth of a vertex u from all its deals with
its neighbors. Let xs(u, e) denote the wealth u gets from the agreement on edge e. Let
αs(u, e) = γs(u)− xs(u, e) be the wealth u receives from all its deals except that on e. We
say that αs(u, e) and αs(v, e) are the outside options with respect to the edge e for u and
v respectively, that is, the amount each of them receives if no agreement is reached on the
deal on e.
Definition 3.2.1 (Diﬀerential Utility). Let s be any state of the bargaining network. Let
x be the wealth of u from the deal on e = (u, v). Then, the diﬀerence utility of u from this
deal is ∆u(x) = Uu(αs(u, e)+x)−Uu(αs(u, e)), and the diﬀerence utility of v from this deal
is ∆v(c(e)− x) = Uv(αs(v, e) + c(e)− x)− Uv(αs(v, e)).
We shall drop the subscript s if the state is clear from the context.
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Definition 3.2.2. Let s be any state of the bargaining network. Define ys(u, e) to be the
wealth u would get on the edge e = (u, v) if it is renegotiated (according to some two-
party solution), the wealth divisions on all other edges remaining unchanged. Also define
change(s, e) = |xs(u, e)− ys(u, e)|.
3.2.1 Proportional Bargaining Solution (PBS)
We say that the allocation on an edge e = (u, v) with value c satisfies the Proportional Bar-
gaining Solution (PBS) condition if it maximizes the functionWP (x) = min{∆u(x),∆v(c(e)−
x)} where x denotes the allocation to u. Thus if an edge e is renegotiated according
to the Proportional Bargaining Solution (PBS), then ys(u, e) = argmax0≤x≤cWP (x) and
ys(v, e) = c(e) − ys(u, e). Note that ys(u, e) is simply a function of the two values αs(u, e)
and αs(v, e), along with the utility functions of u and v.
The following lemma gives a simpler equivalent condition for PBS when the utility
functions are increasing and continuous, and is applicable to the two-party setting as well.
Lemma 3.2.1. If the utility functions of all vertices are increasing and continuous, then
for any edge e = (u, v), the PBS condition reduces to the condition ∆u(x) = ∆v(c(e)− x),
that is, the condition of equal diﬀerence utility, and there is a unique solution x satisfying
this condition.
Proof. Since the utility functions are increasing, so ∆u(x) is an increasing function while
∆v(c(e) − x) is a decreasing function of x, and both are non-negative functions when x ∈
[0, c(e)]. Also, ∆u(0) = ∆v(0) = 0. Thus there is a unique value z such that ∆u(z) =
∆v(c − z). If x < z, then ∆u(x) < ∆v(c(e) − x), and so WP (x) = ∆u(x) < ∆u(z), and if
x > z, then ∆u(x) > ∆v(c(e)−x), and so WP (x) = ∆v(c(e)−x) < ∆v(c(e)− z). So WP (x)
takes its maximum value only at x = z.
3.2.2 Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS)
We say that the allocation on an edge e = (u, v) satisfies the Nash Bargaining Solution
(PBS) condition if it maximizes the function WN (x) = ∆u(x)∆v(c(e)− x) where x denotes
the allocation to u. Thus if an edge e is renegotiated according to PBS, then ys(u, e) =
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argmax0≤x≤cWN (x) and ys(v, e) = c(e) − ys(u, e). Note that ys(u, e) is simply a function
of the two values αs(u, e) and αs(v, e), along with the utility functions of u and v.
If e is renegotiated according to the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), then ys(u, e) is
a value 0 ≤ x ≤ c such that the NBS condition is satisfied, that is, the function WN (x) =
∆u(x)∆v(c(e)− x) is maximized.
The following lemma gives a simpler equivalent condition for NBS when the utility
functions are increasing, concave and twice diﬀerentiable, and is applicable to the two-party
setting as well.
Lemma 3.2.2. If the utility functions of all vertices are increasing, concave and twice dif-
ferentiable, then for any edge e = (u, v), the NBS condition reduces to the condition ∆u(x)∆￿u(x)
=
−∆v(c(e)−x)∆￿v(c(e)−x) , that is, the condition of equal diﬀerence utility, and there is a unique solution x
satisfying this condition. Moreover, let Qu(x) =
∆u(x)
∆￿u(x)
, and let Rv(x) = −∆v(c(e)−x)∆￿v(c(e)−x) . Then
Qu(x) is increasing, Rv(x) is decreasing, and Qu(x)−Rv(x) has a unique zero in [0, c(e)].
Proof. Diﬀerentiating ∆u(x)∆v(c(e) − x) with respect to x and equating the derivative to
zero, we get the equation
∆u(x)∆
￿
v(c(e)− x) +∆￿u(x)∆v(c(e)− x) = 0
⇒ ∆
￿
u(x)
∆u(x)
= −∆
￿
v(c(e)− x)
∆v(c(e)− x)
Since the utility functions are concave and increasing, so is ∆u(x), while ∆v(c(e) − x)
is concave and decreasing in x, and both functions are positive. Thus we have ∆u(x) ≥
0, ∆v(c(e) − x) ≥ 0, ∆￿u(x) > 0, ∆￿v(c(e) − x) < 0,∆￿￿u(x) < 0, and ∆￿￿v(c − x) < 0.
Diﬀerentiating ∆u(x)∆v(c(e)− x) twice and using this information, we can easily see that
this second derivative is always negative. Thus a zero of the first derivative is a maxima.
Thus we have proved the equivalence of the two conditions.
To show uniqueness, let Qu(x) =
∆￿u(x)
∆u(x)
, and let Rv(x) = −∆
￿
v(c(e)−x)
∆v(c(e)−x) . Again, we can
verify that Q￿u(x) > 0 and R￿v(x) < 0 since ∆￿￿u(x) < 0 and ∆￿￿v(c − x) < 0. Moreover,
Qu(0) = 0 and Rv(c) = 0, since ∆u(0) = ∆v(0) = 0. Thus, by an argument similar to
the proof of Lemma 3.2.1, we know that the increasing function Qu(x) and the decreasing
function Rv(x) become equal at a unique value of x.
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3.2.3 Stability and Equilibrium
Definition 3.2.3 (Exact Stability and Equilibirum). We say that an edge e is stable in a
state s if renegotiating e does not change the division of wealth on e, that is, change(s, e) =
0. We say that a state s is an equilibrium if all edges are stable.
We also study two notions of approximation, namely, additive and multiplicative ap-
proximations, as defined below.
Definition 3.2.4 (Additive ￿-Stability and Equilibrium). We say that an edge e is ￿-stable
in the additive sense in a state s if change(s, e) < ￿. We say that s is an additive ￿-
approximate equilibrium if all edges are additive ￿-stable.
Definition 3.2.5. (Multiplicative ￿-Stability and Equilibrium) We say that an edge
e is ￿-stable in the multiplicative sense in a state s if |ys(u, e) − xs(u, e)| < ￿xs(u, e) and
|ys(v, e)−xs(v, e)| < ￿xs(v, e). We say that s is a multiplicative ￿-approximate equilibrium
if all edges are multiplicative ￿-stable.
In this chapter , an approximate equilibrium will refer to additive approximation, unless
specified otherwise.
We refer to an equilibrium as an NBS equilibrium if the renegotiations satisfy the NBS
condition. We refer to the equilibrium as a PBS equilibrium if the renegotiations satisfy the
PBS condition.
3.2.4 Bargaining Concepts as Nash Equilibria
The bargaining solutions may also be viewed as pure Nash equilibria of certain games. Each
edge is a player, and an edge e has a strategy space [0, c(e)]. Strategy of an edge corresponds
to the division of wealth on it. Let e = (u, v) be an edge playing strategy x. If the payoﬀ
of e is ∆u(x)∆v(c(e)− x), and each edge wishes to maximize its own payoﬀ, then the pure
Nash equilibria of this game are exactly the NBS equilibria of the network. Similarly, if the
payoﬀ is instead defined to be min{∆u(x),∆v(c(e)− x)}, then the pure Nash equilibria of
the game coincides with PBS equilibria.
Thus, updating an edge corresponds to an edge playing a best response move in the
corresponding game. As with all pure Nash equilibria concepts, we thus have a natural
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heuristic that gives an equilibrium if it terminates: start from an arbitrary state, and then
update unstable edges repeatedly till all edges are stable. This heuristic is called best
response dynamics. It is worth noting that approximate equilibria of this game does not
necessarily coincide with approximate equilibria of the bargaining network with the same
approximation factor.
3.3 Linear Utility Functions: Characterizing All Equilibria
In this section, we characterize all possible NBS and PBS equilibria when all vertices have
linear increasing utility functions, for every vertex v.
We show that in our model, if we make this assumption, there is a unique NBS equilib-
rium and a unique PBS equilibrium, and network topology has no influence on the division
of profits on the deals at equilibrium. The following two theorems formalise these observa-
tions.
Theorem 1. Suppose all vertices have linear increasing utility functions. Then there is a
unique NBS equilibrium, in which the profit on every edge is divided equally between its two
end-points.
Proof. Let Ui(x) = kix + li ∀i ∈ V (G). Let s be an NBS equilibrium. Then, on any edge
e = (u, v), as(x) = kux and bs(x) = kv(c(e) − x). In particular, they are independent of
αs(u, e) and αs(v, e). Since ku and kv are constants, the product as(x)bs(x) is maximized
when x = c(e)/2.
Theorem 2. Suppose all vertices have linear increasing utility functions. Let Ui(x) =
kix + li ∀i ∈ V (G). Then there is a unique PBS equilibrium, such that for any edge
e = (u, v), xs(u, e) = c(e)
kv
ku+kv
.
Proof. Since the utility functions are increasing and continuous, we can apply Lemma 3.2.1
and for any edge e = (u, v), solve the equation as(x) = bs(x). Substituting the values, we
get the equation kux = kv(c(e) − x), which has the unique solution x = c(e) kvku+kv . Again,
the solution is independent of αs(u, e) and αs(v, e). Further, if ku = kv, then the solution
becomes x = c(e)/2, which is the same as the solution for NBS.
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3.4 Existence of Equilibrium for Non-Linear Utility Func-
tions
We now turn our focus towards non-linear utility functions. In this section, we prove that
PBS and NBS equilibria exist on all graphs, when the utility functions satisfy some natural
conditions. The proofs use the Brouwer fixed point theorem, and is similar to the proof of
existence of mixed Nash equilibrium in normal form games.
Theorem 3. PBS equilibrium exists on any social network when all utility functions are
increasing and continuous. NBS equilibrium exists on any social network when all utility
functions are increasing, concave and twice diﬀerentiable.
Essentially, it is suﬃcient for the utility functions to satisfy the following general condi-
tion of continuity:
Condition 1. Let s be any state of the bargaining model, and e = (u, v) be an edge. For
every ￿ > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that for any state t such that |αt(u, e) − αs(u, e)| < δ
and |αt(v, e)− αs(v, e)| < δ, we have |yt(u, e)− ys(u, e)| < ￿.
Note that ys(u, e) and yt(u, e) are influenced both by the utility functions as well as the
two-party solution concept that is used (NBS or PBS). Thus whether Condition 1 holds
will depend on whether the renegotiations follow the NBS or the PBS condition, and also
on the utility functions.
Lemma 3.4.1. If Condition 1 holds for the NBS solution concept or the PBS solution
concept, then NBS or PBS equilibrium exists, respectively.
Proof. We define a function f : [0, 1]m → [0, 1]m that maps every state s to another state
f(s). Given s, we can construct the unique solution t such that the deal on an edge e = (u, v)
in t is the renegotiated deal of e in s, that is, xt(u, e) = ys(u, e). We define f(s) to be t.
Thus, f(s) is the “best-response” vector for s.
Clearly, s is an ￿-approximate equilibrium if and only if ||s− f(s)||∞ < ￿. In particular,
s is an equilibrium if and only if f(s) = s, that is, s is a fixed point of f . Also, [0, 1]m
is a closed, bounded and convex set. So if f were continuous, then we can immediately
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use Brouwer fixed point theorem to deduce that the equilibrium exists. Thus the following
claim completes the proof.
Claim 1. f is continuous if and only if Condition 1 holds.
Proof. Suppose Condition 1 holds for some ￿ and δ. Thus, if ||s−t||∞ < δ/n, then |αt(u, e)−
αs(u, e)| < δ and |αt(v, e) − αs(v, e)| < δ, so, by Condition 1, |yt(u, e) − ys(u, e)| < ￿, and
thus ||f(s)− f(t)||∞ < ￿. Since there exists a δ for every ￿ > 0, so f is continuous.
Now suppose f is continuous. Let ￿ > 0. Then there exists δ > 0 such that for any
solution t, if ||s− t||∞ < δ, then ||f(s)− f(t)||∞ < ￿, which implies that coordinatewise for
every edge e, we have |yt(u, e) − ys(u, e)| < ￿. Since this is true for all ￿ > 0, Condition 1
holds.
Lemma 3.4.2. Condition 1 holds for all increasing, continuous utility functions when rene-
gotiations follow the PBS condition.
Proof. Let s be any state of the bargaining model and let e = (u, v) be any edge. Here,
Lemma 3.2.1 is applicable. Let h(s, x) = as(x) − bs(x). Also, let gs(x) = h(s, x) be a
function defined on a particular state s. Note that gs is an increasing, continuous function
on the domain [0, c(e)], gs(0) < 0 and gs(c(e)) > 0. The renegotiated value ys(u, e) is the
unique zero of gs(x) between 0 and c(e).
Let y = ys(u, e) be the zero of gs. Let η = max{|gs(y − ￿)|, |gs(y + ￿)|}. Then, since gs
is increasing, η > 0, and for all x ∈ [0, c(e)] \ (y − ￿, y + ￿), |gs(x)| ≥ η.
Now, observe that h(s, x) is dependent on αs(u, e), αs(v, e) and x only, and is continuous
in all three of them when the utility functions are continuous. Thus, there exists δ > 0 such
that for any state t where |αs(u, e) − αt(u, e)| < δ and |αs(v, e) − αt(v, e)| < δ, we have
|h(s, x)− h(t, x)| < η ∀x ∈ [0, c(e)], that is |gt(x)− gs(x)| < η. This implies that gt(x) ￿= 0
for all x ∈ [0, c(e)] \ (y − ￿, y + ￿), and so the zero of gt, which is yt(u, e), lies in the range
(y − ￿, y + ￿).
Lemma 3.4.3. Condition 1 holds for all increasing, concave and twice diﬀerentiable utility
functions when renegotiations follow the NBS condition.
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Proof. Let s be any state of the bargaining model and let e = (u, v) be any edge. Here,
Lemma 3.2.2 is applicable. Let h(s, x) = qs(x) − rs(x). Also, let gs(x) = h(s, x). The rest
of the proof identically follows that of Lemma 3.4.2.
Combining Lemmas 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, we get Theorem 3.
3.5 The Bargain Monotonicity Condition
The bargain monotonicity condition seems like a natural condition that a negotiation be-
tween two selfish players can be expected to satisfy. This condition is indeed satisfied by the
PBS solution concept whenever the utility functions are concave and increasing. For NBS,
however, concavity and monotonicity of utility functions is not suﬃcient for satisfying this
condition. We will instead identify a stronger property of utility functions that is necessary
and suﬃcient for satisfying the bargain monotonicity. This stronger property is satisfied by
several natural classes of utility functions including xp, 0 < p < 1 and log(a + bx) where
a, b > 0.
Condition 2 (Bargain Monotonicity Condition). An instance of the bargaining problem
satisfies the bargain monotonicity condition with respect to a solution concept (PBS, NBS)
if for any edge e = (u, v) and a pair of states s and s￿ of the bargaining network such that e
is stable in both s and s￿ with respect to the solution concept, whenever αs￿(u, e) ≥ αs(u, e)
and αs￿(v, e) ≤ αs(v, e), then xs￿(u, e) ≥ xs(u, e).
The above condition states that on any edge (u, v), if the outside options of u increases
while that of v decreases, then u claims a higher share of wealth on this edge when it
is renegotiated. Note that Condition 2 is essentially a two-player condition that has no
dependence on the network itself and merely depends on the outside options of the players.
The bargain monotonicity condition seems like a natural condition that a negotiation
between two selfish players can be expected to satisfy. It is a condition that depends on the
bargaining network as well as the solution concept.
Lemma 3.5.1. PBS solutions satisfy the bargaining monotonicity condition on all networks
where the utility functions of all the players are concave and increasing.
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Proof. Let p = xs(u, e) and q = xs(v, e). Consider the state s￿￿ derived from s with the sole
modification that u gets p and v gets q on e. Then, the diﬀerence utility of u from e in s is
at most that in s￿￿, since the function U(z + p)− U(z) is decreasing in z when U is concave
(this is precisely equivalent to diminishing marginal utility). By a symmetric argument, the
diﬀerence utility of v from e in s is at least that in s￿. Thus, the diﬀerence utility of e to u
is at most that of e to v in s￿￿. So by Lemma 3.2.1, u must get at least p on the edge e in
s￿ to ensure that e is stable.
We now focus on identifying utility functions where the NBS concept will satisfy Con-
dition 2 on all networks. Let U be the utility function of any vertex u. In light of Lemma
3.2.2, it is clear that R(α, x) = U(α+x)−U(α)U ￿(α+x) must be a non-increasing function of α. If
not, then there exists some positive α1 and α2 > α1, such that R(α1, x) < R(α2, x). It is
easy to create a network with two states s and s￿ where u have outside options α1 and α2
respectively, while one of its neighbor v have the same outside option in both states. Then,
the balanced outcome on the edge (u, v) gives a greater share to u in s than in s￿, thus
contradicting Condition 2. The utility functions of all players must satisfy this property,
and it is suﬃcient as well. The above discussion is captured in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5.2. Let χ be the family of all concave, increasing, and twice diﬀerentiable utility
functions U ∈ χ, such that R(α, x) = U(α+x)−U(α)U ￿(α+x) is a non-increasing function of α for all
α > 0 and x > 0. Then every network, where all players have utility functions from χ,
satisfies the bargain monotonicity condition for the NBS concept.
Now, suppose that U is concave, increasing and twice diﬀerentiable at all positive values.
Simplifying the equation, we have
d
dα
U(α+ x)− U(α)
U ￿(α+ x) ≤ 0
⇔U(α+ x)− U(α)U ￿(α+ x) ≤
U ￿(α+ x)− U ￿(α)
U ￿￿(α+ x)
(since U ￿(α+ x) > 0, and U ￿￿(α+ x) ≤ 0)
It can be easily verified that natural utility functions such as xp, 0 < p < 1 and
f + log(a+ bx), a > 0, b > 0, f ≥ 0 belong to χ, and so Lemma 3.5.2 applies.
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Not all concave utility functions satisfy the equation above. In particular, we construct a
concave, increasing and twice diﬀerentiable function U that violates the equation. The key is
to construct a sharp change in marginal utility. We achieve this by making |U ￿￿(α+x)| very
large compared to the other expressions in the equation. We describe the utility function by
defining U ￿. Let U ￿(x) = 1 for 0 < x < 1, and U ￿(x) = 1/2 for x > 1.01. For 1 ≤ x ≤ 1.01,
U ￿(x) decreases from 1 to 1/2 smoothly, so that U ￿ is diﬀerentiable everywhere, and we can
also ensure that U ￿￿(1.005) < −50, which is the average slope of U ￿ in the range [1, 1.01].
Now, in the above equation, let α = 0.5 and x = 0.505. Note that the left-hand-side
of the equation is more than xU
￿(α+x)
U ￿(α+x) = x > 0.5, while the right hand side is less than
1/|U ￿￿(α + x)| < 1/50, thus violating the equation. So we conclude that if the marginal
utility of a player changes abruptly, Condition 2 may be violated. The above discussion is
summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5.3. There exists a bargaining network where all the players have concave utility
functions, such that Condition 2 is not satisfied in the NBS concept.
In contrast, however, natural utility functions such as xp, 0 < p < 1 and f + log(a +
bx), a > 0, b > 0, f ≥ 0 satisfy the condition that R(α, x) is a non-increasing function of
α, and so Lemma 3.5.2 applies. Thus Condition 2 is satisfied when all players have utility
functions of these forms. The key reason is that there is no sharp change in marginal utility
in these functions. To illustrate, we show our computation for U(x) = xp, 0 ≤ p < 1, below.
Let U(x) = xp for any p between 0 and 1. We show that R(α, x) is a non-increasing
function of α.
d
dα
U(α+ x)− U(α)
U ￿(α+ x) =
d
dα
(α+ x)p − αp
p(α+ x)p−1
=
d
dα
￿
α+ x
p
− α
p(α+ x)1−p
p
￿
=
1
p
￿
1− p
￿
α+ x
α
￿1−p
− (1− p)
￿
α
α+ x
￿p￿
=
1
p
(1− pz1−p − (1− p)z−p) where z = α+ x
α
To prove that the above derivative is non-positive, it is suﬃcient to show that g(z) =
pz1−p + (1− p)z−p ≥ 1 ∀z ≥ 1. This follows from observing that g(1) = 1, and that
g￿(z) = p(1− p)z−p − p(1− p)z−(1+p) = p(1− p)z−p(1− 1
z
) ≥ 0 when z ≥ 1
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3.6 Computing Equilibria
We will now design a fully-polynomial time approximate scheme for computing approx-
imate additive and multiplicative equilibria in bipartite networks, provided the bargain
monotonicity condition below is satisfied.
3.6.1 Algorithmic Results
To be used as a subroutine in our algorithm, we define an Update oracle, that takes an
edge e = (u, v) of the network as input. The oracle is called when our algorithm shall have
a current state s of the bargaining network, and the oracle shall renegotiate the edge e
according to the 2-player bargaining solution we use, and modify the division of wealth on
e only, to change the state to s￿, so that e becomes stable. The computation of the Update
oracle depends solely on the outside options of u and v with respect to e, that is, αs(u, e)
and αs(v, e), and the utility functions of the u and v. We assume that the oracle also knows
the input to the problem, that is, the social network and the utility functions of the players,
as well as whether the goal is to compute an NBS or a PBS equilibrium.
The Update oracle essentially performs an improvement step of the best response dy-
namics in the game played by edges that was described in Section 3.2.4. Since the bargaining
equilibrium concepts are pure Nash equilibria of this game, it is natural to wonder if a se-
quence of updates starting from a random state of the bargaining network converges to
equilibrium. We do not know if all sequences converge, though our simulations suggest
that random sequences converge to approximate equilibrium on random networks. As we
shall show, there exists a sequence that converges to additive ￿-approximate equilibrium in
number of steps that is polynomial in ￿−1 and the number of edges, in bipartite graphs. The
property of graphs that is critically used is that it has no odd cycles, which is an equivalent
characterization of bipartite graphs.
Input: Edge e
Modify current state s to a new state s￿ such that xs￿(u, e) = ys(u, e) and
xs￿(v, e) = ys(v, e), and s￿ matches s on all edges except e;
Function Oracle Update(e)
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Theorem 4. If the bargaining network and the solution concept satisfies the bargain mono-
tonicity condition, then from any start state s, there is a polynomial-time computable se-
quence of at most O(m2cmax/￿) edge updates that converge to an additive ￿-approximate
bargaining equilibrium, where m is the number of edges. Thus we have an FPTAS if the
Update oracle runs in polynomial time.
To get an FPTAS for computing a multiplicative approximate equilibrium (which is
an algorithm almost identical to that for the additive approximation), we shall need the
Update oracle to further satisfy a basic condition, which is essentially that whenever an
edge is updated, none of its endpoints get too small a share.
Condition 3. (Polynomially Bounded Updates Condition) There exists a constant
r > 0 such that if the outside options of the endpoints of an edge e = (u, v) are at most α,
then ys(u, e) ≥ 1αr and ys(v, e) ≥ 1αr for all α ≥ 0.
Theorem 5. If the bargaining network (and the solution concept) satisfies the bargain
monotonicity condition and the polynomially bounded updates condition, then from any
start state s, there is a polynomial-time computable sequence of at most O(m2 log ncmax/￿)
edge updates that converge to a multiplicative (1 + ￿)-approximate equilibrium, where cmax
is the maximum value of any edge in the network, n is the number of vertices and m is the
number of edges. Thus we have an FPTAS if the Update oracle runs in polynomial time.
Before describing the algorithm, we shortly dwell on when and how is the response of the
Update oracle computable in polynomial time. It is true for all increasing and continuous
utility function in the PBS concept, and also true for all increasing concave functions in
the NBS setting. This is because by an application of Lemma 3.2.1 and Lemma 3.2.2
respectively, the problem reduces to being given two functions of the same variable, one
increasing and the other decreasing, and being asked to find a value of the variable where
the two functions are equal. This can be done with exponential accuracy in polynomial
time using a binary search process. It is easy to absorb this exponentially small error in
the update oracle into the approximation factor of the equilibrium, so we will neglect it.
We now proceed to describe our algorithm.
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3.6.2 The Algorithm
Let s be the current bargaining state, describing division of wealth on each edge. Algorithm
2 describes our algorithm to compute an ￿-approximate equilibrium. For either additive
or multiplicative approximation, note that the corresponding definition for approximate
stability of an edge should be used in the algorithm to decide if an edge is ￿-stable.
Input: Bargaining network G and an oracle access to the Update function
Output: An ￿-approximate equilibrium
Initialize to an arbitrary state s;
Color all edges WHITE;
while there exists a WHITE edge e do
Color e BLACK;
while there exists a BLACK edge e￿ that is not ￿-stable in the current state do
Update (e￿);
Output current state;
Algorithm 2: An FPTAS for computing an ￿-approximate equilibrium
It is fairly easy to see that when Algorithm 2 terminates, the final state of the bargaining
network is an ￿-approximate equilibrium. The outer while loop implies that algorithm can
terminate only when all edges are colored black. Moreover, the inner while loop can
terminate only when all black edges become ￿-stable. Thus in the last repetition of the
outer loop, the last white edge gets colored black, and then the inner while loop ensures
that the algorithm terminates only when all the black edges (which is the entire network
now) are ￿-stable, and thus the current state is an ￿-equilibrium. So we only need to argue
the termination and running time of the algorithm.
Since the inner loop of the algorithm terminates only when all the black edges are ￿-
stable, so at the beginning of the next inner loop, only the new black edge e may not be
￿-stable. If it is not, the loop terminates without a single call to the oracle. However, if
e is unstable, then it is the first edge to be relaxed in this execution of the loop, and the
influence of this update now travels along the black edges.
Let e = (u, v), and suppose updating e caused u to receive more wealth from the deal
on e, than it was receiving just before the update. In such a case, we say that the update
favors u. Noting that G is a bipartite graph, we label every vertex in the same partition
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as u as +, and the vertices in the other partition as −. This labeling is only for the sake
of analysis, and may be diﬀerent for distinct executions of the inner loop. Note that every
edge is between a vertex labeled + and a vertex labeled −. Lemma 3.6.1 is crucial, and
Theorem 4 follows from it. The proof of 3.6.1 depends on Condition 2 being satisfied.
Lemma 3.6.1. If Bargaining Monotonicity Condition holds, then during the execution of
the inner loop, whenever an edge e￿ = (u￿, v￿) is updated, such that u￿ is labeled +, the update
favors u￿.
Proof. We shall prove this statement by induction. By definition, the statement holds for
the first step, that of updating e. For the inductive step, suppose that the statement has
been true for the first i − 1 update steps, i ≥ 2. Consider the ith update step, where the
edge updated is e￿ = (u￿, v￿). Since the beginning of the loop, whenever an edge incident on
u￿ has been updated, by the induction hypothesis, u￿ was favored as it is labeled +. Note
that since e￿ is a black edge, it was ￿-stable at the beginning of this loop. So, since the last
time that e￿ was ￿-stable, all the updates have only increased the outside option of u￿ with
respect to e￿. By a similar argument, the outside option has gone down or stayed the same
for v￿. Thus Condition 2 implies that u￿ is favored in this update step, and the inductive
proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 4. If we only update edges that are not ￿-stable in the additive sense,
then since every update increases the wealth of the favored vertex by at least ￿, and since
the wealth from an edge e￿ to any of its endpoint cannot exceed cmax, the edge shall not
be updated more than cmax/￿ times in one iteration of the inner loop. Finally, in each
repetition of the inner while loop, at most m distinct edges are updated, and the loop itself
is repeated m times. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 5. Now, suppose we only update edges that are not ￿-stable in the
multiplicative sense. Assume that the Polynomially Bounded Updates Condition is true.
Then, whenever an edge has been updated at least once before, both of its endpoints receive
a share whose inverse is polynomially bounded in ncmax, which is an upper bound on all
outside options. Either of these shares can at most go up to cmax within a single iteration
of the outer loop, and on every update it goes up (or down) by a factor of at least (1 + ￿)
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(or (1 − ￿)) so the edge cannot be updated more than O(￿−1 log(ncmax)) times. Again, in
each repetition of the inner while loop, at most m distinct edges are updated, and the loop
itself is repeated m times. This completes the proof of Theorem 5.
3.7 Inequality of Sharing in PBS vs NBS equilibria
In this section, we shall study the eﬀect of network topology on PBS and NBS equilibria,
and compare the two. Our result shows that we should expect more skewed deals in a PBS
equilibrium compared to an NBS equilibrium.
In the rest of this section, we shall assume here that all vertices have the same utility
function U(x), and that the deal on every edge has unit profit, so that the network topology
is solely responsible for any skewness in the distribution of profits in an equilibrium. We
also assume some natural properties of the utility function that are satisfied by all functions
of the form xp.
3.7.1 Inequality in NBS equilibrium
The theorem below implies that if two adjacent vertices have high (but possibly highly un-
equal) degrees, then the deal between them is shared almost equally in any NBS equilibrium.
We shall later show that this is not true for PBS equilibria.
Theorem 6. Let U(x) be the utility function of every vertex, and let all edges have unit
weight. Let U(x) be increasing, twice diﬀerentiable and concave. Also, suppose U(x)−U(0)U ￿(x) <
Kx ∀x ∈ [0, 1] for some constant K, and |U ￿￿(x)| ≤ ￿(x)U ￿(x) for some decreasing function
￿(x). Let s be any NBS equilibrium in this network. Let e = (u, v) be an edge such that u and
v have degree more than (K+1)d+1 for some positive integer d. Then, |xs(u, e)− 12 | < ￿(d).
Note that the assumptions on the utility function guarantee the existence of NBS equi-
librium. Also note that the function U(x) = xp for some 0 < p < 1 satisfies the conditions
of Theorem 6 with K = p−1 and ￿(x) = (1− p)/x. The function U(x) = log(1 + x) satisfies
the conditions of Theorem 6 as well, with K = 2, since (1 + x) log(1 + x) < (1 + x)x ≤ 2x
when x ∈ [0, 1], and ￿(x) = 11+x . To prove the above theorem, we will need the next two
lemmas.
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Lemma 3.7.1. Let U(x) be increasing, twice diﬀerentiable and concave. Also, suppose
U(x)−U(0)
U ￿(x) < Kx ∀x ∈ [0, 1] Then at an NBS equilibrium s, for every edge e = (u, v),
xs(u, e) ≥ 1K+1 and xs(v, e) ≥ 1K+1 .
Proof. By Lemma 3.2.2, xs(u, e) is the unique solution to qs(x) = rs(x). Note that rs(x) ≥
1 − x. This follows from the fact that bs(x) ≥ −(1 − x)b￿s(x), since bs(x) is concave and
decreasing and bs(1) = 0 (edges have unit weight).
Now, we show that qs(x) ≤ Kx ∀x ∈ [0, 1]. To show this, we need the following claim.
Claim 2. If s1 and s2 are any two states such that αs1(u, e) > αs2(u, e), then qs1(x) <
qs2(x) ∀x ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. To complete the proof, we need to prove our claim. For this, we view qs(x) as a
function z(α) of αs(u, e), keeping x constant, where α = αs(u, e), and observe that this
function is decreasing. That is, z(α) = U(α+x)−U(α)U ￿(α+x) , where x is constant. Note that
U ￿(α + x) − U ￿(α) < xU ￿￿(α + x), and U(α + x) − U(α) > xU ￿(α + x). Diﬀerentiating
z(α) with respect to α and using the above inequalities, we get that the numerator of the
derivative z￿(α) is U ￿(α + x)(U ￿(α + x) − U ￿(α)) − (U(α + x) − U(α))U ￿￿(α + x) < 0, while
the denominator is positive. So z￿(α) < 0, which implies our claim.
Thus, qs(x) is greatest when αs(u, e) = 0, in which case qs(x) =
U(x)−U(0)
U ￿(x) < Kx, the
last inequality being our assumption. Thus, if x satisfies qs(x) = rs(x), then Kx > 1 − x,
or x > 1/(K + 1). This completes our proof of Lemma 3.7.1.
Lemma 3.7.2. Let U(x) be increasing, twice diﬀerentiable and concave. Let s be an NBS
equilibrium, e = (u, v) be any edge, and ￿ > 0. Also, let |U ￿￿(αs(u, e))| ≤ ￿U ￿(αs(u, e)) and
|U ￿￿(αs(v, e))| ≤ ￿U ￿(αs(v, e)). Then, if u gets x on this agreement at equilibrium (and v
gets 1− x), then |x− 12 | < ￿.
Proof. Let α = αs(u, e) and β = αs(v, e). According to NBS, x is the solution maximizing
(U(α+x)−U(α))(U(β+1−x)−U(β)). Diﬀerentiating the quantity with respect to x and
equating to zero, we get the following condition: U ￿(α+ x)(U(β + 1− x)− U(β))− U ￿(β +
1− x)(U(α+ x)− U(α)) = 0.
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We are seeking a solution to this equation. The left-hand-side of the above equation is
a function g(x) of the form h1(x)− h2(x) that is decreasing, continuous, positive at x = 0
and negative at x = 1. Thus, the equation g(x) = 0 has a solution in x ∈ (0, 1).
Note that U(β + 1 − x) − U(β) lies between U ￿(β)(1 − x) and U ￿(β + 1)(1 − x), while
U(α + x) − U(α) lies between U ￿(α)x and U ￿(α + 1)x. Also, U ￿(β + 1 − x) > U ￿(β + 1) >
U ￿(β) + U ￿￿(β), and U ￿(α+ x) > U ￿(α+ 1) > U ￿(α) + U ￿￿(α), for all x ∈ (0, 1).
Now, for contradiction, suppose x ≤ 12 − ￿ = 12(1− 2￿). Then,
h1(x) > U ￿(α+ 1)U ￿(β + 1)(1− x) > (U ￿(α) + U ￿￿(α))(U ￿(β) + U ￿￿(β))(1− x)
= U ￿(α)U ￿(β)(1 + U
￿￿(α)
U ￿(α) )(1 +
U ￿￿(β)
U ￿(β) )(1− x)
≥ U ￿(α)U ￿(β)(1− ￿)(1− ￿)(1
2
)(1 + 2￿) >
1
2
U ￿(α)U ￿(β)(1− 2￿)
≥ U ￿(α)U ￿(β)x > h2(x)
Thus, g(x) > 0 when x ≤ 12 − ￿. Similarly, g(x) < 0 when x ≥ 12 + ￿.
Proof of Theorem 6. There are (K+1)d edges incident on each vertex u and v excluding
(u, v), so Lemma 3.7.1 implies that at an NBS equilibrium, αs(u, e) >
1
K+1(K + 1)d = d
and αs(v, e) >
1
K+1(K + 1)d = d. Since |U ￿￿(x)| ≤ ￿(x)U ￿(x) and ￿(x) is decreasing, we put
￿ = ￿(d) < min{￿(αs(u, e)), ￿(αs(v, e))} in Lemma 3.7.2 to obtain our result.
3.7.2 Inequality in PBS equilibrium
In contrast, consider two star networks (where leaves are attached to a single central node),
one with d1 leaves and the other with d2 leaves, and consider the composite network G
formed by adding an edge between the centers of the two stars. Let d1 >> d2 > d. Let
x1/2 be the utility function of all players. Then, Theorem 6 implies that the edge between
the two centers is shared such that each party gets at least 12 − 12d . In contrast, it can be
checked that in a PBS equilibrium, the wealth of the two centers are close to d1 and d2
respectively, and the deal between them is shared at a ratio close to
√
d1 to
√
d2 for large
values of d. So the diﬀerence in the share of this edge between PBS and NBS equilibrium
is stark when, say, d1 = 10000 and d2 = 100 – if the players are sharing a dollar, then the
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skew is less than a cent for NBS equilibrium, while the center of the star with 100 leaves
receives less than 10 cents on the deal in a PBS equilibrium.
3.8 Simulation Studies
While a number of works have strived to quantify relationships between network structure
and various game-theoretic equilibria [68, 63, 37, 17], precise characterizations are rare. We
turn to an alternative approach, which is that of empirically investigating the structure-
equilibrium relationship in networks randomly generated from well-studied stochastic for-
mation models such as preferential attachment (PA), that gives scale-free networks, and
Erdos-Renyi random graphs. We are particularly interested in studying how a player’s
position in the network influences its bargaining power, so we assign identical utility func-
tions to all players. For all our simulations, unless otherwise mentioned, we use the utility
function U(x) = √x.
The summary of our findings is as follows:
• Random best response dynamics on a network always appears to converge to the
same PBS or NBS equilibrium. This provides evidence that these networks have
unique equilibrium.
• In each random network family there is very high positive correlation between degree
and wealth, for either equilibrium concepts. However, degree alone is not a good
predictor of wealth.
• Bargaining power of a vertex, measured as the average share received by the vertex
on all its edges, increases with degree.
• Outcomes given by the two equilibrium concepts diﬀer strongly. Eﬀects of network
structure is more pronounced in PBS equilibrium. The bargaining powers of vertices
have a greater variance in PBS equilibrium. Also, the divisions on edges are generally
more skewed in PBS equilibrium and more balanced in NBS equilibrium.
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3.8.1 Methodology
The broad methodology we followed was to (a) generate many random networks from specific
stochastic formation models (namely, preferential attachment [9] and Erdos-Renyi [48]),
(b) compute bargaining equilibria on these networks by running best-response dynamics
until convergence, and (c) perform statistical analyses relating structural properties of the
network to equilibrium properties.
For the best response dynamics, we start from a random state, and then repeatedly pick
any edge that is not ￿-stable and update it, until all edges are ￿-stable, for ￿ = 0.001. In
all our simulations, all edges in the network have unit wealth. Also, in all our simulations,
we imposed the same utility function U on all vertices, so that the sole diﬀerence between
the players is their positions in the network. Unless mentioned otherwise, U = √x in our
simulations; on some simulations we chose U = xp for various values for 0 < p < 1.
We examined the properties of equilibria on 100 graphs sampled from each formation
model. The distributions we studied in the preferential attachment model are PA(50, 1) and
PA(50, k), for all integers k from 1 to 5, where PA(n, k) denotes a preferential attachment
model with 50 vertices and k new links being added per vertex. The distributions we studied
in the Erdos-Renyi model are ER(50, 4k/100), for all integers k from 1 to 5, where ER(n, p)
denotes a random graph with 50 vertices where the probability that an edge exists is p. Note
that ER(50, 4k/100) and PA(n, k) have comparable number of edges in expectation. Unless
specified otherwise, all the data presented below uses a utility function of
√
x for all vertices.
On every network that was included in the sample, we ran random best response dy-
namics 20 times, for both PBS and NBS, each time starting from a random initial state and
then updating unstable edges at random. In every network, this randomized algorithm con-
verged to states that were all within a radius of 0.01 in l∞ norm. Further, this radius had a
decreasing trend whenever ￿ was reduced. This it seems plausible that on all these networks,
every run of the algorithm converges to a small neighborhood of a unique equilibrium. This
event occurred for both the PBS and NBS concepts. Since the approximate PBS equilibria
computed are almost the same, we shall subsequently only consider one PBS equilibrium
and one NBS equilibrium when analysing the wealth distribution on the vertices.
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3.8.2 Correlation Between Degree and Wealth
Echoing earlier results found in a rather diﬀerent (non-bargaining) model [65], we found
that in both formation models there is a very high correlation between vertex degree and
wealth at equilibrium — on average (over networks), correlations in excess of 0.95. Given
such high correlations, it is natural to attempt to model the wealth of each vertex in a given
network by a linear function of its degree — that is, in a given network we approximate
the equilibrium wealth wv of a vertex v of degree dv by αdv − β, and minimize the mean
squared error (MSE)
1
n
￿
v∈V
(wv − (αdv − β))2
where n = |V |. We find that such fits are indeed quite accurate (low MSE). We do note
that the correlation is generally higher, and the MSE generally lower, in NBS equilibrium
compared to PBS equilibrium, so linear functions of degree are better models of wealth in
NBS than PBS.
Note that since the sum of the wealth of all vertices is equal to the number of edges m,
we have ￿
v∈V
αdv − β ≈ m⇒ α(2m)− βn ≈ m⇒ β ≈ m
n
(2α− 1)
Thus, β˜ = mn (2α − 1) is an estimate of β that is almost accurate when the mean squared
error is as small as we have found. β˜ is positive if α > 0.5, and negative if α < 0.5. In
essence, therefore, the wealth distribution on the vertices of a specific network is succinctly
really expressed by just a single real value – the degree coeﬃcient α. Note that α itself is a
function of the network, and as we shall see, is also dependent on the equilibrium concept.
3.8.3 Regression Coeﬃcients
For each graph, we have two coeﬃcient values α, one for the PBS equilibrium and the other
for the NBS equilibrium. Thus each distribution of graphs gives two distributions of α, one
for PBS equilibrium and the other for NBS equilibrium. A standard t-test reveals that for
both network formation models, these distributions of coeﬃcients have rather means at a
high level of statistical significance. On all networks, the coeﬃcient in the PBS equilibrium
was higher than that in the NBS equilibrium, and both numbers were greater than 0.5.
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Figure 3.1: PBS and NBS regression coeﬃcients versus edge density in (a) PA and (b) ER
networks
Figure 3.1(a) shows the values of α for PBS and NBS equilibria in the 5 diﬀerent
distributions, which vary in their edge density, from the preferential attachment model. The
horizontal axis shows the number of new links added per vertex in the random generation,
while the vertical axis shows the regression coeﬃcients from 100 trials. Figure 3.1(b) shows
the analogous plot for distributions from the Erdos-Renyi model, with the horizontal axis
representing the edge probability. The plots clearly demonstrate that the dependence of
wealth on degree is stronger in PBS than in NBS. In preferential attachment networks, both
equilibrium concepts seem to have diminished coeﬃcients with increased edge density, but
this eﬀect is absent or muted in Erdos-Renyi.
3.8.4 Division of Wealth on Edges
So far we have examined the total wealth of players in equilibrium states; we can also
examine how the wealth on individual edges is divided at equilibrium. Figure 3.2 shows
histograms of the division of wealth on edges in the distribution PA(50, 2) for PBS and
NBS equilibria. The horizontal axis shows the amount of the smaller share of an edge,
and the vertical axis shows the number of edges whose smaller share is within the given
range. The number of edges is summed over 100 graphs from each distribution. In NBS,
the wealth on most edges are split quite evenly, while in PBS, the split is heavily skewed,
yet another indication that network structure plays a greater role in PBS equilibrium than
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Figure 3.2: A histogram of PBS and NBS equilibria, respectively, for inequality of each
edge, for PA(50, 2)
in NBS equilibrium.
A more refined view of this phenomenon is provided in Figure 3.3. Here we show the
average edge divisions as a function of the degrees of the two endpoints d1 and d2 for the
two equilibrium notions in the distribution PA(50, 3). We note that while both surfaces are
smooth and have similar trends, the slope of the surface is much gentler in NBS equilibrium
than in PBS equilibrium, demonstrating that even neighbors with rather diﬀerent degrees
tend to split deals approximately evenly at NBS equilibrium.
3.8.5 Other Utility Functions
All experiments described so far examined the utility function
√
x. We also performed
experiments examining equilibria varied with a change of utility functions. We examined
U = xp where p = i/10, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ 10, on each graph distribution, and found that for
each of them, the correlation of wealth and degree was still very high and linear fits still
provide excellent approximations. We know theoretically that for i = 10, that is, U(x) = x,
we have α = 0.5. Figure 3.4(a) illustrates how the degree coeﬃcient for PBS equilibrium
decreases smoothly in PA(50, 3), from an average value of almost 1 to 0.5, as p goes from
0.1 to 1.0, while that for NBS equilibrium starts barely above 0.5 and also goes down to
0.5, albeit with a far gentler slope. Figure 3.4(b) shows the same plot for the distribution
ER(50, 0.12), which, in expectation, has approximately the same number of edges as in
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Figure 3.3: Edge division versus edge endpoint degrees in PBS and NBS, resp., for PA(50, 3)
PA(50, 3). Thus, again viewing a higher value of α as a higher variance in bargaining
power and thus greater eﬀects of network structure, with α = 0.5 implying the absence of
network eﬀect, we conclude from the figures that network eﬀects gradually diminish when
the utility function approaches linearity.
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(b)ER(50, 0.12) resp.
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3.9 Uniqueness of Equilibrium
The simulations suggested that equilibrium may be unique in the networks we ran our sim-
ulations on, or at least that the random best response dynamics converges to a unique one.
In this section, we address the question of whether equilibrium is unique. Unfortunately,
the answer to this question is no.
We focus on regular graphs with unit wealth on all edges, and the same utility function
U , which is increasing, continuous and concave, for all vertices. This class has one state
that is both PBS and NBS equilibrium: the state where the value on every edge is divided
into two equal parts. In fact, one may consider this state to be the natural solution on
regular networks. We investigate if there is any other equilibrium. We show that one can
choose U such that there are multiple equilibria, both for PBS and for NBS.
However, we give a simple condition of the update process that will ensure uniqueness
in this class of networks. We show that many natural concave utility functions such as
xp, 0 < p < 1 satisfy this condition in both PBS and NBS concepts, and thus ensure unique
PBS and NBS equilibrium, respectively.
3.9.1 PBS Equilibrium is Not Unique
Consider any d-regular bipartite graph (d ≥ 2) with edges of unit wealth, and every player
with the same utility function U , which is defined as U(x) = 100x for 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.01, and
U(x) = log x − log 0.01 + 1 for x > 0.01. Then, U(0) = 0, U is diﬀerentiable, and U ￿ is a
decreasing positive function, so U is concave and increasing. One may view U as a shift of
the logarithmic function designed to ensure that concavity and the condition U(0) = 0 are
satisfied. For this utility function and any regular network, there are uncountably many
PBS equilibria.
Let the vertices in the bipartite graph be X ∪ Y , where X and Y are independent sets.
Consider a state s where on every edge, the endpoint inX receives 1/2−￿, while the endpoint
in Y receives 1/2+￿, for any 0 < ￿ < 0.49. Then, for any edge, the outside options of its two
endpoints are (d− 1)(1/2− ￿) and (d− 1)(1/2+ ￿) respectively, and s is a PBS equilibrium
if and only if U(d(1/2 − ￿)) − U((d − 1)(1/2 − ￿)) = U(d(1/2 + ￿)) − U((d − 1)(1/2 + ￿)).
It is easy to check that both sides evaluate to log d/(d− 1). Since the result holds for any
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0 < ￿ < 0.49, we have a continuum of PBS equilibria.
3.9.2 NBS Equilibrium is Not Unique
We again consider d-regular bipartite graph (d ≥ 2) with edges of unit wealth, and every
player with the same utility function U . However, we need to choose U more carefully, and
we shall only get multiple NBS equilibrium, instead of uncountably many.
Let the vertices in the bipartite graph be X ∪ Y , where X and Y are independent sets.
Consider a state s where on every edge, the endpoint in X receives 1/4, while the endpoint
in Y receives 3/4. Then, for any edge, the outside options of its two endpoints are (d−1)/4
and 3(d− 1)/4 respectively, and s is an NBS equilibrium if and only if
U(d/4)− U((d− 1)/4)
U ￿(d/4) =
U(3d/4)− U(3(d− 1)/4)
U ￿(3d/4)
Note that 3(d − 1)/4 > d/4 when d ≥ 2, so the above equation is easy to satisfy. We can
define an increasing, continuous and concave function U such that U ￿(d/4) = 1, U ￿(3d/4) =
1/2 and (U(d/4)−U((d−1)/4)) = 2(U(3d/4)−U(3(d−1)/4)). In particular, we can choose
U such that U = 8x ∀x ≤ (d− 1)/4, so that U((d− 1)/4) = 2(d− 1), and then decrease the
slope gradually such that U(d/4) = U((d − 1)/4) + 1 = 2d − 1 and U ￿(d/4) = 1, and then
U ￿(3(d− 1)/4) = 1, and finally U(3d/4) = U(3(d− 1)/4) + 1/2 and U ￿(3d/4) = 1/2.
3.9.3 Uniqueness in Regular Graphs
The following condition, which is dependent on the utility function U of the players as well
as the concept we are considering, PBS or NBS, is suﬃcient to ensure uniqueness on regular
graphs with unit wealth on edges and identical utility functions for the players. We call
it a rallying condition, because it allows the player with less outside options to bargain a
greater share than what the disbalance in the outside options suggest, even though it gets
the smaller portion.
Condition 4 (Bargain Rallying Condition). Let s be any state of a bargaining network and
e = (u, v) be any edge of wealth c. Without loss of generality, suppose αs(u, e) ≤ αs(v, e).
Then, our condition is that c/2 ≥ ys(u, e) > cαs(u,e)αs(u,e)+αs(v,e) .
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This condition is satisfied by common concave utility functions such as U(x) = xp where
0 < p < 1, and also U(x) = f + log(a + bx) where a > 0, b > 0. A detailed discussion is
deferred to Section 3.9.4.
We shall now present and prove our main uniqueness result.
Theorem 7. If Condition 4 is satisfied in the PBS (or NBS) concept on a regular graph with
unit wealth on every edge and identical utility function for all players, which is increasing,
continuous and concave, then there is a unique PBS (or NBS, respectively) equilibrium,
where the wealth on every edge is shared equally between its endpoints.
Proof. By contradiction. Clearly, the state, where wealth on every edge is equally divided,
is an equilibrium. Suppose there exists another equilibrium s. There exists an edge where
xs(u, e) < 1/2 or xs(v, e) < 1/2. Consider the edge e = (u, v) which has the most lopsided
division, that is, find e such that min (xs(u, e), xs(v, e)) is minimized. Without loss of
generality, suppose that u gets the smaller share 1/2 − ￿ on e, for some ￿ > 0. Since
Condition 4 is satisfied, so αs(u, e) ≤ αs(v, e). Note that u gets at least 1/2− ￿ from each
edge incident on it, and so αs(u, e) ≥ (d − 1)(1/2 − ￿). Similarly, v gets at most 1/2 + ￿
from each incident edge, so αs(v, e) ≤ (d−1)(1/2+ ￿). Thus αs(v, e)/αs(u, e) ≤ 1/2+￿1/2−￿ . Now
using Condition 4, we get that ys(u, e) >
1
1+ 1/2+￿1/2−￿
= 1/2− ￿ which is a contradiction to our
assumption that s is an equilibrium.
3.9.4 Characterization of Bargain Rallying Condition
We try to recognize simpler easy-to-check conditions on U that is suﬃcient for the bargain
rallying condition to hold in the PBS or NBS concept on networks with utility function U
for all players. We always assume that U is increasing, continuous and concave. First, we
consider the PBS concept.
Condition 5. Let U be a utility function. Our condition is that U(Kx) − U(x) is an
increasing function of x, ∀x > 0, ∀K > 1.
Lemma 3.9.1. If all players have the same utility function U that satisfies Condition 5,
then Condition 4 holds in the PBS concept.
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Proof. Let a = αs(u, e) and let b = αs(v, e), and let a < b. Note that to prove that
Condition 4 holds, Lemma 3.2.1 implies that it is suﬃcient to show that U(a+ caa+b)−U(a) <
U(b + cba+b) − U(b), that is, if u gets ca/a + b from the edge e, then it is getting less than
what the PBS condition stipulates.
Let g(x) = U((1 + ca+b)x) − U(x). Then, the above equation simply states that g(a) <
g(b), and it will suﬃce if g(x) is an increasing function, which in turn is satisfied if U(Kx)−
U(x) is increasing in x, which is Condition 5.
It is easy to verify that common concave utility functions such as U(x) = xp where
0 < p < 1, and also U(x) = f + log(a + bx) where a > 0, b > 0, satisfy Condition 5. To
illustrate, we show the computation for U(x) = xp: U(Kx)−U(x) = Kpxp−xp = xp(Kp−1).
Note that (Kp − 1) is a positive constant while xp is an increasing function of x.
Following the same thread of reasoning, we can find a similar condition for NBS.
Condition 6. Let U be a utility function. Our condition is that U(Kx)−U(x)U ￿(Kx) is an increasing
function of x, ∀x > 0, ∀K > 1.
Lemma 3.9.2. If all players have the same utility function U that satisfies Condition 6,
then Condition 4 holds in the NBS concept.
Proof. The proof is almost identical to that of Lemma 3.9.1, except that we apply Lemma
3.2.2 instead of Lemma 3.2.1. We define
g(x) =
U((1 + ca+b)x)− U(x)
U ￿((1 + ca+b)x)
and by a similar argument, Condition 4 holds if g(x) is increasing, which is satisfied if
U(Kx)−U(x)
U ￿(Kx) is increasing in x when K > 1.
It is easy to verify that common concave utility functions such as U(x) = xp where
0 < p < 1, and also U(x) = f + log(a + bx) where a > 0, b > 0, satisfy Condition 6. To
illustrate, we show the computation for U(x) = xp.
U(Kx)− U(x)
U ￿(Kx) =
(Kp − 1)xp
pKp−1xp−1
= p−1K1−px1−p(Kp − 1)xp = p−1K1−p(Kp − 1)x
p−1K1−p(Kp − 1) is a positive constant while x, of course, is an increasing function of x.
So U(Kx)−U(x)U ￿(Kx) is an increasing function of x.
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3.10 Generalized Utility Functions
In all previous results in this chapter, as well as the definitions in the Preliminary section,
utility function was assumed to be a function of the sum of the wealth received by the
player on all edges incident upon it, that is the function was of the form U(x1+x2 . . .+xd),
where x1, x2 . . . xd are the diﬀerent shares it receives from its d edges. We can, instead,
define a more general concept of a utility function, one that is multi-dimensional, and is
an arbitrary function of the values of the wealth it receives from its edges, that is, of the
form U(x1, x2 . . . xd). The concepts of PBS and NBS equilibrium can be easily extended
to this setting, by simply redefining diﬀerence utility, which is still the additional utility a
player receives from the deal, given what it is getting from its other deals. In particular,
its diﬀerence utility from the first incident edge is U(x1, x2, x3 . . . xd) − U(0, x2, x3 . . . xd).
Note that the outside option for this first edge should also be redefined as a sequence of
d values (0, x2, x3 . . . xd) where the value corresponding to the first edge is zero, while the
rest reflects the wealth the player receives from its other (d− 1) deals.
We think it is worth noting that even under this generalized model, the existence results
of [24] hold, that is,
• PBS equilibrium exists on all networks if the utility functions are increasing and
continuous.
• NBS equilibrium exists on all networks if the utility functions are increasing, contin-
uous and concave.
These results follow from the fact that analogous versions of Lemmas 3.2.1 and 3.2.2
hold in this model too, using the fact that an increasing, continuous and/or concave multi-
dimensional function has the same property along each dimension.
Further, it is easy to verify that the bargaining monotonicity condition is satisfied by
concave utility functions in the PBS concept. Again, the condition needs to be modified to
take care of the fact that outside options are now a sequence: we say that αs(u, e) ≥ αs￿(u, e)
if the former dominates the latter in every dimension. This condition is suﬃcient to show
that the same FPTAS algorithm works even in this generalized model.
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3.11 Conclusion
Our model is an addition to the extensive literature on network exchange theory, and it
diﬀers from previous models in that network eﬀects are caused by the non-linearity of utility
functions of the players. Even when players can enter into as many deals as their degree,
our model still suggests a network eﬀect on outcomes and unequal sharing of deals. Further,
the eﬀect of network structural properties such as degree on the outcome propagates beyond
the immediate neighborhood.
The most prominent theoretical question left unanswered in our model is that of com-
puting approximate or exact equilibria in general graphs, and to find precise conditions on
utility functions that guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium.
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Chapter 4
Item Pricing in Combinatorial
Auctions
In this chapter, we begin our study of revenue maximizing strategies for a single seller in
the presence of many buyers. Results in this chapter were published in collaboration with
Zhiyi Huang and Sanjeev Khanna [22].
We consider the following Item Pricing problem. There are n items owned by a single
seller, and m prospective buyers who value these items. We assume a limited supply setting
where each item can be sold to at most one buyer.The seller can price each item individually,
and the price of a set of items is simply the sum of the prices of the individual items in the
set. The buyers arrive in a sequence, and each buyer has her own valuation function v(S),
defined on every subset S of items. Each buyer chooses a set of items to buy (depending on
the prices), and these items become unavailable to future buyers. We assume the valuation
functions to be subadditive, which means that v(S)+v(T ) ≥ v(S∪T ) for any pair of subsets
S, T of items. For some results, we shall assume the valuations to be XOS, that is, they can
be expressed as the maximum of several additive functions. XOS functions are subadditive,
and include all submodular functions.
The strategy used by the seller in choosing the prices of the items is allowed to be
randomized, and is referred to as a pricing strategy. If a buyer buys a subset of items S, her
utility is defined as her valuation v(S) of the set minus the price of the set S (sum of prices
of individual items in S). We assume that every buyer is rational, and so buys a subset
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of available items that maximizes her utility. We assume that a buyer cannot strategize
over her position in the arrival sequence of buyers – she comes to the seller immediately
when she has a demand for the items, and cannot advance or postpone her arrival time
deliberately, neither can she come to the seller more than once (possibly as a reaction to
the seller’s pricing strategy). The revenue obtained by the seller is the sum of the amounts
paid by each buyer, and our goal is to design pricing strategies that maximize the expected
revenue of the seller. In this chapter, we design strategies in a setting where the seller
has no knowledge of the valuation functions of the buyers, and look for strategies that
provide worst-case revenue guarantee on any instance, the only assumption being that the
buyers’ valuation functions are subadditive. In other words, we design pricing strategies in
a prior-free world.
Pricing Strategies A uniform pricing strategy is one where at any point of time, all
unsold items are assigned the same price. The seller may set prices on the items initially
and never change them, so that cost of an (unsold) item is the same for every buyer. We
call such a strategy to be a static pricing strategy. Static pricing is the most widely applied
pricing scheme till date. Alternatively, a seller may show diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent buyers
(without knowing the buyer’s valuation function) – we shall call this a dynamic pricing
strategy. Dynamic strategies are applicable in places where the seller may frequently adjust
her prices over time, and are commonly observed while buying airline tickets or booking
hotel rooms. However, a dynamic strategy in which the price of an item fluctuates a lot
may not be desirable in some applications. However, a dynamic strategy in which the price
of an item fluctuates a lot may not be desirable in some applications. So we introduce
an interesting subclass of dynamic strategies, called dynamic monotone pricing strategies,
where the price of an item can only decrease with time.
Social Welfare An allocation of items involves distributing the items among the buyers,
and the social welfare of an allocation is defined as the sum of the buyers’ valuations for
the items received by each of them. We denote the maximum social welfare, achieved by
any allocation, by OPT. We measure the performance of a pricing strategy as the ratio of
the maximum social welfare against the smallest expected revenue of the strategy, for any
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adversarially chosen ordering of the buyers. (Some of our results, where it will be explicitly
stated, shall consider expected revenue under the assumption that the order in which buyers
arrive is uniformly random.) If this ratio is at most α on any instance (where α can depend
on the size of the instance), we say that the strategy achieves an α-approximation. Note
that the maximum social welfare is an upper bound on the revenue the seller can obtain
under any circumstance. In fact, there exists simple instances with n items and a single
buyer where the maximum social welfare is log n, but the revenue can never exceed 1 for any
pricing function [8]. Thus we are comparing the performance of our strategies against a bar
that may be significantly higher than the revenue of an optimal truthful auction, and the
above example shows that we can never hope to achieve anything better than a logarithmic
approximation. Our general goal is to design pricing strategies that achieve polylogarithmic
approximation.
Related Work A relevant body of literature is the design of truthful or incentive com-
patible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions [36], where all buyers report their valuations
before the seller decides on allocation of the items and prices charged to the buyers. While
there exists a truthful mechanism which maximizes social welfare among buyers in all in-
stances, namely VCG auction, there is no such analogue for revenue maximization, unless
one makes Bayesian assumptions about buyers’ valuations. Even for welfare maximization,
VCG auction may not be eﬃciently implementable, and this has inspired a large body
of work in algorithmic mechanism design that design approximately welfare maximizing
truthful mechanisms that are also computationally eﬃcient (see [16] for a survey, as well as
[71, 69, 46, 43]). Feige [49] gave a 2-approximation algorithm for computing a social welfare
maximizing allocation, but it is not known how to construct a truthful mechanism with
such a performance guarantee. Dobzinski et al. [46, 43] gave logarithmic approximation
via truthful mechanisms when buyers have XOS valuations and subadditive valuations re-
spectively. The mechanism achieving this approximation is in fact a static uniform pricing
strategy.
Relatively less work exists on revenue optimization via truthful mechanisms, especially
in prior-free settings. Most results assume unlimited supply of copies of each item [59], so
that one buyer taking an item aﬀect its availability to future buyers. Pricing strategies
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form a natural class of truthful mechanisms, and thus the design of such strategies can be
viewed in the context of designing truthful mechanisms. Moreover, they are simpler from an
organizational point of view, compared to running an auction such as VCG – buyers need not
be present in the market at the same time, instead they can come at any time, interact with
the seller and leave with a subset of items mutually agreed upon. This is a crucially needed
property for many consumer markets, since we do not expect to participate in an auction
every time we go to buy milk from a grocery store, or when visiting a garage sale. Setting
prices on subsets of items is a mechanism of intermediate complexity, which has many of the
advantages of pricing over auctions, but may still be too complex to use, especially if the
bundles are priced unnaturally. Item pricing can be viewed as a simple mechanism in this
class where the bundles of items are priced additively, and is most natural from a buyers’
perspective. Some research has been directed towards developing truthful mechanisms that
approximately maximize revenue [7, 50, 57], while others have focused on designing item
pricing strategies that maximizes revenue (eg. [58, 6, 3, 19, 40]). All the pricing strategies
analyzed in these papers are static, and often uniform. Most of these results are also in a
prior-free model.
Under Bayesian assumptions (i.e. buyer valuations are drawn from distributions that
are known to the seller), optimal revenue maximizing mechanisms, such as that given by
Myerson [76], have been characterized for single parameter settings (such as the case where
the seller has only one item to sell), and such characterizations do not apply to multi-
parameter settings such as ours. Pricing strategies for revenue maximization is also a
commonly studied problem in revenue management (see [85] for a comprehensive overview),
with varying degrees of structural assumptions on seller’s inventory and buyers’ valuations
and strategic behavior. Most of the work in the revenue management literature makes
Bayesian assumptions, and studies complex (i.e. non-uniform, dynamic) pricing strategies
that are natural for many applications.
Balcan, Blum and Mansour [8] considered static pricing strategies with the objective of
revenue maximization, with limited supply of inventory and subadditive buyer valuations,
in a prior-free model. In the unlimited supply setting, they designed a pricing strategy that
achieve revenue which is logarithmic approximation to the maximum social welfare even
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for general valuations. The strategy, again, was a uniform strategy. This result was also
proved independently in [18]. However, in the limited supply setting, they could only get a
2O(
√
logn log logn) factor approximation using a static uniform strategy. Crucially, they ruled
out the existence of static uniform strategies that achieve anything better than a 2Ω(log
1/4 n)
approximation, even if the buyer valuations are XOS, and the ordering of buyers is assumed
to be chosen uniformly at random. Thus their result distinguished the limited and unlimited
supply settings. This impossibility of getting a good (polylogarithmic) approximation is a
consequence of being restricted to static uniform strategies, and it remains impossible even
if the seller knew the buyer valuations, and had unlimited computational power. Further,
almost all eﬃcient mechanisms designed in these related problems have only used a single
price for all items. It is, therefore, natural to consider dropping one of these restrictions,
namely, look at dynamic uniform strategies and static non-uniform strategies, both of which
use multiple prices, and attempt to find better guarantees on the revenue.
It is worth noting that there are other revenue maximizing auctions which give poly-
logarithmic guarantees, Hartline [60] notes that running the VCG auction with a random
uniform oﬀset yields O(log n) approximation for arbitrary valuation functions, though it is
not computationally eﬃcient. Also, independent from our work, Dobzinski [42] has devel-
oped a bundle pricing strategy for combinatorial auctions with subadditive valuations that
gives O(log2 n) approximation – the strategy not only prices items, but also restricts buyers
from buying a nonempty subset of items smaller than some critical size. Our results below
show that pricing bundles of items is not needed to achieve such a guarantee on revenue.
Recently, constant factor approximation results in revenue maximization via item pricing
have been obtained in Bayesian models, for special cases of subadditive valuations such as
budgeted additive [13] and unit-demand [28] valuations.
Our Results and Techniques The table below summarizes our results on the Item
Pricing problem in the limited supply setting, along with relevant earlier work. Our
contributions are labeled with the relevant theorem numbers.
Our first contribution is to strengthen the lower bound results for static uniform pric-
ing, by constructing instances with XOS valuations where uniform pricing functions cannot
achieve any better than a 2Ω(
√
logn) approximation, even if the seller knew the buyer val-
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Pricing
Strategy
Subadditive valuations ￿-XOS valuations
Algorithm a Lower Bound b Algorithm a Lower Bound b
Dynamic
Uniform
Pricing
O(log2 n)
[Thm. 9] c
Ω
￿￿
logn
log logn
￿2￿
[Thm. 10]
O(log2 n)
[Thm. 9] c
Ω
￿￿
logn
log logn
￿2￿
[Thm. 10]
Dynamic
Monotone
Uniform
Pricing
O(log2 n)
[Thm. 11] d
Ω
￿￿
logn
log logn
￿2￿
[Thm. 10]
O(log2 n)
[Thm. 11] d
Ω
￿￿
logn
log logn
￿2￿
[Thm. 10]
Static
Uniform
Pricing
2
￿O(√logn)
BBM08[8] c
2Ω(
√
logn)
[Thm. 8]
2
￿O(√logn)
BBM08[8] c
2Ω(
√
logn)
[Thm. 8]
Static Non-
Uniform
Pricing
2
￿O(√logn)
BBM08[8] c
Ω (log n)
BBM08[8]
O(m log ￿ log3 n)
[Thm. 13] c
Ω (log n)
[BBM08 [8]]
aAll algorithms assume that the seller knows OPT up to a constant factor. This assumption can be
removed by worsening the approximation ratio by a factor of logOPT(log logOPT)2.
bAll lower bounds are in the full information setting, where the seller knows the buyers’ valuations, the
number and arrival order of buyers, has unbounded computational power, and can even force the arrival
order of buyers.
cBuyers arrive in an adversarial order. Thus the algorithm satisfies the upper bound for any order of
buyers, including the order that minimizes expected revenue.
dBuyers arrive in a uniform random order, that is, every permutation of buyers is equally likely. The
bound is on the expected revenue under this assumption. This algorithm also assumes that the seller knows
the number of buyers m up to a constant factor. The assumption can be removed by making the algorithm
randomized, and worsening the approximation ratio by a factor of logm(log logm)2.
Table 4.1: Summary of results on revenue maximizing item pricing in combinatorial auctions
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uations, and had unlimited computational power. Our basic construction with only two
buyers and a chosen ordering between them, is structurally very similar to the one given in
[8], except for a better tuning of parameters. However, this basic construction, as well as
that in [8], fails to give a lower bound if we switched the arrival order of the two buyers. In
other words, the lower bound of the basic construction holds only if the buyer arrival order
is adversarial. We build instances derived from the basic construction to demonstrate how
truly limiting static uniform pricing is for combinatorial auctions with limited supply. First,
we increase the number of buyers and construct valuations such that the same lower bound
holds for uniformly random arrival order of buyers. We further extend the construction to
show that the lower bound holds even if the seller could force an arrival order among buyers.
All these constructions have simple 3-XOS valuations for all buyers, i.e. XOS valuations
that can be expressed as the maximum of 3 additive component functions. Finally, we ex-
tend the last instance so that all buyers have identical XOS valuations, though not 3-XOS,
and the lower bound continues to hold for any ordering of buyers. Theorem 8 summarizes
our lower bound results on static uniform pricing.
In contrast, we design a simple randomized dynamic uniform pricing strategy such
that its expected revenue is O(log2 n) approximation of the optimal social welfare, when
the valuation functions are subadditive, provided the seller knows an estimate of OPT.
The strategy randomly chooses a reserve price at the beginning, and then in each round,
randomly chooses a price above the reserve price (but less than OPT) and puts this price
on each unsold item. By using a fresh random price (from a suitable set of prices) in each
round, we guarantee, in expectation, to collect a large fraction of the revenue that can be
obtained from the current buyer given the remaining items. Intuitively, an appropriate
reserve price helps to avoid selling large number of items cheaply to some buyers before
the arrival of a buyer who would be willing to pay a high price. As in [8, 46], all random
prices are chosen on the logarithmic scale; in particular, the reserve price may be chosen
uniformly at random from the set of powers of 2 (or any constant greater than 1) within
the range [OPT,OPT/2n].
The dynamic uniform pricing strategy described above achieves a high revenue, but
requires random fluctuation in the price of an unsold item. This may not be a desirable
80
property in some applications. We design a dynamic monotone uniform pricing strategy
where the price of any unsold items only decreases over time. We show that if the ordering of
buyers is assumed to be uniformly random, that is, all permutations of buyers are equally
likely, then the expected revenue of this strategy is an O(log2 n) approximation of the
optimal social welfare. The strategy is in fact deterministic, provided the seller knows
estimates of OPT and m up to a constant factor, and simply decreases the price gradually
over the sequence of buyers. Deterministic strategies giving good approximation in such
limited information settings are rare. The usual need for randomness in the face of limited
information is taken care of by exploiting the randomness of the arrival order. We emphasize
here that our lower bound for static uniform pricing holds for any ordering of buyers.
We also construct a lower bound instance to show that the performance of our dynamic
uniform pricing strategies is almost optimal among all dynamic uniform strategies. We show
that no dynamic uniform pricing scheme can guarantee a revenue of ω(OPT(log log n)2/ log2 n)
even for XOS (which is a subclass of subadditive) buyer valuations. This bound holds even
when the seller knows the buyers’ valuation functions and unbounded computational power,
and can even choose the arrival order among the buyers.
All our algorithms as well as the algorithms in [8] assume that OPT is known to the
seller up to a constant factor. Moreover, our dynamic monotone strategy assumes that the
number of buyers m is known to the seller up to a constant factor. Once this information is
provided, the strategies are independent of the buyer valuations, and can be easily seen to
be truthful. As Balcan et al. [8] pointed out, for any parameter that is assumed to be known
up to a constant factor, if the seller instead knows an upper bound of H and a lower bound
of L on the optimum, then this assumption can be removed by guessing the parameter to
be a power of 2 between H and L, uniformly at random, worsening the approximation ratio
by a factor of Θ(log(H/L)). Note that an estimate of up to a factor of poly(n) suﬃces for
our results – as such, an estimate on the highest value of a single item to any one buyer
would serve as an adequate estimate. It is not hard to see that even for a single item, the
approximation guarantee cannot be better than Θ(log(H/L)) – see [5] for such results even
in Bayesian models. If the seller instead knows that OPT ≥ 1, but knows no upper bound,
then the assumption can be removed by worsening the approximation ratio by a factor of
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Θ(log x(log log x)2) in the approximation, where x is the said parameter.
Finally, we give a static non-uniform strategy that gives anO(m log ￿ log3 n)-approximation
if the buyers’ valuations are XOS valuations that can be expressed as the maximum of ￿ ad-
ditive components. Note that when the order of buyers is adversarial, the hard instance for
static uniform pricing has only two buyers, and their valuation functions are the maximum
of o(log n) additive functions components. In particular, our strategy gives polylogarithmic
(in n) approximation when the number of buyers are small (polylogarithmic in n), and has
XOS valuations which are the maximum of quasi-polynomial (in n) additive components.
We note that these guarantees are quite weak and quite easy to achieve if buyer arrival
order is assumed to be uniformly random, or even if the seller is allowed to reject certain
buyers (in particular, reject all but one buyer chosen at random, and use the result of Bal-
can et. al. [8]). Nevertheless, developing a static non-uniform strategy is an ideal goal for
a seller, and can be most widely applicable, since it does not discriminate between buyers
at all. Moreover, all lower bounds have so far been proved for uniform strategies only, so
non-uniform strategies may even yield better approximation results. The techniques used
to prove our result may be useful towards finding a static non-uniform strategy with better
revenue guarantee, so we include it in this work.
Organization The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, we formally
describe the problem, establish our notations and present some preliminary lemmas that
will be useful in proving our main results. In Section 4.2, we present our lower bound
results for static uniform strategies. In Section 4.3, we present our algorithms as well as
lower bound for dynamic uniform strategies. In Section 4.4, we present our results for static
uniform strategies. We discuss our conclusions and some open problems in Section 4.5.
4.1 Preliminaries
In the Item Pricing problem, we are given a single seller with a set I of n items that she
wishes to sell. There are m buyers, each with their own valuation function defined on all
subsets of I. A buyer with valuation function v values a subset of items S ⊆ I at v(S).
The buyers arrive in a sequence, and each buyer visits the seller exactly once. The seller
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is allowed to set a price on each item, and the price of a subset of items is the sum of the
prices of items in that subset. For every item sold to the buyers, the seller receives the price
of that item. Note that an item can be sold at most once. So a seller can only oﬀer those
items to a buyer that has not been sold to any previous buyer. The revenue obtained by
the seller is the sum of the prices of all the sold items.
Each buyer buys a subset of the items shown to her that maximizes her utility, which is
defined as the value of the subset minus the price of the subset. This is clearly the behavior
that is most beneficial to the buyer. The Item Pricing problem is to design (possibly
randomized) pricing strategies for the seller that maximizes the expected revenue of the
seller.
Unless noted otherwise, all our algorithmic results will assume that the seller has no
knowledge of the order of arrival of the buyers, total number of buyers, or the valuation
functions of buyers. We refer to a setting as the full-information setting if all these param-
eters are known to the seller.
Valuation Functions Throughout this chapter, we will assume that the buyer valuation
function v is subadditive, which means that
v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ) , ∀S ⊆ I, T ⊆ I .
Unless explicitly stated otherwise, this will be the only assumption on the buyer valuation
functions. For some results, we shall assume the buyer valuations to be more restrictive
than subadditive.
Definition 4.1.1. A subadditive valuation function v is called an XOS valuation if it can
be expressed as v(S) = max{a1(S), a2(S), . . . , a￿(S)} on all subsets of items S ⊆ I, where
a1, a2 . . . a￿ are non-negative additive functions. The functions a1, a2, ..., a￿ are referred to
as the additive valuation components of the XOS valuation v. We say that v is an ￿-XOS
function if it can be expressed using at most ￿ additive valuation components.
We note that a 1-XOS function is simply an additive function, that all XOS valuations
are subadditive, and that not all subadditive valuations can be expressed as XOS valuations
[70].
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Pricing Strategies We will study the power of some natural classes of pricing strategies.
Definition 4.1.2. A pricing strategy is said to be static if the seller initially sets prices
on all items, and never changes the prices in the future. A pricing strategy is said to be
dynamic if the seller is allowed to change prices at any point in time. A dynamic pricing
strategy is also said to be monotone if the price of every item is non-increasing over time.
Definition 4.1.3. A pricing strategy is said to be uniform if at all points in time, all unsold
items are assigned the same price.
4.1.1 Notation
For a buyer B with a valuation function v, we use Φ(B, J, p) to denote a set of items that the
buyer B may buy when presented with set J of items, each of which are priced at p. Since
v(S)− p|S| is the utility if the buyer buys the set S, so Φ(B, J, p) ∈ argmaxS⊆Jv(S)− p|S|
maximizes the utility. Note that there may be multiple possible sets that maximize the
utility. In this chapter, when we make a statement involving Φ(B, J, p), the statement shall
hold for any choice of these sets. We shall denote the maximum utility as U(B, J, p); note
that in contrast to Φ(B, J, p), the value U(B, J, p) is uniquely defined. When the underlying
buyer B is clear from the context, we shall denote these two values as Φ(J, p) and U(J, p)
respectively. Moreover, if the set of available items J is also clear from the context, then
we shall denote these two values as Φ(p) and U(p) respectively. For any set S and a buyer
with valuation function v, we define Hv(S) = maxS￿⊆S v(S￿) as the maximum utility the
buyer can get if all items in S are oﬀered to her at zero price.
Definition 4.1.4. We say that a set of items S is supported at a price p with respect
to some buyer B with valuation function v, if B buys the entire set S when the set S is
presented to B at a uniform pricing of p on each item.
The following lemma follows easily from the fact that the valuation functions are sub-
additive, and appears in earlier works as well (e.g.. [43, 8]). Its proof is included for the
sake of completeness.
Lemma 4.1.1. Let S be a set of items that is supported at price p. with respect to a buyer
B with subadditive valuation function v. Then v(S￿) ≥ p|S￿| for all S￿ ⊆ S.
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Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists S￿ ⊂ S with v(S￿) < p|S￿|. By subadditivity of v,
we know v(S￿) + v(S \ S￿) ≥ v(S), and hence v(S \ S￿) ≥ v(S)− v(S￿). Then the utility for
B of buying the set (S \ S￿) is at least v(S)− v(S￿)− p|S \ S￿|. But￿
v(S)− v(S￿)− p|S \ S￿|￿− p|S￿|+ p|S￿| = (v(S)− p|S|)− v(S￿) + p|S￿|
> v(S)− p|S| ,
contradicting the assumption that buyer picks set S at price p.
4.1.2 Optimal Social Welfare and Revenue Approximation
We now define optimal social welfare, the measure against which we evaluate the perfor-
mance of our pricing strategies.
Definition 4.1.5. An allocation of a set S of items to buyers B1, B2 . . . Bm with valuations
v1, v2 . . . vm, respectively, is an m-tuple (T1, T2, . . . , Tm) such that Ti ⊆ S for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and
Ti∩Tj = ∅ for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m. The social welfare of an allocation is defined as
￿m
i=1 vi(Ti), and
an allocation is said to be a social welfare maximizing allocation if it maximizes
￿m
i=1 vi(Ti).
The optimal social welfare OPT is defined as the social welfare of a social welfare maximizing
allocation.
Clearly, OPT is an upper bound on the revenue that any pricing strategy can get. Let
R be the revenue obtained by the strategy, which is the sum of the amounts paid by all the
buyers.
Definition 4.1.6. A pricing strategy is said to achieve an α-approximation if the expected
revenue of the strategy E[R] is at least OPT/α.
Unless stated otherwise, expected revenue is computed assuming an adversarial ordering
of the buyers, that is, the ordering that minimizes the expected revenue of the strategy. In
other words, we require a strategy to work well irrespective of the order of buyers in which
they arrive.
Note that OPT is not a tight upper bound on the maximum revenue that can be achieved
by any pricing strategy, even with full knowledge of buyer valuations and unbounded com-
putational power. In fact, the following example appears in Goldberg et al. [61] and Balcan
85
et al. [8]: if there is a single buyer with valuation function v(S) =
￿|S|
i=1 1/i, then for any
pricing of the n items, the revenue is at most 1, while OPT = Θ(log n). This shows that
nothing better than a logarithmic approximation can be achieved in the absence of any
other assumption on the buyer valuations.
4.1.3 The Single Buyer Setting with Uniform Pricing Strategies
Balcan et al. [8] considered the setting where there is an unlimited supply of each item, so
that no buyer is aﬀected by items bought before her arrival. In particular, if there is only
a single buyer, then there is no distinction between limited and unlimited supply, as long
as the buyer never wants more than one copy of the same item. For the single buyer case,
Balcan et al. [8] gave an O(log n) approximation, and in the process proved some lemmas
that will be useful for our algorithmic results in the limited supply setting as well.
Suppose a set S is being shown to a buyer B with valuation function v. The optimal
social welfare in this single buyer instance is Hv(S). We consider setting a uniform price,
that is, the same price on all items. The following lemma (which also appeared in Balcan
et. al. [8]) states that the number of items bought monotonically decreases as the price on
the items is increased.
Lemma 4.1.2. (Lemma 6 of [8]) Suppose a buyer B is oﬀered a set S of items using
a uniform pricing. Then for any p > p￿ ≥ 0, if B buys Φ(p) if all items are priced at
p, and Φ(p￿) if all items are priced at p￿, then |Φ(p)| ≤ |Φ(p￿)|. Thus there exist prices
∞ = q0 > q1 > . . . > q￿ > q￿+1 = 0 and integers 0 = n0 < n1 < . . . < n￿ ≤ |S| such that
when items in S are uniformly priced at p ∈ [qt+1, qt) there is a subset S￿ ⊆ S of size nt
that is supported at price p, and the utility U(p) of the buyer B satisfies
U(p) = U(qt) + nt(qt − p) . (4.1)
Since the empty set maximizes utility when the price is q1, we get that U(q0) = U(q1) =
0. Moreover, the utility at price q￿+1 = 0 is U(q￿+1) = Hv(S). Thus we get that
Hv(S) =
￿￿
t=1
nt(qt − qt+1) .
The following lemma is a slight variation of Lemma 8 of [8].
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Lemma 4.1.3. Suppose a set S is being shown to a buyer B, with valuation function v,
using a uniform price. Let H ￿ be any number such that H ￿ ≥ Hv(S). Let γ > 1, and let
p[t] = H ￿/γt. Then, for any k ≥ 0, we have
k￿
t=1
p[t]|Φ(p[t])| ≥ U(p[k])
γ − 1 ≥
1
γ − 1
￿
Hv(S)− |S|H
￿
γk
￿
.
Proof. Suppose that qs > p[k] ≥ qs+1, for some s ≤ l. Since U(q0) = U(q1) = 0, and also
that q1 ≤ OPT, so
U(p[k]) = U(qs) + (U(p[k])− U(qs))
=
s−1￿
t=1
(U(qt+1)− U(qt)) + ns(qs − p[k])
=
s−1￿
t=1
nt(qt − qt+1) + ns(qs − p[k]) .
The above sum can be seen as an integral of the following step function f from p[k] to
q1: in the range [qt+1, qt), f takes the value nt. So we can upper bound it by an upper
integral of f . Note that f(p) ≤ |Φ(p)| ≤ |S|, and also that f is a decreasing function. Thus
we get
U(p[k]) ≤
k−1￿
t=0
|Φ(p[t+ 1])| (p[t]− p[t+ 1])
= (γ − 1)
k−1￿
t=0
|Φ(p[t+ 1])| p[t+ 1] = (γ − 1)
k￿
t=1
|Φ(p[t])| p[t] .
Further, since U(0) = Hv(S), and we have U(p[0]) − U(p[k]) =
￿ p[k]
0 f(x)dx ≤ |S| p[k],
so U(p[k]) ≥ Hv(S)− |S| p[k].
Briefly, Lemma 4.1.3 will be used as follows: if one of {H ￿, H ￿/2, H ￿/4 . . . H ￿/2k} is
chosen uniformly at random and set as the uniform price for all items in S, then for a
suﬃciently large choice of k, the revenue obtained is Ω(Hv(S)/k). This will happen when
the right-hand-side of the equation in the lemma evaluates to Ω(Hv(S)). We shall frequently
use this lemma, and with H ￿ = Θ(H), our choice of k will be logarithmic in the number of
items.
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4.1.4 Optimizing with Unknown Parameters
Almost all our algorithms use the following lemma, which was implicitly mentioned in the
Appendix of [8]. It tells us that strategies can be allowed to assume that it approximately
knows the value of some parameters, as long as the parameters are not too large, since
these assumptions can be removed by guessing the value of these parameters and getting
it correct with inverse-polylogarithmic probability. The lemma below is applicable to the
Item Pricing problem with multiple buyers, and to both static dynamic pricing strategies.
Lemma 4.1.4. Consider a pricing strategy S that gives an α-approximation in expected
revenue, provided the seller knows the value of some parameter x to within a factor of 2.
Then if the seller instead only knows that L ≤ x < H, there exists a pricing strategy S ￿ that
gives an O(α log(H/L)) approximation in expected revenue, where L and H are powers of
2. If the seller instead only knows that x ≥ 1 but no upper bound, then for any constant
￿ > 0, there exists a pricing strategy S ￿￿ that gives an O(α log x(log log x)1+￿) approximation
in expected revenue.
Proof. We construct a pricing strategy by approximately guessing the value of x, up to the
nearest power of 2, using a suitable distribution, at the beginning, and using this estimate
in the given pricing strategy. Our revenue is assured only when our guess is correct, and
we count only that revenue in our analysis.
In the case where L and H are given, we guess x from the set {L, 2L, 4L . . .H}, so that
our guess of x is correct within a factor of 2, with probability at least Ω(1/ log(H/L)). Since
the given pricing strategy gives a revenue of Ω(OPT/α) in expectation when the guess is
correct within a factor of 2, we get an expected revenue of at least Ω(OPT/α log(H/L)).
In the second case, where the seller only knows that x ≥ 1, then we guess that
x = 2i with probability 1
c(i log1+￿ i)
, where c =
￿∞
i=1 1/i log
1+￿ i, which is finite. If x is
between 2i and 2i+1, then the probability of guessing x correctly within a factor of 2 is
at least Ω(1/i log1+￿ i) = Ω(1/(log x(log log x)1+￿)), so the expected revenue is at least
Ω(OPT/(α log x(log log x)1+￿)).
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4.2 Improved Lower Bounds for Static Uniform Pricing
In this section, we construct a 2Ω(
√
logn) lower bound for static uniform pricing strategies,
improving upon the 2Ω(
√
logn). Note that this lower bound essentially matches the upper
bound in [8]. Our lower bound holds even if the seller had full information and could choose
the ordering among buyers.
In our constructed instances, each buyer has a simple XOS function with only 3 additive
components. We construct another instance where all buyer valuations are identical and
XOS, though this common valuation function has more than 3 additive components. These
instances demonstrate that the limitation of static uniform pricing strategies comes from the
dependency introduced by limited supply of items, instead of coming from the complexity
or heterogeneity of the buyer valuations.
The following theorem summarizes our lower bound results about static uniform pricing.
Theorem 8. There exists a set of buyers with XOS valuations, such that if the seller is
restricted to a static uniform pricing strategy, then even in the full information setting, for
any choice of price, the revenue produced is at most OPT/2Ω(
√
logn), where n is the number
of items.
Additionally, one of the following (but not both) can also be ensured, with the revenue
still being at most OPT/2Ω(
√
logn):
• The valuations of all the buyers can be expressed as 3-XOS functions.
• All buyers have identical valuation function.
We now present the proof of Theorem 8. We will first construct an instance with two
buyers whose valuations consist of only three additive components each, such that if buyer
1 arrives before buyer 2, then the revenue obtained will satisfy the required upper bound.
This part of our construction is very similar to that given in [8], with some changes in the
parameter that allows us to improve the lower bound result from 2Ω(log
1/4 n) to 2Ω(
√
logn).
We will then extend this construction to instances with essentially the same revenue bound,
where all buyers have identical valuations.
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4.2.1 A Hard Two-Player Instance
Let us fix some parameters that we use in our construction: Let k be a (large) positive
integer, Y =
√
2, X = Y k, and n0 = X6k = Y 6k
2
. The instance will have n = X +X2 +
· · ·+X6k = Θ(n0) items.
Let S0, S1, · · · , S6k−1 be a partition of the items into disjoint sets such that |Si| = n0Xi .
For every i, let there be a subset S￿i ⊆ Si such that |S￿i| = |Si|X = n0Xi+1 .
There are two buyers with valuations v1 and v2 respectively. Let us first define the valua-
tion for each item. Then, we will complete the definition by giving the additive components.
The buyer valuations for a single item are:
v1(j) =

0 , if j ∈ Si \ S￿i
1
n0
￿
X
Y
￿i
, if j ∈ S￿i
v2(j) =

X
2n0(X − 1)
￿
X
Y
￿i
, if j ∈ Si \ S￿i
X
2n0
￿
X
Y
￿i
, if j ∈ S￿i
The valuation function of each buyer consists of three additive components which are
additive inside the subsets A0 = S0 ∪ S3 ∪ · · · ∪ S6k−3, A1 = S1 ∪ S4 ∪ · · · ∪ S6k−2, and
A2 = S2 ∪ S5 ∪ · · · ∪ S6k−1 respectively, that is,
v1(S) = max
 ￿
j∈S∩A0
v1(j) ,
￿
j∈S∩A1
v1(j) ,
￿
j∈S∩A2
v1(j)
 ,
v2(S) = max
 ￿
j∈S∩A0
v2(j) ,
￿
j∈S∩A1
v2(j) ,
￿
j∈S∩A2
v2(j)
 .
.
We will prove that this instance admits the desired gap between the optimal social
welfare and the revenue given by the best static uniform pricing strategy.
Lemma 4.2.1. In the two-player instance, the optimal social welfare is greater than 1, and
no static uniform pricing strategies could give more than 1/2Ω(
√
logn) of revenue.
Proof. Let us first consider the value of the optimal social welfare. By our construction, we
have the following facts about buyer valuations.
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Fact 1. For every 0 ≤ i ≤ 6k − 1, we have
v1(S
￿
i) =
1
XY i
, v2(S
￿
i) =
1
2Y i
, v2(Si \ S￿i) =
1
2Y i
.
Fact 2. For each 0 ≤ j ≤ 2, we have
v1(Ai) =
1
XY i
1− Y −6k
1− Y −3 , v2(Ai) =
1
Y i
1− Y −6k
1− Y −3 .
By these facts, it is easy to see that allocating A1 to buyer 1 and A0 to buyer 2 maximizes
the social welfare. Therefore, we have that in the two-player instance that we constructed,
the optimal social welfare is
OPT = v1(A1) + v2(A0) =
1
XY
1− Y −6k
1− Y −3 +
1− Y −6k
1− Y −3 > 1 .
Next, we will show that the revenue given by any static uniform pricing is at most
O(OPT/X) = OPT/2Ω(
√
logn). Let us first briefly explain the intuition behind this proof.
As we can see in the construction, the revenue that comes from buyer 1 is upper bounded
by her maximum valuation, which is only O
￿
1
X
￿
. So in order to get revenue non-trivially
better than 1/X, we need to get good revenue from buyer 1. However, we will show that
when the uniform price is chosen such that selling a subset of items, say, Si ∪ Si+3 ∪ . . . ,
to buyer 2 would provide good revenue, buyer 1 would purchase the subset S￿i ∪ S￿i+3 ∪ . . . .
On the one hand, the size of the latter subset is only a 1X fraction of the size of the former.
So the purchase of buyer 1 does not provides much revenue. On the other hand, the
subset purchased by buyer 1 contribute half of the valuation in the subset Si ∪ Si+3 ∪ . . . .
Therefore, buyer 2 now has much less incentive to purchase this subset and would turn to
Si+1 ∪ Si+4 ∪ . . . instead, which gives little revenue.
Now let us present the proof which validates the above intuition. Let us illustrate which
subset of items each buyer would choose given a uniform price p of the items. First, it is
clear that the buyer would choose a subset of items from the same additive component.
Second, given the price P and subject to that the buyer would choose items from the
additive component Ai, the buyer would choose an item j ∈ Ai iﬀ its valuation is higher
than the price p. Notice the valuation for a single item in the same additive component is
monotone in the sense that
v1(j ∈ S￿i) < v1(j ∈ S￿i+3) , v2(j ∈ Si \ S￿i) < v2(j ∈ S￿i) < v2(j ∈ Si+1 \ S￿i+1) .
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Therefore, for buyer 1 we only need to consider subsets of the form S￿i ∪ S￿i+3 ∪ · · · ∪
S￿
i+3￿ 6k−i−13 ￿ for 0 ≤ i ≤ 6k − 1. Similarly, for buyer 2 we only need to consider subsets
of the form Si ∪ Si+3 ∪ · · · ∪ Si+3￿ 6k−i−13 ￿ and S
￿
i−1 ∪
￿
Si ∪ Si+3 ∪ · · · ∪ Si+3￿ 6k−i−13 ￿
￿
for
0 ≤ i ≤ 6k − 1.
For convenience, we let Ti denote ∪j∈ζiSj , where ζi = {j : 6k − 1 ≥ j ≥ i, j ≡ i
(mod 3)}. Similarly, we let T ￿i denote ∪j∈ζiS￿j . We let ui(S, p) denotes the utility of buyer
i at price p when she buys the set S.
Notice that if p ∈ [v2(j ∈ Si \ S￿i), v2(j ∈ Si+1 \ S￿i+1)], then the total number of items
which has valuation higher than p is at most |S￿i|+
￿
i+1≤j<6k |Sj | = n0Xi+1 +
￿
i+1≤j<6k
n0
Xj <
3n0
Xi+1 . So the revenue is at most
X
2n0(X−1)
￿
X
Y
￿i+1 3n0
Xi+1 <
3
Y i+1 . Hence, we conclude that if
p > v2(j ∈ S3k−1 \ S￿3k−1), then the revenue is at most O(Y −3k) = O(X−3) = O
￿
OPT
2
√
logn
￿
.
In the remaining discussion, we will assume p ≤ v2(j ∈ S3k−1 \ S￿3k−1).
Choice of Items of Buyer 1 We have the following for every 0 ≤ i ≤ 3k − 1:
u1(T
￿
i , p) =
￿
j∈ζi
￿
v1(S
￿
j)− p|S￿j |
￿
=
￿
j∈ζi
￿
1
XY j
− p n0
Xj+1
￿
=
1
XY i(1− Y −3)(1±O(X
−3))− p n0
Xi+1
(1±O(X−3)) .
Therefore, u1(T ￿i , p) ≥ u1(T ￿i+1, p) is equivalent to that the price p satisfies (0 ≤ i ≤
3k − 1):
p ≤ ai = 1
n0(1 + Y −1 + Y −2)
￿
X
Y
￿i
(1±O(X−1)) (4.2)
Here, we omit the exact value of ai for the sake of clean notation. Notice that ai’s are
monotone, we have that buyer 1 would choose the subset T ￿i iﬀ. p ∈ [ai−1, ai]. The buyer
may break ties arbitrarily on the boundary.
Choice of Items for Buyer 2 Now we turn to buyer 2’s choice of items. Subject to the
assumption that p ∈ [ai−1, ai], 0 ≤ i ≤ 3k − 1, the items in T ￿i are taken away by the first
buyer when buyer 2 arrives. Further, we have that v2(j ∈ Si−1 \S￿i−1) = X2n0(X−1)
￿
X
Y
￿i−1
<
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ai−1. So the options available to buyer 2 are the following:
u2(Ti \ T ￿i , p) =
￿
j∈ζi
￿
v2(Sj \ S￿j)− p|Sj \ S￿j |
￿
=
￿
j∈ζi
￿
1
2Y j
− pn0(X − 1)
Xj+1
￿
=
1
2Y i(1− Y −3)(1±O(X
−3))− p n0
Xi
(1±O(X−1))
≤ 1
2Y i(1− Y −3)(1±O(X
−1)) (because p ≥ ai−1) ,
u2(Ti+1, p) =
￿
j∈ζi+1
(v2(Sj)− p|Sj |) =
￿
j∈ζi+1
￿
1
Y j
− p n0
Xj
￿
=
1
Y i+1(1− Y −3)(1±O(X
−3))− p n0
Xi+1
(1±O(X−1))
≥ 1
Y i+1(1− Y −3)(1±O(X
−1)) (because p ≤ ai)
u2(Ti+2 ∪ S￿i−1, p) ≤
￿
j∈ζi+2
v2(Sj) + v2(S
￿
i−1) =
￿
j∈ζi+2
1
Y j+2
+
1
2Y i−1
=
1
Y i+2(1− Y −3)(1±O(X
−3)) +
1
Y i+1
,
u2(Ti+2, p) ≤
￿
j∈ζi+2
v2(Sj) =
1
Y i+2(1− Y −3)(1±O(X
−3)) .
It is easy to verify that
u2(Ti+1, p) > max{u2(Ti \ T ￿i , p), u2(Ti+2 ∪ S￿i−1, p), u2(Ti+2, p)} .
So subject to the assumption that p ∈ [ai−1, ai], we get that buyer 2 would choose the
subset Ti+1. Hence, the total revenue is at most
p(|T ￿i |+ |Ti+1|) ≤ ai
￿ n0
Xi+1
+
n0
Xi+1
￿
<
2
X
.
Thus we get an Ω(X) = 2Ω(
√
logn) gap between revenue and the optimal social welfare
since logX = Θ(k) = Θ(
√
log n).
4.2.2 Extensions of the Two-Player Instance
We now complete the proof of Theorem 8 by extending the above two-player instance. We
present three hard instances such that
• Instance 1: The 2Ω(
√
logn) lower bound holds even if the buyers come in random
order;
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• Instance 2: The lower bound holds even if the seller can choose the order of the
buyers;
• Instance 3: The lower bound still holds if all the buyers have identical valuation
functions.
The construction of each of the latter instances is based on the previous instance.
Instance 1: Consider an instance with n items, where there are m ≥ X buyers. One of
them has the same valuation function as “buyer 2” in the two player instance constructed
above. The other m − 1 of them have identical valuation functions, and match that of
“buyer 1”. Each of the other m− 1 buyers has its own shadow copy of T ￿i . Then the profit
is at most OPT if the special buyer comes first and (following the arguments given for the
two-player instance above) at most O
￿
OPT
X
￿
otherwise. Since the first event happens with
probability only 1/m, so the expected revenue is at most (since m ≥ X):
1
m
OPT+
m− 1
m
O
￿
OPT
X
￿
< O
￿
OPT
X
￿
.
Instance 2: Now consider another instance in which we make m copies of the setting in
Instance 1 (only items are copied, not the buyers) such that each buyer is “buyer 2” in
exactly one copy, that is, each buyer has the same valuation as buyer 2 of the original
2-player instance in exactly one copy, and is “buyer 1” in the remaining copies. Moreover,
each copy of the set of items has exactly one buyer designated as “buyer 2”. We combine
these valuations over the distinct sets of items to get 3-XOS valuations: the valuations of the
sets Ai of each copy, for each i = 0, 1, 2, are combined in an additive fashion to create each
additive component. Let OPT1 denote the optimal social welfare in Instance 1. Then, it is
easy to see that OPT = Ω(mOPT1). When the first buyer in this new instance comes, she
may provide “good” revenue (at most OPT1) by purchasing items in the replicate in which
she is buyer 2. However, she also ruins all other replicates since she behaves as “buyer 2” in
those replicates. Therefore, by our construction, each of the remaining buyers will provide
at most O
￿
OPT1
X
￿
of revenue. This happens regardless of who comes in as the first buyer.
So the total revenue is at most OPT1 + (m − 1)O
￿
OPT1
X
￿
< O
￿
mOPT1
X
￿
= O
￿
OPT
X
￿
even if the seller could choose the buyer arrival order.
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Instance 3: Finally, consider a setting where all buyers are identical and share the same
valuation function v(S) = max1≤i≤m vi(S), where {vi|1 ≤ i ≤ m} are the buyer valuation
functions as defined in Instance 2. This is no longer a 3-XOS valuation. Intuitively, each of
these newly constructed buyers can buy items from any one copy of the item set behaving
as “buyer 2”, but if it does so, then it must act as “buyer 1” in all the other copies. So
as in Instance 2, the first buyer to arrive buys St in one of the copies and S￿t￿ in the all
other copies for some t, t￿, and ruins the revenue obtainable on all the other copies from
the remaining buyers when it does so. Therefore, a static uniform pricing strategy has the
same performance here as in Instance 2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 8.
4.3 Dynamic Uniform Pricing Strategies
We now present a dynamic uniform pricing strategy that achieves anO(log2 n)-approximation
to the revenue when buyer valuations are subadditive. This improves upon the previous best
known approximation factor of 2O(
√
logn log logn) [8] for the Item Pricing problem. Our
strategy makes the assumption that the seller knows OPT, the maximum social welfare,
to within a constant factor. However, this assumption can easily be eliminated by using
Lemma 4.1.4, worsening the approximation ratio of the strategy by a poly-logarithmic fac-
tor. As noted earlier, our algorithmic results for uniform strategies extend to the setting
where items may have multiple copies, by treating each copy as a distinct item.
We will also establish an almost matching lower bound result which shows that no
dynamic uniform pricing strategy can achieve o(log2 n/ log log2 n)-approximation even when
buyers are restricted to XOS valuations, the seller knows the value of OPT, buyer valuation
functions, and is allowed to specify the order of arrival of the buyers.
4.3.1 A Dynamic Uniform Pricing Algorithm
Let k = ￿log n￿ + 1, and let pi = OPT/2i (recall that OPT denotes the maximum social
welfare). The pricing strategy proposed by Blum et. al. [8] is to simply choose a price p
from pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, uniformly at random; then set up a static uniform strategy with price p.
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Even though this strategy has poor performance when there are two buyers and a limited
supply of items, Blum et. al. showed that if there is only a single buyer (equivalently, there
are unlimited number of copies available for each item) the expected revenue of this strategy
is an O(log n) approximation to optimal social welfare. Our lower bound construction on
static uniform pricing with two buyers would in fact break if the two buyers could be shown
two diﬀerent (but uniform) prices. So it is natural to consider the straightforward dynamic
extension of the simple strategy in [8], namely, pick a fresh uniform price p at random upon
the arrival of each buyer. However, the following instance indicates that such a pricing
strategy may perform poorly: consider 2n buyer and n items; the first n buyers share an
additive valuation and have value 1 for each item; the last n buyers are unit-demand buyers
that have value n for getting at least item (getting more than one items does now increase
the valuation). It is easy to verify that OPT = n2 because we can allocate one item to each
of the last n buyers. However, if we use the “fresh-price-upon-arrival” strategy as described
above, then with high probability, we would have choose a uniform price that is at most 1
for at least one of the first n buyers; hence the buyer would have purchase all the items at
a very low price.
Now, let us introduce a dynamic uniform pricing strategy which avoid selling items at
low price by picking a non-trivial reserve price upfront:
1: At time 0, choose a reserve price p∗ from the set {p1, p2 . . . pk+1}, uniformly
at random.
2: Upon arrival of any buyer, the algorithm chooses a price pˆ uniformly at random
from the set {p1, p2 . . . , p∗}, and assigns the price pˆ to all items that are yet
unsold.
Let us first give a short argument which shows that this strategy gives a revenue of
Ω(OPT/ log3 n) in expectation. This argument shall provide some intuition why the above
pricing strategy guarantees good revenue.
Consider a social welfare maximizing allocation (T1, . . . , Tm). By the standard argument
in [43] and [8], there exists a price p ∈ {p1, . . . , pk} and subsets T ￿i ⊆ Ti supported at p such
that p
￿m
i=1 |T ￿i | = Ω
￿
OPT
logn
￿
. Further, if the algorithm guesses the correct reserve price,
that is, p∗ = p/2, then upon the arrival of buyer i we have the following holds: Either
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half of the items in T ￿i are already sold, in which case take into account the revenue of at
least p∗(|T ￿i |/2) = p|T ￿i |/4 for selling those items in T ￿i ; or at least half of the items in T ￿i
remain unsold, in which case we will take into account the revenue we get from buyer i.
Subadditivity ensures that the unsold set of items are still valuable, regardless of the items
that have been sold. Due to an analogue of Lemma 4.1.3 (see Lemma 4.3.1 for details),
picking a random uniform price from {p1, p2, . . . , p∗} provides an expected revenue of at
least Ω(p|T ￿i |/ log n) from buyer i. In the above argument, we are counting the revenue from
each item at most twice (for the set T ￿i it belongs to; and for the buyer who buy it). So the
expected revenue when p∗ = p/2 is at least
￿n
i=1Ω(p|T ￿i |/ log n) = Ω(OPT/ log2 n). Since
p∗ = p/2 with probability Ω(1/ log n), we have the desired bound.
Next, we will provide a more careful analysis of the algorithm by taking into account
the revenue contribution when the algorithm makes a “wrong” choice of reserve price. By
doing so, we are able to shave oﬀ a log n factor and prove that the expected revenue is at
least Ω(OPT/ log2 n).
Theorem 9. If the buyer valuations are subadditive, then the expected revenue obtained by
the dynamic strategy above is Ω(OPT/ log2 n).
The following lemma is key to the proof of Theorem 9. It gives a lower bound on the
expected revenue obtained from a buyer if there remains a subset of items that is supported
at twice the reserve price.
Lemma 4.3.1. Suppose when the ith buyer Bi arrives, there remains a set L
j
i of unsold
items such that vi(L
j
i ) ≥ pj |Lji |, where vi is the valuation function of Bi. Then if the seller
picks a price from {p1, p2, · · · , pj+1} uniformly at random, and prices all items at this single
price, it receives an expected revenue of at least pj |Lji |/2(j + 1) from this buyer.
Proof. (Lemma 4.3.1) Let I ￿ be the set of unsold items when the buyer Bi arrives. Now if
the uniform price chosen by the seller is pj+1, then buying the set L
j
i would give Bi a utility
of at least vi(L
j
i )− pj+1|Lji | ≥ pj |Lji |− pj+1|Lji | since vi(Lji ) ≥ pj |Lji | by the assumption of
the lemma. Thus
U(Bi, I ￿, pj+1) ≥ pj |Lji |− pj+1|Lji | =
pj |Lji |
2
(4.3)
97
From Lemma 4.1.3, we get that U(Bi, I ￿, pj+1) ≤
￿j+1
t=1 |Φ(Bi, I ￿, pt)|pt. Combining with
equation 4.3, we get
j+1￿
t=1
|Φ(Bi, I ￿, pt)|pt ≥ pj |L
j
i |
2
.
Thus the expected revenue obtained from Bi is
1
j + 1
j+1￿
t=1
|Φ(Bi, I ￿, pt)|pt ≥ pj |L
j
i |
2(j + 1)
,
completing the proof of the lemma.
Proof. (Theorem 9) Let (T1, T2, . . . Tm) be an optimal allocation of items to buyersB1, B2 . . . Bm,
who have valuation functions v1, v2 . . . vm respectively, such that
￿m
i=1 vi(Ti) = OPT is the
maximum social welfare. Also, let T ji be the subset of Ti that would be bought by Bi if it
were shown only the items in Ti, and all items were uniformly priced at pj . Now consider
the case when p∗ = pj+1. Let Rj be the revenue in this case. Let Zji ⊆ T ji be a random
variable that denotes the subset of items in T ji that are sold before buyer Bi comes. Then
Rj ≥￿mi=1 p∗|Zji | =￿mi=1 pj |Zji |/2.
Note that vi(T
j
i \ Zji ) ≥ pj |T ji \ Zji | by Lemma 4.1.1. So, by Lemma 4.3.1, conditioned
on the set Zji , the expected revenue received from Bi is at least
￿
pj |T ji \ Zji |
￿
/2(j + 1).
Thus, conditioned on the sets Zji for all i, we have
E[Rj|Zji ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m] ≥ Ω
￿
m￿
i=1
￿
pj|Zji|+
pj|Tji \ Zji|
j
￿￿
= Ω
￿
m￿
i=1
pj|Tji|
j
￿
.
Since the value on the right-hand side above is independent of the variables Zji on which
the expectation of Rj is conditioned on, we get
E[Rj] = Ω
￿
m￿
i=1
pj|Tji|
j
￿
.
Thus the expected revenue R =
￿k
j=0R
j of our dynamic strategy is given by
E[R] =
1
k + 1
k￿
j=0
E[Rj] = Ω
 k￿
j=0
m￿
i=1
pj|Tji|
k2
 = Ω
 m￿
i=1
k￿
j=0
pj|Tji|
k2
 (4.4)
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Since k = ￿log n￿ + 1, and OPT ≥ Hvi(Ti), from Lemma 4.1.3 and Equation (4.4), it
follows that
k￿
j=0
pj |T ji | ≥ Ω
￿
vi(Ti)− |Ti|OPT
2n
￿
.
Thus we have
E[R] = Ω
￿
1
k2
￿
m￿
i=1
vi(Ti)−
m￿
i=1
|Ti|OPT
2n
￿￿
= Ω
￿
1
k2
￿
OPT− OPT
2
￿￿
= Ω
￿
OPT
log2 n
￿
.
4.3.2 Lower Bound for Dynamic Uniform Pricing
We shall now construct a family of instances of the problem, where the buyers have distinct
￿-XOS valuations, where ￿ = O(log n/ log log n), such that no dynamic uniform strategy
can achieve a o(log2 n/(log log n)2)-approximation, even in the full information setting, and
even when the seller can specify the order in which the buyers should arrive.
Before getting into the full proof, let us first explain the high-level picture of our hard
instance. First, let us review two instances of a single buyer which yield an Ω(log n/ log log n)
lower bound for uniform pricing. We will use these two instances as basic gadgets in the
lower bound construction.
Instance 1: Consider k = Θ(log n/ log log n) disjoint subsets of items S1, . . . , Sk
such that |Si| = n/ log2i n and v(Si) = i for i ∈ [k]. Here we let v denote the
buyer’s valuation. v is an XOS valuation with k additive components that are
additive among items in Si, i ∈ [k], respectively.
Instance 2: Almost the same as instance 1 except that the valuation v is additive
among all items.
In instance 1, we have that OPT = k and the best revenue by uniform pricing is O(1).
In instance 2, we have that OPT = Ω(k2) and the best revenue by uniform pricing is O(k).
The analysis is deferred to the full proof. Hence, each of the two instances establishes an
Ω(k) = Ω(log n/ log log n) lower bound.
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Now let us explain how to construct a hard instance based on these two gadgets. We will
consider m￿ log n buyers. Each buyer has a private copy of instance 1 and a public copy
of instance 2. Here, the terms private and public are used to indicates if the other buyers
are interested in buying those items. Concisely, each buyer does not value the items in the
other buyers’ private subset, but do value the items in the other buyers’ public subsets, yet
at a much lower value which is only a 1/k2 fraction of value of the same items in her own
public subset.
On the one hand, allocating each agent her public subset yields a social welfare of
Ω(mk2). So we have OPT = Ω(mk2).
On the other hand, by our construction, if a buyer purchase items in her private subset,
than the revenue is no more than O(1). So in order to get revenue at least ω(m), we need to
have some “good” sale by selling items in the public subsets. Indeed, the buyers may have
incentive to choose the public subsets because the valuation in instance 2 is additive among
all items. However, we can further show that when a buyer buys items in her public subset,
she also buys many items from other buyers’ public subsets at low price. Therefore, she
eliminates (partially) the edge of the public subsets. Moreover, after a few such “good” sales
(at most O(log n)), the advantage of buying the public subsets has completely disappeared.
Hence, we can bound the number of such “good” sales by O(log n) and further bound the
total revenue from these “good” sales, getting the desired lower bound.
Next, let us formally state our lower bound result in Theorem 10 and present the proof.
Theorem 10. There exists a set of buyers with XOS valuations, such that if the seller is
restricted to using a dynamic uniform pricing strategy, then even when the seller has full
information of buyer valuation functions and can even choose the order of arrival of the
buyers, the revenue produced is O(OPT(log log n)2/ log2 n), where n is the number of items.
Proof. Let B1, B2 . . . Bm denote the buyers. Our construction will use three integer pa-
rameters k, F, and Y , to be specified later. These parameters will satisfy the conditions
that k > 1, F > 1, Y > 4, and m ≥ 2Y ≥ 4k. Let f(i) = (i + 1)F/Y i. Then,
f(0) > f(1) > . . . > f(k) > f(k + 1).
For each buyerBi, we create 2(k+1) disjoint sets of items Si0, Si1 . . . Sik and S￿i0, S￿i1 . . . S￿ik
such that |Sij | = |S￿ij | = Y j items each. Let Si = ∪0≤j≤kSij and S￿i = ∪0≤j≤kS￿ij . We call
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the items in Si as shared and those in S￿i as private. The private items of Bi are valued by
buyer i only, and has zero value to all other buyers.
The valuation function vi of buyer Bi is constructed as an XOS valuation with (k + 2)
additive functions vi0, vi1 . . . vi(k+1) in its support, that is, vi = max0≤j≤k+1 vij . For 0 ≤
j ≤ k, the valuation function vij has positive value only for private items, and is defined as
vij(x) =
 f(j) if x ∈ S￿ij0 otherwise
The valuation function vi(k+1) has positive values only for shared items:
vi(k+1)(x) =
 f(j) if x ∈ Sij for 0 ≤ j ≤ kf(j + 1) if x ∈ S￿j for 1 ≤ ￿ ≤ m, ￿ ￿= i, and 0 ≤ j ≤ k
This completes the description of the instance. Note that vi(S￿ij) = f(j)|S￿ij | = (j+1)F ,
and that
vi(Si) =
k￿
j=0
f(j)|Sij | =
k￿
j=0
(j + 1)F = Ω(k2F ) .
Thus if we allocate each set Si to buyer Bi for i = 1, 2 . . .m, the social welfare obtained
is Ω(mk2F ), and hence OPT is Ω(mk2F ).
Consider now the arrival of some buyer Bi at time t. By our construction of the valuation
function, Bi will either buy only shared items or buy only private items, but not both. If the
buyer Bi were to buy shared items, and the price of each item is set at f(j) ≥ p > f(j+1),
then Bi would pick up all remaining items in ￿
0≤t≤j
Sit
￿ ￿
1≤￿ ￿=i≤m
￿
0≤t≤(j−1)
S￿t
 .
Since
￿
0≤t≤j Y
t ≤ 2Y j , the total price that Bi would pay to the seller is bounded by
f(j)(2Y j + 2mY j−1) = 2(j + 1)F + 2m(j + 1)F/Y = 2(1 +m/Y )(j + 1)F .
We now consider the maximum revenue generated if Bi were to buy a subset of its
private items. Note that when Bi arrives, all private items of Bi are still unsold. Suppose
Bi were to buy private items. What is the maximum revenue we can get? For this, note
that if the price of each item is (j + 1)F/jY j , then the utility from buying S￿ij is
(j + 1)F − (j + 1)F/j = (j + 1)(j − 1)F/j = (j − 1/j)F ,
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and the utility from buying S￿i(j−1) is
jF − (j + 1)F/jY > (j − 1/j2)F > (j − 1/j)F , since Y > 2j.
So at this price, the set S￿i(j−1) is preferred to S
￿
ij by Bi, and since the items in sets S
￿
it
for t > j have less value than the price, they are not even considered. For a greater price,
the utility of S￿i(j−1) must continue to dominate that of S
￿
ij , since the former has fewer items.
So at most Y j−1 items are bought when the price is at least (j + 1)F/jY j , for all j ≥ 1.
This implies that the revenue obtained from Bi when she buys from her private items is at
most Y j((j + 1)F/jY j) < 2F .
Consider any ordering of buyers. If the price is ever set at more than f(0), then no
item is sold in that round, while if the price set is f(k + 1) or lower, all items are sold in
that round and the revenue generated is at most 2mY kf(k + 1) = 2m(k + 2)/Y . Consider
the first time when the price set in a round is at most f(j) but greater than f(j + 1), for
some 0 ≤ j ≤ k. We call this round a j-good sale, and let Bi be the buyer. In a j-good
sale, Bi may buy all remaining items in Sit for all 0 ≤ t ≤ j, plus all items in Slt for all
1 ≤ ￿ ≤ m, ￿ ￿= i and 0 ≤ t ≤ j − 1, to yield revenue of at most
2(1 +m/Y )(j + 1)F ≤ O((m/Y )kF ) .
However, consider any time when a price in the range (f(j − 1), f(j)] appears again, and
let Bl, ￿ ￿= i be the buyer who faces this price. If Bl were to buy shared items, the only
items that are valued higher than the price and still remaining are those in S￿j , since Bi
took away whatever was remaining of S￿t for all t < j. Note that the only reason the shared
items could have given Bi a better utility was that the shared items had additive valuation,
while the private items had XOS valuation, so she got no benefit in picking up multiple sets
of private items. However, since only one feasible set S￿j of the shared items is left, this
advantage has vanished, and the revenue from B￿ is the same as the revenue if there were
no shared items at all. As discussed above, the revenue from B￿ in this case is at most 2F .
Finally, since a j-good sale can happen at most once for any 1 ≤ j ≤ (k + 1), the total
revenue generated fro all j-good sales is O
￿
(mk2F )/Y
￿
. The remaining rounds each give a
revenue of at most 2F , contributing in total O(mF ) to the revenue. Thus the revenue ob-
tained by any dynamic uniform strategy, for any ordering of buyers, is O
￿
(1 + k2/Y )mF
￿
.
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Now since the maximum social welfare is Ω(k2mF ), the approximation factor achieved
is bounded from below by Ω
￿
(k2Y )/(k2 + Y )
￿
. For any k > 10, if we set Y = k2 and
m = 2Y , then n = Θ(Y k+1) = kΘ(k), and the approximation factor is Ω(k2). As k =
Θ(log n/ log log n), we get that the smallest approximation factor that can be achieved is
Ω
￿
(log n/ log log n)2
￿
.
4.3.3 Dynamic Monotone Uniform Pricing Strategies
The dynamic uniform strategy described in Section 4.3.1 chooses a random price for each
buyer; this can result in large fluctuations in prices shown even to consecutive buyers,
which may not be preferable. We now present a simple strategy that uses a monotonically
decreasing uniform pricing for the items. When the number of buyers m is at least 2 log n,
the strategy gives an O(log2 n)-approximation to the revenue provided the buyers arrive in
a uniformly random order, that is, all permutations of the buyers are equally likely to be the
arrival order. As a corollary of this result, we conclude that if the buyers are identical, no
matter the order in which they arrive, this pricing scheme gives an O(log2 n)-approximation.
The strategy assumes that the seller knows the number of buyers m (and also OPT), and is
deterministic. Knowing estimates of m and OPT up to constant factors are also suﬃcient
for the performance of our strategy. Just like OPT, an estimate for m can be guessed using
Lemma 4.1.4.
Let k = log n + 1, and let γ = 2
k
m ≥ 1. Thus γm > 2n. The strategy gives a good
guarantee only when m ≥ log n+ 1. The strategy is as follows:
1: For 1 ≤ t ≤ m, the seller prices all unsold items uniformly at
p[t] =
OPT
2γt
when the tth buyer arrives.
Thus the price decreases with time. For m = ω(log n), the relative decrease in the price
for consecutive buyers is
p[t]− p[t+ 1]
p[t]
=
￿
1− 1
γ
￿
= Θ(
log n
m
) ,
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which tends to zero, and so the price decreases smoothly with time. It is worth noting
that another dynamic monotone strategy yields the same approximation guarantee (similar
analysis, details omitted): start with price OPT, and halve the price after every mlogn buyers.
This strategy has the benefit that the price is changed only a few (log n) times.
Theorem 11. Suppose m ≥ log n+1, and suppose that the buyer valuations are subadditive.
If the ordering of buyers in which they arrive is uniformly random (that is, all permutations
are equally likely), then the expected revenue of the dynamic monotone uniform pricing
scheme described above is
Ω
￿
OPT
log2 n
￿
.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is fairly complex, so let us first provide some intuition
regarding its veracity. If we focus on the contribution of a single buyer Bi after fixing the
sequence of the remaining buyers (Bi is inserted at a random position in this fixed sequence),
then the following two properties hold, as they did for our first dynamic (non-monotone)
uniform strategy: Bi is oﬀered a random price from a geometric range of prices, and all
previously sold items have been sold at a significantly high price. This observation invites
a similar analysis: if a large number of items from the target set of Bi were sold prior to
her arrival, that would contribute a large fraction of the revenue that could be obtained
from buyer Bi; else a random price shown to Bi yields good revenue from the remaining
items. The second part of the analysis required that the random price oﬀered is independent
from the set of remaining items, which unfortunately is not true for our dynamic monotone
strategy: the position of Bi in the sequence aﬀects both the price oﬀered as well as the
set of remaining items. So we need a more intricate analysis – one that does not merely
conditions on the set of remaining items. Nonetheless, our intuitions are proved correct, as
we see below. With this prelude, we present our formal proof of the result.
Let (T1, T2, . . . Tm) be an optimal allocation of items to buyers B1, . . . , Bm, who has
valuation functions v1, v2 . . . vm respectively, such that
￿m
i=1 vi(Ti) = OPT is the maximum
social welfare. Also, let T ji be the subset of Ti that would be bought by Bi if it were shown
only the items in Ti, and all items were uniformly priced at OPT/γj = 2p[j].
Fix a buyer Bi. Let Ri be a random variable that denotes the revenue obtained by
the seller from Bi. Let R￿i be a random variable that denotes the revenue obtained by the
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seller by selling items in Ti. Then, if R is a random variable that denotes the total revenue
obtained by our strategy, we have R =
￿m
i=1Ri and R ≥
￿m
i=1R
￿
i, so R ≥
￿m
i=1
Ri+R￿i
2 .
Fix a permutation π of all buyers except Bi. We shall say that the event π occurs if
these buyers arrive in the relative order given by π, with Bi arriving somewhere in between.
We shall now compute E[Ri +R￿i|π].
Let πj denote the permutation of all the buyers formed by inserting Bi after the (j−1)th
but before the jth position in π, whichever exists, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. That is Bi comes in as
the jth buyer in πj . Let Z
j
i denote the set of items that were sold before the arrival of Bi
when the arrival sequence of buyers is πj . Note that Z
j
i is no longer a random variable once
πj is fixed, and neither are Ri and R￿i. Also note that Pr [πj|π] = 1/m. Thus,
E[R￿i|π] ≥
1
m
m￿
j=1
p[j− 1]|Zji| ≥
1
m
m￿
j=1
p[j]|Zji| (4.5)
Let Sji be the set of items bought by Bi when the permutation of buyers is πj . Let U ji
be the utility derived by Bi in this process, and let R
j
i be the revenue obtained from Bi in
the process. For 1 ≤ j < m, note that when the permutation is πj , then when Bi arrives,
the set Sj+1i is also available, and Bi prefers S
j
i over this set at price p[j]. Thus
U ji = vi(Sji )− p[j]|Sji | ≥ vi(Sj+1i )− p[j]|Sj+1i |
= vi(S
j+1
i )− p[j + 1]|Sj+1i |− (γ − 1)p[j + 1]|Sj+1i | = U j+1i − (γ − 1)Rj+1i
This implies that Rj+1i ≥ 1γ−1(U j+1i − U ji ), for 1 ≤ j < m. Also note that vi(S1i ) −
p[0]|S1i | ≤ 0, since no bundle of items can have value greater than p[0] = OPT. So vi(S1i )−
p[1]|S1i | − (γ − 1)p[1]|S1i | = U1i − (γ − 1)R1i ≤ 0, or R1i ≥ 1γ−1U1i . Thus, adding the terms
Rti, we find that the terms telescope, and
j￿
t=1
Rti ≥
1
γ − 1
￿
j￿
t=2
￿
U ji − U j−1i
￿
+ U1i
￿
=
1
γ − 1U
j
i
By Lemma 4.1.1, we have vi(T
j
i \Zji ) ≥ 2p[j]|T ji \Zji |. So the utility of T ji \Zji to buyer
Bi at price p[j] is (2p[j]− p[j])|T ji \ Zji | = p[j]|T ji \ Zji |, which is at most U ji . Thus
j￿
t=1
Rti ≥
1
γ − 1U
j
i =
p[j]|T ji \ Zji |
γ − 1
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Using the above equation, we get
m
m￿
j=1
Rji ≥
m￿
j=1
j￿
t=1
Rti =
1
γ − 1
m￿
j=1
p[j]|T ji \ Zji |
⇒
m￿
j=1
Rji ≥
m￿
j=1
p[j]|T ji \ Zji |
(γ − 1)m ≥ Ω
￿
p[j]|T ji \ Zji |
log n
￿
The last inequality follows from the fact that γ − 1 = Θ
￿
logn
m
￿
.
Note that E[Ri|π] = 1m
￿m
j=1R
j
i. Combining with equation (4.5), we get that
E[Ri +R
￿
i|π] =
1
m
Ω
 m￿
j=1
p[j]
￿
|T ji \ Zji |
log n
+ |Zji |
￿
≥ 1
m
Ω
 m￿
j=1
p[j]|T ji |
log n
 = Ω
 1
m log n
 m￿
j=1
OPT
γj
|T ji |

Using Lemma 4.1.3, we get that
m￿
j=1
OPT
γj
|T ji | ≥
1
γ − 1
￿
vi(Ti)− |Ti|OPT
γm
￿
≥ 1
γ − 1
￿
vi(Ti)− |Ti|OPT
2n
￿
Again using the fact that γ − 1 = Θ
￿
logn
m
￿
, we get that
E[Ri +R
￿
i|π] ≥ Ω
￿
1
log2 n
￿
vi(Ti)− |Ti|OPT
2n
￿￿
Since the right-hand-side of the above equation is independent of π, we conclude
E[Ri +R
￿
i] ≥ Ω
￿
1
log2 n
￿
vi(Ti)− |Ti|OPT
2n
￿￿
.
Thus we get that the expected revenue is
E[R] =
1
2
E[Ri +R
￿
i] ≥ Ω
￿
1
log2 n
￿
m￿
i=1
vi(Ti)−
m￿
i=1
|Ti|OPT
2n
￿￿
= Ω
￿
1
log2 n
￿
OPT− OPT
2
￿￿
= Ω
￿
OPT
log2 n
￿
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4.4 Static Non-Uniform Pricing
Another approach to get around the performance barrier for static uniform pricing, exhibited
by Theorem 8, is to consider static non-uniform pricing, which allows the seller to post
diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent items but the prices remain unchanged over time. We showed
that there exist instances with identical buyers where no static uniform pricing can achieve
better than 2Ω(
√
logn)-approximation even in the full information setting. Surprisingly, this
hardness result breaks down if we consider non-uniform pricing, using only two distinct
prices. As mentioned earlier, our algorithmic results extend to the setting where there are
multiple copies of an item; however, our non-uniform strategies may assign diﬀerent prices
to diﬀerent copies of the same item.
4.4.1 Full Information Setting
We first introduce the (p,∞)-strategies, i.e. the seller posts price p for a subset of the
items and posts ∞ for all other items. The intuition is that by using this strategy the
seller can prevent certain buyers from buying certain items (that has high utility to some
other buyer) and thus achieve better revenue. The proof of the theorem below depends
on the performance of the following dynamic monotone strategy. Let k = ￿log n￿ + 1 and
m￿ = ￿m/(k + 1)￿. Recall that pi = OPT/2i for i = 1, 2, · · · , k. The seller posts a single
price p1 for the first m￿ buyers, then she posts a single price p2 for the next m￿ buyers, and
so on and so forth. We call each time period that the seller posts a fixed price a phase, and
we call this strategy the k-phase monotone uniform strategy. The proof of Theorem 11 can
be easily modified to show that this strategy gives O(log2 n)-approximation as well.
Theorem 12. In the full information setting, if m ≥ log n+1, and all buyers share the same
subadditive valuation function, then there exists a (p,∞)-strategy which obtains revenue at
least Ω(OPT/ log3 n).
Proof. Given that the k-phase dynamic monotone uniform strategy for identical buyers ob-
tains revenue at least Ω(OPT/ log2 n), at least one of the k = ￿log n+ 1￿ phases contributes
1/k fraction of the revenue. Without loss of generality, assume the ith phase contributes at
least Ω(OPT/k log2 n) = Ω(OPT/ log3 n) revenue. Suppose T is the set of items unsold at
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the beginning of phase i in the above k-phase strategy, and this set can be computed in the
full information setting by simulating buyer behavior using oracle queries.
Consider the following (p,∞)-strategy. The seller posts price p = pi+1 for each item in
T , and posts ∞ for all other items. Then when the first m￿ = ￿m/(k + 1)￿ buyers come,
they will behave the same as the m￿ buyers in phase i in the dynamic strategy scenario. So
the revenue collected is at least Ω(OPT/ log3 n).
4.4.2 Buyers with ￿-XOS Valuations
The above theorem shows a clear gap between the power of uniform pricing and the power of
non-uniform pricing in the full information setting. However, it crucially uses the knowledge
of the valuation function and the fact that all buyers are identical; information that is
usually not known to the seller. Hence strategies in the limited information setting are
more desirable in practice.
Fortunately, we find that considering static non-uniform pricing is also beneficial in the
limited information setting. We first note that if the buyer order is randomized, then it is
quite easy to get an O
￿
m log n logOPT(log logOPT)2
￿
approximation using static uniform
pricing, even with general valuations, and without the assumption of knowing OPT. This
can be done as follows: Just focus on selling items to the first buyer. If Bi is the first
buyer, and the algorithm knew the value vi(Ti), then using the single buyer (unlimited
supply setting) algorithm in [8], the strategy gets Ω(vi(Ti)/ log n) in expectation from the
first buyer, and we do not care what it gets from the other buyers. Thus the expected
revenue of the algorithm is 1m
￿￿m
i=1 vi(Ti)
logn
￿
= OPTm logn . This algorithm would have to guess
vi(Ti) ≤ OPT of the first buyer Bi, up to a constant factor, and can do so by incurring an
additional factor of O(logOPT(log logOPT)2) as described in Lemma 4.1.4.
However, if we require a strategy to give guarantees on expected revenue against any
order of buyers, and in particular an adversarial ordering, then static uniform pricing cannot
give a better bound than 2Ω(
√
logn) even when there are only two buyers, with 3-XOS
valuations. This is evident from the proof of Theorem 8. We now show a static non-
uniform strategy which achieves polylogarithmic approximation if we assume the valuation
functions are ￿-XOS functions where ￿ is quasi-polynomial in n and the number of buyers
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is polylogarithmic, for all ordering of buyers.
Let k = ￿2 log n￿, and let pi = OPT/2i. With probability half, the seller assigns a single
price p randomly drawn from {p1, p2, · · · , pk} to all items. With probability half, the seller
assigns one of p1, p2, · · · , pk+1 uniformly at random for each item. The price assignment
remains unchanged over time.
Theorem 13. For m buyers with ￿-XOS valuations functions, the expected revenue of the
above strategy is
Ω
￿
OPT
m log ￿ log3 n
￿
.
Suppose the XOS valuation function of the ith buyer is vi(S) = max1≤j≤￿ ai,j(S), where
ai,j(S) are additive functions ∀i, j. For each m-tuple z = (z1, z2, · · · , zm) ∈ [￿]m, define az
to be an additive function such that for each item g ∈ I, az(g) = max1≤i≤m ai,zi(g). For
each z and each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let Γz,j denote the set of items g such az(g) ∈ [pj , pj−1). We
say such a set Γz,j is large if its size is at least 16m log ￿ and we say it is small otherwise.
Define Az and Cz as follows:
Az =
￿
Γz,j≥16m log ￿
1≤j≤k
Γz,j , Cz =
￿
Γz,j<16m log ￿
1≤j≤k
Γz,j .
In the case where the seller posts one of p1, p2, · · · , pk+1 uniformly at random for each
item, let Πj denote the set of items which are priced pj/2 = pj+1.
The following two lemmas are crucial to the proof of Theorem 13.
Lemma 4.4.1. If the seller posts a single price p randomly drawn from {p1, · · · , pk} for all
items, then the expected revenue is at least Ω(az(Cz)/m log ￿ log n) for any z ∈ [￿]m.
Proof. Let Rj denote the revenue if the seller posts a single price pj . When the seller posts
a single price pi for all items, the buyers will buy at least one item if Cz ∩Γz,j is not empty.
Since |Cz ∩ Γz,j | < 16m log ￿, we have Rj ≥ az(Cz ∩ Γz,j)/16m log ￿. Since k = ￿2 log n￿,
the expected revenue is at least
1
k
k￿
j=1
Rj ≥
k￿
j=1
az(Cz ∩ Γz,j)
16km log ￿
=
az(Cz)
16km log ￿
= Ω
￿
az(Cz)
m log ￿ log n
￿
,
since with probability 1/k, the price posted is pj and the revenue is Rj .
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Lemma 4.4.2. If the seller posts one of p1, p2, · · · , pk+1 uniformly at random for each item,
then with probability at least 3/4 we have for every z ∈ [￿]m and 1 ≤ j ≤ k, |Πj ∩ Γz,j | ≥
|Az ∩ Γz,j | /2k.
Proof. If Γz,j is small then |Az ∩ Γz,j | = 0 and the given equation is trivially true. Now
suppose Γz,j is large, that is, |Γz,j | ≥ 16m log ￿. Note that each item in Γz,j has probability
1/k of being priced pj/2. Using Chernoﬀ bounds and we get that the probability that less
than 1/2k fraction of Γz,j are priced pj/2 is at most 1/22m log ￿ = 1/￿2m. There are at most
￿m distinct m-tuples z. For each z there are at most k = ￿2 log n￿ sets Γz,j . So the total
number of diﬀerent Γz,j is at most ￿mk < ￿2m/4. By using union bound we finish the proof
of this lemma.
We can now complete the proof of Theorem 13.
Proof. (Theorem 13) If there exists some vector z such that az(Cz) ≥ OPT320 log2 n , then we
know from Lemma 4.4.1 that the expected revenue is at least
Ω
￿
OPT
m log ￿ log n
￿
.
Now let us assume az(Cz) <
OPT
320 log2 n
for any z.
By Lemma 4.4.2, it suﬃces to prove that the expected revenue is high if for each z ∈ [￿]m
such that
|Πj ∩ Γz,j | ≥ |Az ∩ Γz,j |
2k
.
Suppose T = (T1, T2, · · · , Tm) is the allocation that maximizes the social welfare, then
OPT =
￿m
i=1 vi(Ti). There exists m-tuple z
￿ ∈ [￿]m such that ai,z￿i(Ti) = vi(Ti) and thus
OPT =
m￿
i=1
ai,z￿i(Ti) ≤ az￿(I) = az￿(Az￿) + az￿(Cz￿) .
By our assumption az￿(Az￿) ≥ OPT − OPT/320 log2 n ≥ OPT/2 and hence az￿(Az￿ ∩
Γz￿,r) ≥ OPT/2k for some r ∈ [k]. Let Z denote the set Πr ∩ Γz￿,r and we have |Z| ≥￿￿Γz￿,r￿￿ /2k. Since k = ￿2 log n￿, we have
pr |Z| ≥ pr
￿￿Γz￿,r￿￿
2k
≥ az￿(Γz￿,r)
4k
≥ OPT
8k2
≥ OPT
40 log2 n
.
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Suppose the ith buyer buys the set Si for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and let S denote the union of
all Si. If |S ∩ Z| ≥ |Z| /2 then the revenue is at least (pr/2) |S ∩ Z| ≥ (pr/2)(|Z| /2) =
Ω(OPT/ log2 n). Otherwise, |Z \ S| ≥ |Z| /2. Let ui(Si) denote the utility of set Si to the
ith buyer. We have
m￿
i=1
ui(Si) ≥
m￿
i=1
ui(Z \ S) ≥ az￿(Z \ S)− pr2 |Z \ S| ≥
pr
2
|Z \ S| ≥ OPT
160 log2 n
.
Hence
￿m
i=1 vi(Si) ≥
￿m
i=1 ui(Si) ≥ OPT160 log2 n . Note that there exists an m-tuple z￿￿ ∈ [l]m
such that ai,z￿￿i (Si) = vi(Si). So
az￿￿(Cz￿￿) + az￿￿(Az￿￿) = az￿￿(I) ≥
m￿
i=1
ai,z￿￿i (Si) ≥
OPT
160 log2 n
.
By our assumption, az￿￿(Cz￿￿) <
OPT
320 log2 n
, so az￿￿(Az￿￿) = Ω(OPT/ log
2 n). Note that an item
g is bought if and only if its price is less than ai,z￿￿i (g) for some i. So all items in Γz￿￿,j ∩Πj
are bought (for all j) and by Lemma 4.4.2, with probability at least 3/4, the revenue is at
least
k￿
j=1
pj
2
￿￿Γz￿￿,j ∩Πj￿￿ ≥ k￿
j=1
pj
￿￿Γz￿￿,j ∩Az￿￿￿￿
4k
= Ω
￿
az￿￿(Az￿￿)
k
￿
= Ω
￿
OPT
log3 n
￿
.
Hence the expected revenue is at least Ω(OPT/m log ￿ log3 n), and the proof is complete.
4.5 Conclusion
We have shown that using multiple prices allows a seller to get better guarantees on revenue
even when the seller does not know the buyers’ valuations. For this, we allowed the seller to
show diﬀerent prices to each buyer. These dynamic strategies, however, still show the same
price on every item to a particular buyer. Dynamic strategies may be applicable in may set-
tings, particularly online settings, but static strategies are more widely applicable. We have
also shown that static strategies using multiple prices can be better than using a single price
on all items, but our guarantee is better only when the number of buyers is small, and the
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valuation functions are more restrictive than just being subadditive. The main open prob-
lem here is whether static non-uniform strategies can give polylogarithmic approximation
even when the number of buyers is large and they have subadditive valuations.
A broader question is to find better bounds on the maximum revenue any pricing strategy
can obtain. We have used optimal social welfare as our bound, but even with one buyer,
there are instances where the maximum social welfare and the maximum revenue that can
be obtained by any strategy, is separated by a logarithmic factor. One may expect that
if we instead try to design eﬃciently computable strategies and compare them against an
optimal pricing strategy (or an optimal strategy in some broad class of strategies), better
approximation factors, such as a constant, may be achieved.
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Chapter 5
Sequential Posted Pricing in
Multi-Unit Auctions
In this chapter, we study multi-unit auctions in Bayesian setting. We consider the following
Sequential Posted Pricing problem in a K-unit auction. There is a single seller with K
identical copies of a single item to sell, to n prospective buyers. Each buyer is interested
in exactly one copy of the item, and has a value for it that is unknown to the seller. The
buyers arrive in a sequence, and each buyer appears exactly once. The arrival order may be
chosen by the seller. The seller quotes a price for the item to each arriving buyer, and may
quote diﬀerent prices to diﬀerent buyers. Assuming that buyers are rational, a buyer buys
the item if the price quoted to him is less than his value for the item, and pays the quoted
price to the seller. This process stops when either K buyers have bought the item or when
all buyers have arrived and left. Results in this chapter were published in collaboration
with Eyal Even-Dar, Sudipto Guha, Yishay Mansour and S Muthukrishnan [20].
We focus on pricing and ordering strategies in the above model, called sequential posted-
price mechanisms (SPMs), that maximize the seller’s expected revenue. A (non-adaptive)
SPM is also equivalent to asking prices in parallel, and choosing to sell the items to up
to K of the buyers who accepted their respective oﬀered prices. Posted price mechanisms
are clearly incentive compatible, and commonly used in practice. We design strategies in
a Bayesian framework, where each buyer draws his value of the item from a distribution.
These value distributions are known to the seller, and are used in designing the mechanism.
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SPMs were recently studied in the general context of Bayesian single-parameter mech-
anism design (BSMD), which includes our K-unit auction, by Chawla et. al. [28]. They
designed eﬃciently computable SPMs for various classes of BSMD problems and compared
their expected revenue to that of the optimal auction mechanism, which was given by Myer-
son [76]. For the K-unit auction, they showed that their SPM guarantees (1−1/e)-fraction
of the revenue obtained by Myerson’s auction. Bhattacharya et. al. [13] (as well as [28]) also
used sequential item pricing to approximate optimal revenue, when the seller has multiple
distinct items. However, the SPM computed by their algorithms may not be the optimal
SPM, i.e. there may exist SPMs with greater expected revenue. Given that sequential
pricing is quite common in practice, we focus in this chapter on eﬃciently computing an
optimal SPM.
Our Results The results in [28] immediately imply a (1 − 1/e)-approximation for the
problem of computing optimal SPMs in K-unit auction. We strictly improve this bound.
We design two diﬀerent algorithms – the first is a polynomial time algorithm that yields a
(1− KK
K!eK
) ≈ (1− 1√
2πK
)-approximation, and is meant for large values of K, and the second
is a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for constant K. Combining these two
algorithms yield a polynomial time approximation scheme for the optimal SPM problem,
for all values of K: if K > 12π￿2 , run the first algorithm, else run the second algorithm.
Recall that a PTAS is an algorithm that, for any given constant ￿ > 0, yields (1 − ￿)-
approximation in polynomial time (the exponent of the polynomial should be a function of
￿ only, and independent of input size).
Note that a sequential posted pricing strategy can be adaptive – it can alter its prices
and the ordering of the remaining buyers based on whether the current buyer buys the item.
We shall call such strategies as Adaptive SPMs, or ASPMs, while SPM shall refer to a
non-adaptive pricing and ordering strategy. Clearly, the expected revenue from an optimal
ASPM is at least that from an optimal SPM.
Further, the analysis of our first algorithm shows that it gives the said approximation
guarantee of (1 − KK
K!eK
) ≈ (1 − 1√
2πK
) even against the expected revenue of Myerson’s
revenue-optimal auction. Thus the gap between an optimal SPM and an optimal auction
vanishes solely as a function of the inventory size is increased, and this result holds even if
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the buyers’ pool is chosen adversarially based on K. In other words, a seller who owns a
large inventory may commit to use a pricing strategy instead of an auction, and be assured
that this commitment can lead only to a small regret, even before gathering any knowledge
about the buyers’ pool.
We design a third algorithm that outputs an ASPM, and is a PTAS for computing
an optimal ASPM, for constant K. Again, combining this result with our first algorithm,
we obtain a PTAS for the optimal ASPM problem, for all values of K. Adaptive PTAS
with multiplicative approximation is rare to find in stochastic optimization problems. For
example, an adaptive PTAS for the stochastic knapsack problem has been developed very
recently [12]. The theorem below summarizes our results.
Our Techniques The first algorithm is based on a linear programming (LP) relaxation of
the problem, such that the optimal solution to the LP upper bounds the expected revenue
from any truthful mechanism, and in fact any Bayes-Nash equilibrium of any, possibly non-
truthful, mechanism. We show that this LP has an optimal integral solution (after adding
infinitesimal perturbations to break ties arbitrarily), from which we construct a pricing for
the buyers. The buyers are ordered simply in decreasing order of prices – it is easy to see
that this is an optimal ordering policy given the prices. The LP formulation implies that if
there were no limit on the number of copies the seller can sell, then the expected revenue
obtained from this pricing would be equal to the LP optimum, and at most K copies of the
item are sold in expectation. However, the algorithm is restricted to selling at most K copies
in all realizations, and the result follows by bounding the loss due to this hard constraint.
The interesting property we find is that this loss vanishes as K increases. It should be
noted that an LP-based approach is used in [13]; however, they consider a more general
problem with multiple distinct items, and their analysis yielded no better than constant
approximation factors.
The second algorithm uses a dynamic programming approach, which is common in the
design of approximation schemes. We make some key observations that reduce the problem
to an extended version of the generalized assignment problem (GAP) [82, 29] with constant
number of bins, which has polynomial time algorithm (polynomial in the size of bins and
number of items) using dynamic programming. The main observation is that in any SPM,
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if we pick a contiguous subsequence of buyers to whom there is very small probability of
selling even a single copy, and arbitrarily permute this subsequence, the resulting SPM will
have almost the same expected revenue as the original SPM. This observation drastically
cuts down the number of configurations that we have to check before finding a near-optimal
SPM.
The third algorithm for computing ASPM is a generalization of the second algorithm,
but it must now approximate a decision tree, that may branch at every step based on
whether a copy is bought, instead of an SPM sequence. The key observation in this case
is that there exists a near-optimal decision tree that does not branch too often, and the
problem again reduces to an extension of GAP with constant number of bins.
Other Related Work Maximizing welfare via truthful mechanisms in prior-free settings
have been studied for K-unit auctions [44, 45] and combinatorial auctions, such as the work
described in Chapter 4. Bayesian assumptions has led to constant approximation against
optimal revenue from any auction for special cases of combinatorial auctions [13, 28]. But
Bayesian assumptions can also lead to tighter upper bounds on optimal sequential pricing,
and that is one of our main contribution. A parallel posted-price approach has been used
in a more complex repeated ad auction setting to get constant approximation [21].
5.1 Preliminaries
In a K-unit auction, there is a single seller who has K identical copies of a single item, and
wish to sell these copies to n prospective buyers B1, B2 . . . Bn. Each buyer Bi is interested
in one copy of the item, and has value vi for it. vi is drawn from a distribution specified
by cumulative distribution function (cdf) Fi that is known to the seller. The values of
diﬀerent buyers are independently drawn from their respective distributions. Without loss
of generality, we assume that K ≤ n.
Definition 5.1.1. Let piv denote the probability that Bi has value v for the item. Let p˜iv
denote the probability that Bi has value at least v. We shall call it the success probability
when Bi is oﬀered price v. Clearly p˜iv =
￿
v￿≥v piv￿.
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We assume, for all our results, that each value distribution is discrete, with at most L
distinct values in its support (i.e. these values have non-zero probability mass). Let UVi be
the support set of values for the distribution of Bi, and let UV =
￿n
i=1 UVi . We shall also
assume that L is polynomial in n, and that p˜iv is an integral multiple of
1
10n2 for all i, v.
These assumptions are without loss of generality for obtaining PTAS for optimal SPM or
ASPM (see Section 5.4.1 for a brief discussion).
Definition 5.1.2. A sequential posted-price mechanism (SPM) is a mechanism which con-
siders buyers arrive in a sequence, and oﬀers each of them a take-it-or-leave-it price: the
buyer may either buy a copy at the quoted price or leave, upon which the seller makes an
oﬀer to another buyer. Each buyer is given an oﬀer at most once, and the process ends
when either all K copies have been sold, or there is no buyer remaining.
An SPM specifies the entire sequence of buyers and prices before the process begins. In
contrast, an adaptive sequential posted-price mechanism (ASPM) may decide the next buyer
based on which of the current and past buyers accepted their oﬀered prices.
Note that there can be no adaptive behavior when K = 1, since the process stops with
the first accepted price. Thus an ASPM can be specified by a decision tree: each node of
the tree contains a buyer and a price to oﬀer. Each node may have multiple children. The
selling process starts at the root of the tree (i.e. oﬀers the price at the root to the buyer at
the root), and based upon whether a sale occurs at the root, moves to one of the children
of the root, and continues inductively. The process stops when either K items have been
sold, or n buyers have appeared on the path in the decision tree traversed by the process –
the latter nodes are the leaves of the decision tree.
It is easy to see that the decision of an optimal ASPM at any node of the tree should
depend only on the number of copies of the item left and the remaining set of buyers (the
latter is solely determined by the node reached by the process). Thus, each node has at
most K children, at most one each for the number of copies left. Note that an ASPM may
not adapt immediately to a sale – it may move to a fixed buyer regardless of the outcome.
Such a node will only have a single child. Without loss of generality, we shall represent an
ASPM such that each non-leaf node either has a single child or K children (some of which
may even be infeasible). The latter nodes are called branching nodes. In this context, an
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SPM is simply an ASPM whose decision tree is a path.
Note that SPM and ASPM are incentive compatible: a buyer Bi buys the item if and
only if its value vi is equal to or greater than the price oﬀered to it, and pays only the
quoted price to the seller.
Definition 5.1.3. The revenue R(v1, v2 . . . vn) obtained by the seller for a given SPM is
the sum of the payments made by all the buyers, which is a function of the valuations of the
buyers. The expected revenue of an SPM or ASPM is computed over the value distributions
Evi∼Fi [R(v1, v2 . . . vn)]. An optimal SPM or ASPM is an SPM (respectively, ASPM) that
gives the highest expected revenue among all SPMs (respectively, ASPMs).
Let the expected revenue of an optimal SPM (or ASPM) be OPT. An α-approximate
SPM (or ASPM, respectively), where α ≤ 1, has expected revenue at least αOPT.
5.1.1 Basic Result
An SPM must specify an ordering of the buyers as well as the prices to oﬀer to them. It is
worth noting that if either one of these tasks is fixed, the other task becomes easy.
Lemma 5.1.1. Given take-it-or-leave-it prices to oﬀer to the buyers, a revenue-maximizing
SPM with these prices simply considers buyers in the order of decreasing prices. Given an
ordering of buyers, one can compute in polynomial time a revenue-maximizing ASPM that
uses this ordering (and only adapts the oﬀered prices).
Proof. For the first claim, consider an SPM where there are two buyers Bi and Bj , such
that Bi arrives just before Bj , but is oﬀered a lower price than Bj . Consider the modified
SPM created by swapping Bi and Bj in the order, while keeping the price oﬀered to Bi, Bj
and other buyers unchanged. In realizations where at most one of Bi or Bj accepts the
price, the revenue of the original and modified SPMs are equal. However, in realizations
where both buyers accept their oﬀered prices, the selling process may not reach the latter
buyer, and so the modified SPM has higher or equal revenue in that case.
For the second claim, we can compute the prices using dynamic programming. Let
the buyers be ordered as Bπ(1), Bπ(2) . . . Bπ(n). Let A(i, j) denote the maximum expected
revenue that can be obtained from the last i buyers in the given ordering, if there are j items
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left to sell to them. For initialization, set A(1, 0) = 0, and A(1, j) = maxx∈UV xPr [vn ≥ x]
for j ≥ 1, which is the maximum expected revenue from Bn with the item in stock. Suppose
A(i− 1, j) has been computed for all j. Then A(i, j) can be computed by iterating through
all possible prices to oﬀer Bn−i+1, and pick one that yields highest expected revenue. For
a price x ∈ UV , the expected revenue is (x + A(i − 1, j − 1))Pr [vn−i+1 ≥ x] + A(i −
1, j)Pr [vn−i+1 < x]. Finally, A(n,K) is the expected revenue. Note that we could store,
along with A(i, j), the optimal price p, and these prices yield the required ASPM.
5.2 LP-based Algorithm for Large K
In this section we present our first algorithm that yields us an approximation factor that
improves as K increases, and implies a vanishing adaptivity gap. The following theorem
summarizes our result.
Theorem 14. For all K ≥ 1, if a seller has K units to sell, there exists an SPM whose
expected revenue is at least 1 − KK
K!eK
≥ 1 − 1√
2πK
fraction of the expected revenue of an
optimal auction. This SPM can be computed in polynomial time.
As a first step to our algorithm, we add random infinitesimal perturbation to the values
v ∈ UVi and the associated probability values piv, so that almost surely, UVi are disjoint,
and further, all the values and probabilities are in general position. Intuitively, this property
is used in our algorithm to break ties.
By Myerson’s characterization [76], any truthful mechanism (in particular, Myerson’s
optimal auction) can be viewed as follows: it sets a price for each buyer Bi as a function
of the bids of all other buyers, and Bi receives the item if and only if its valuation exceeds
this oﬀered price. Consider the event Eiv that Bi is oﬀered the item at price v, and accepts
the oﬀer. Let yiv denote the probability of that Eiv occurs when P is implemented. Let
xiv denote the probability that Bi was oﬀered price v when P is implemented. Note that
both probabilities are taken over the value distributions of the buyers, as well as internal
randomization of P. Naturally, we must have yiv ≤ p˜ivxiv. Also, by linearity of expectation,
the expected revenue obtained by P is￿ni=1￿v∈UV vyiv. Moreover,￿ni=1￿v∈UV yiv is the
expected number of copies of the item sold by the seller, and this quantity must be at most
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K. Finally, the mechanism enforces that each buyer is oﬀered a price at most once in any
realization, and hence in expectation,i.e.
￿
v∈UV xiv ≤ 1.
Viewing xiv and yiv as variables depending upon the mechanism used, optimum of the
following linear program Lp-K-SPM provides an upper bound to the expected revenue
from any auction. Our algorithm involves computing an optimal solution to this program
with a specific structure, and use the solution to construct an SPM. We also consider its
dual program, Dual-K-SPM.
Lp-K-SPM = max
n￿
i=1
￿
v∈UV
vyiv
yiv ≤ p˜ivxiv ∀i ∈ [1, n], v ∈ UV￿
v∈UV xiv ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ [1, n]￿n
i=1
￿
v∈UV yiv ≤ K
yiv, xiv ≥ 0
Dual-K-SPM = minKτ +
￿
i λi
ζiv + τ ≥ v
λi −
￿
v p˜ivζiv ≥ 0
ζiv,λi, τ ≥ 0
Lemma 5.2.1. Assuming that the points in UVi and the probabilities p˜iv have been perturbed
infinitesimally, and so are in general position, there exists an optimal structured solution
x∗iv, y∗iv of Lp-K-SPM, computable in polynomial time, such that:
1. for all i, v, yiv = p˜ivxiv.
2. for each i there is exactly one v such that xiv > 0. Let v(i) denote the value for which
xiv(i) > 0.
3. There exists at most one i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n and xiv(i) = 1. If such i = i￿ exists,
then v(i￿) = minni=1 v(i).
Proof. Given any feasible solution to Lp-K-SPM, where yiv < p˜ivxiv for some i, v, we can
simply reduce xiv till yiv becomes equal to p˜ivxiv. This change keeps the solution feasible,
and also leaves the objective unchanged. So we can simply eliminate the variables yiv from
Lp-K-SPM by setting yiv = p˜ivxiv. An optimal solution to this modified LP will also be an
optimal solution for the original LP, and naturally satisfy the first condition in the lemma.
By a minor abuse of notation, we refer to this modified LP as Lp-K-SPM.
120
Let us now consider the Lagrangian program LagrangianSPM(τ) obtained by remov-
ing the constraint of selling at most K copies, and associating a cost τ of violating this
constraint in the objective. The following property holds by LP duality: let τ∗ be the
assignment to variable τ in an optimal solution to Dual-K-SPM. Then the optimum of
LagrangianSPM(τ∗) is equal to the optimum of Lp-K-SPM in value. We shall compute an
optimal solution of LagrangianSPM(τ∗) that is also feasible for Lp-K-SPM, and satisfies
either τ∗ = 0 or
￿
i
￿
v p˜ivxiv = K. Such a solution must also be an optimal solution of
Lp-K-SPM.
LagrangianSPM(τ) = max
￿￿
i
￿
v
vp˜ivxiv + τ(K −
￿
i
￿
v
p˜ivxiv)
￿
= Kτ +
￿
i
max
￿
v
(v − τ)p˜ivxiv￿
v
xiv ≤ 1
yiv, xiv ≥ 0
If p˜iv = 0, then we assume that xiv is set to zero, since this does not aﬀect feasibility or
value of the objective. Let an optimal solution of LagrangianSPM(τ∗) be denoted by x∗iv(τ∗).
Such a solution must satisfy x∗iv(τ∗) = 0 for all v < τ∗. Further for some i, if maxv(v−τ∗)p˜iv
is maximized at a unique v, then x∗iv(τ∗) = 1 if v = argmaxv∈UVi{(v−τ∗)p˜iv|v ≥ τ∗}, and 0
otherwise. If maxv(v− τ∗)p˜iv > 0, then the added perturbations ensure that the maximum
is indeed unique.
Suppose the maximum is zero for some i, then p˜iv = 0 and so x∗iv(τ∗) = 0 ∀v > τ∗. Since
every buyer has some non-zero probability of having a positive value for the item (else we
can simply neglect such buyers), we have τ∗ > 0. The only x∗iv(τ∗) that we may set to a non-
zero value is for v = τ∗, provided that τ∗ ∈ UVi . Because of added perturbations, this can
happen for at most one buyer i. We first fix the assignment of all other variables as described
above, then set this x∗iv to the highest value less than 1 such that
￿
i
￿
v p˜ivxiv) ≤ K. This
gives our required structured solution. Given τ∗, constructing the solution requires linear
time. As mentioned before, τ∗ can be computed by solving Dual-K-SPM; one may also
use binary search techniques for this purpose, similar to many packing LPs (details omitted,
see, eg. [80]).
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Our algorithm for computing an SPM is as follows:
1. Compute an optimal structured solution of Lp-K-SPM.
2. In the SPM, oﬀer price v(i) to Bi, and consider buyers in order of decreasing v(i).
5.2.1 Approximation Factor
It remains to analyze the approximation factor of our algorithm. Let the order of decreasing
prices be Bπ(1), Bπ(2) . . . Bπ(n). For 1 ≤ i < n, let Zi be a two-valued random variable that
is v(π(i)) = zi with probability p˜π(i)v(π(i)) = ui, and 0 otherwise. To define Zn, note that
x∗π(n)v(π(n)) in the structured optimal solution may not have been 1, so let Zn be v(π(n)) = zn
with probability x∗π(n)v(π(n))p˜π(n)v(π(n)) = un and 0 otherwise. If Z =
￿n
i=1 Zi, then E[Z] is
the optimum of the LP solution. The revenue of the algorithm, however, is at least equal to
the sum of the first K variables in the sequence Z1, Z2 . . . Zn that are non-zero. Let this sum
be denoted by the random variable Z ￿. Note that z1 ≥ z2 ≥ . . . ≥ zn, and
￿n
i=1 ui ≤ K.
The following lemma immediately implies Theorem 14.
Lemma 5.2.2. E[Z￿] ≥ (1− KK
K!eK
)E[Z] ≥ (1− 1√
2πK
)E[Z].
Proof. Let α(i) = ziui. Let the probability that we reach Zi in the sequence before find-
ing K non-zero variables, be given by the function f(i, ￿u) (this function is independent
of z1, z2 . . . zn), where ￿u = (u1, u2 . . . un). Then E[Z￿] =
￿n
i=1 f(i, u˜)α(i), while E[Z] =￿n
=1 α(i). Observe that f(i, ￿u) is monotonically decreasing in i. We shall narrow down the
the instances on which E[Z￿]/E[Z] is minimized.
Claim 3. Given an instance comprising variables Z1, Z2 . . . Zn such that zi > zi+1, one can
modify it to construct another instance Z˜1, Z˜2 . . . Z˜n such that E[Z￿]/E[Z] decreases.
Proof. We modify the instance by defining α￿(j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and setting the possible
non-zero value of Z˜j to be z˜j = α￿(j)/uj , with success probability remaining uj :
α￿(j) =

α(j) if j ￿= i, i+ 1
α(i)−∆ if j = i
α(i+ 1) +∆ if j = i+ 1
where ∆ =
zi − zi+1
1
u(i) +
1
u(i+1)
> 0
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Note that Z˜j = Zj ∀j ￿= i, i+1, so only Zi and Zi+1 gets modified. Further, z˜j are non-
increasing in j (in fact, z˜i = ˜zi+1) so the modified instance is valid. Also,
￿
i α(i) =
￿
i α
￿(i),
so E[Z] remains unchanged. ￿u remains unchanged too, and hence the probabilities f(i, ￿u).
Finally, the change in E[Z￿] is (f(i+ 1, ￿u)− f(i, ￿u))∆ < 0, i.e. E[Z￿] decreases.
Thus, we can restrict our attention to instances where z1 = z2 = . . . = zn = z∗ (say).
Without loss of generality, we let z = 1, so that Z1, Z2 . . . are Bernoulli variables, and
Z ￿ = min{Z,K}. Note that the ordering of the variables do not influence Z ￿. The next step
is to show that if we split the variables, keeping E[Z] unchanged, E[Z￿] can only decrease.
Claim 4. Let Z1, Z2 . . . Zn be Bernoulli variables, such that the success probability is
Pr [Zj = 1] = uj. Suppose that we modify the set of variables by removing Zi from it
and adding two Bernoulli variables Z˜i and Zˆi to it, where Pr
￿
Z˜i = 1
￿
= u˜i > 0 and
Pr
￿
Zˆi = 1
￿
= uˆi > 0, and u˜i + uˆi = ui. Then E[Z￿] = E[min Z,K] decreases or remains
unchanged due to this modification, while E[Z] = K remains unchanged.
Proof. Let X be the sum of the remaining variables, i.e. X =
￿i−1
j=1 Zj +
￿n
j=i+1 Zj . We
shall show that E[Z￿|X ≤ K − 2] and E[Z￿|X ≥ K] remain unchanged by the modification,
while E[Z￿|X = K− 1] decreases, thus proving .
If X ≤ K−2, then Z ￿ is X+Zi in the original instance, and X+ Z˜i+ Zˆi in the modified
instance. Since E[Zi] = E[Z˜i + Zˆi] = ui, so E[Z￿|X ≤ K − 2] remains unchanged. Also, if
X ≥ K, then Z ￿ is simply K in both instances. If X = K − 1, then Z ￿ = K − 1 + Zi
in the original instance and Z ￿ = K − 1 + min{1, Z˜i + Zˆi} in the modified instance. So
E[Z￿|X = K− 1] = K− 1 + ui and E[Z￿|K− 1] = K− 1 +Pr
￿
Z˜i + Zˆi ≥ 1
￿
= K− 1 + (u˜i +
uˆi − u˜iuˆi) < K− 1 + ui, respectively.
Assume that the success probabilities of the Bernoulli variables are all rational – since
rational numbers form a dense set in reals, this shall not change the lower bound we are
seeking. Then, there exists some large integer N such that all the probabilities are integral
multiples of 1/N . Further, we can choose an arbitrarily large N for this purpose. Now, split
each variable that has success probability t/N into t variables, each with success probability
1/N . The above claim implies that E[Z￿]/E[Z] can only decrease due to the splitting. Thus,
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it remains to lower bound E[Z￿]/K for the following instance, as N → ∞: KN Bernoulli
variables, each with success probability 1/N .
For this final step, we use the well-known property that the sum of Bernoulli variables
with infinitesimal success probabilities approach the Poisson distribution with the same
mean. In particular, if P is a Poisson variable with mean K, then the total variation
distance between Z and P is at most (1 − e−K)/N (see e.g. [10]), which tends to zero
as N → ∞. Thus, we simply need to find E[minP,K]/K, and this is the lower bound on
E[Z￿]/E[Z] that we are seeking. It can be verified that E[minP,K] = K(1 − KK
K!eK
) (see
Section 5.4.2), which proves the lemma.
5.3 PTAS for constant K
We now define an optimization problem called VersionGAP, and our PTAS for both SPM
and ASPM for constant K will reduce to solving multiple instances of this problem.
VersionGAP: Suppose there are n objects, and each object has L versions. Let version j
of object i have profit pij and size sij ≤ 1. Also, suppose there are C bins 1, 2 . . . C, where
bin ￿ has size s￿ and a discount factor γ￿ . The goal is to place versions of objects to bins,
such that:
1. Each object can be placed into a particular bin at most once, as a unique version. If
object i is placed as version j into bin ￿, then it realizes a profit of γ￿pij and a size of
sij .
2. Each object can appear in multiple bins, as diﬀerent versions. However, there is a
given collection FC of feasible subsets of bins 1, 2 . . . C. The set of bins that an object
is placed into must be a feasible subset.
3. The sum of realized sizes of objects placed into any bin ￿ must be less than s￿.
The profit made by an assignment of object version to bins, that satisfy all the above
conditions, is the sum of realized profits by all objects placed in the bins. The goal is to
find an assignment that maximizes the profit.
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Lemma 5.3.1. For all objects and versions i, j, let sij be a multiple of 1/M for some fixed
M ≥ 2. Then an optimal solution to VersionGAP can be found in time (ML)O(C)n.
Proof. The algorithm is a simple dynamic programming. Order the objects arbitrarily. Let
D(i, j1, j2 . . . jC) be an optimal feasible assignment (or the profit thereof, by an abuse of
notation) of the first i objects, such that the sum of realized sizes of objects in bin ￿ is
j￿, for ￿ = 1, 2 . . . C. D(i, j1, j2 . . . jC) is assigned as null and its profit as −∞ if no such
assignment exists. Note that we only consider j￿ to be multiples of 1/M and at most 1, for
all ￿.
D(0, j1, j2 . . . jC) is null for all j1, j2 . . . jC , except for D(0, 0, 0 . . . 0) which is zero.
Suppose D(i − 1, j1, j2 . . . jC) have been computed for all j1, j2 . . . jC . Then to compute
D(i, j1 . . . jC), we first choose a feasible subset of bins from FC to place it in (|FC | < 2C
choices), then its version in each bin in this subset (at most LC choices), and then compute
the objective as D(i−1, j1− sit1 , j2− sit2 . . . jC − sitC )+
￿C
￿=1 γ￿pit￿ , where t￿ is the version
in which object i is chosen to be placed in bin ￿ (if the object is not placed in bin ￿, treat
sit￿ and pit￿ as zero).
We iterate through all the choices to maximizes this objective. Thus, computing each
entry D(i, j1 . . . jC) takes time at most O(C(2L)C). The number of entries is at most nMC .
The maximum among all the entries gives the required assignment.
5.3.1 PTAS for Computing SPM
We now design an algorithm to compute a near-optimal SPM for constant K.
Theorem 15. There exists a PTAS for computing an optimal SPM, for any constant K.
The running time of the algorithm is
￿
nk
￿
￿poly(k,￿−1)
, and gives (1− ￿)-approximation.
We shall, without loss of generality, give a (1− ck￿)-approximation, and this will imply
the above theorem: putting ￿ = ￿￿/ck will yield a (1− ￿￿)-approximation.
We first establish some definitions that we shall use. Let a segment refer to a sequence
of some buyers and prices oﬀered to these buyers – we shall refer to parts of an SPM as
segments. Let the undiscounted contribution V(Bi) of a buyer Bi, when oﬀered price x(Bi),
be α(Bi) = x(Bi)p˜ix(Bi), while its weight be p˜ix(Bi), its success probability. Undiscounted
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contribution V(S) of a segment S is the sum of undiscounted contributions of buyers in the
segment, and the weight of the segment is the sum of their weights.
Given an SPM, let dis(B) denote the probability that the selling process reaches buyer
B. The real contribution of a buyer to the expected revenue is α(B)dis(B), and the expected
revenue of the SPM is the sum of the real contributions of all the buyers. More generally,
let γ￿(B) denote the probability that Bi is reached with at least ￿ items remaining. Then
dis(B) = γ1(B). The discount factor dis(S) of a segment S, whose first buyer is B, is
defined to be dis(B). Similarly, we define γ￿(S) = γ￿(B).
We present our algorithm through a series of structural lemmas, each of which follows
quite easily from the preceding lemmas. The first step towards our algorithm is that we
can restrict our attention to truncated SPMs.
Lemma 5.3.2. There exists an SPM of total weight at most K log K￿ , where each buyer has
discount factor at least ￿, that gives an expected revenue of at least (1 − ￿)OPT. We shall
refer to SPMs that satisfy this condition as truncated.
Proof. Consider the smallest prefix of the optimal SPM (with expected revenue OPT) such
that the discount factor of the corresponding suﬃx, obtained by removing the prefix, is
at most ￿. Moreover, if we were to simply omit this prefix, then the expected revenue of
the remaining segment can at most be OPT. So the contribution of the remaining segment
to the optimal SPM is at most ￿OPT, and the prefix alone has expected revenue expected
revenue at least (1− ￿)OPT. By Fact 3, the probability that no copy gets sold in a segment
of weight log K￿ is at most ￿/K. Thus the weight of the prefix is at most K log
K
￿ .
We can now restrict ourself to approximating an optimal truncated SPM. The following
definition of a permutable segment will be crucial to the description of our algorithm.
Definition 5.3.1. We shall call an SPM segment permutable if either:
1. its weight is at most δ = ￿
3
20K3 . We shall refer to such a permutation segment as a
small buyers segment.
2. it has a single buyer, possibly of weight more than δ. In this case, we shall refer to
this buyer as a big buyer.
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Any SPM can clearly be decomposed into a sequence of permutable segments and big
buyers. Moreover, any truncated SPM can be decomposed into a sequence of at most
C = O(
K log K￿
δ ) permutable segments. This is because if the permutable segments are
maximally chosen, then two consecutive permutable segments in the decomposition either
have at least one big buyer between them, or their weights must add up to more than δ
(otherwise, the two segments can be joined to create one permutable segment).
Fact 3. Let 1 > y1, y2 . . . y￿ > 0. Let
￿￿
j=1 yj = s. Then 1−s+s2 > e−s >
￿￿
j=1(1−yj) >
1− s.
Lemma 5.3.3. The probability of selling at least one copy of the item in a small buyers
permutable segment that has weight s is at least s − s2. The probability of selling at least
t ≥ 1 copies (assuming that at least t copies are left as inventory) in such a segment is at
most st. So the probability of selling exactly one copy is at least s− 2s2.
Proof. Fact 3 implies that the probability of selling at least one item is at least s− s2 and
at most s.
For the second statement, consider t = 2. Conditioning on a particular buyer B in the
segment buying a copy, the probability that the remaining buyers in the segment buy at
least one copy is at most s. The two events are independent, so the probability of their
simultaneous occurrence is the product of their probabilities. Summing over all buyers in
the segment, we get that the probability that at least two items are bought is at most s2.
The argument scales in a similar fashion for higher values of t: probability that t items are
bought is at most st.
Lemma 5.3.4. Consider a permutable segment of weight s appearing in an SPM, and let
its discount factor be γ. Then the discount factor of the last buyer in the segment is at least
γ(1− s). If the undiscounted contribution of the segment is α, then the real contribution of
buyers in this segment to the expected revenue is at least αγ(1− δ) and at most αγ.
Proof. The probability of the process not stopping inside the segment, conditioned upon
reaching it, is at least the probability of not selling any copy in the segment, which is at
least 1− s (it is exactly 1− s for a big buyer segment).
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The above lemma shows that the real contribution of a segment can be approximated
by the product of its discount factor and its undiscounted contribution, which does not
depend on the exact buyers, their relative ordering or prices in that segment. We next show
that the discount factor of a segment, given a decomposition of an SPM into permutable
segments, can also be approximated as a function of the approximate sizes of preceding
segments.
Lemma 5.3.5. Given an SPM, that can be decomposed into an ordering of permutable
segments S1, S2 . . .. Let Si be a small buyers segment. Let s be the weight of Si.
Then γ￿(Si)(1− s) + γ￿+1(Si)s+ 4s2 ≥ γ￿(Si+1) ≥ γ￿(Si)(1− s) + γ￿+1(Si)s− 2s2.
Proof. Directly using the bounds in Lemma 5.3.3 to the formula:
γ￿(Si+1) =
￿K
j=￿ γj(Si)Pr [Exactly (j − ￿)copies of the item are bought by buyers in Si].
The lemma below follows easily from Lemma 5.3.5.
Lemma 5.3.6. Given any SPM decomposed into Q ≤ C permutable segments S1, S2 . . .,
such that the weight of Si is between si + τ and si − τ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n￿, where τ = δ/20C.
Consider an alternate SPM (with possibly diﬀerent buyers), that has n￿ buyers, and the ith
buyer in the segment has weight si. Let ρ(￿, i) be the probability that the ith buyer is reached
in the alternate SPM with at least ￿ items remaining. Then
ρ(￿, i)− 12(δ2 + τ)i) ≤ γ￿(Si) ≤ ρ(￿, i) + 12(δ2 + τ)i) .
If the SPM is truncated, then dis(Si) = γ1(Si) ≥ ￿, and since i ≤ Q ≤ C, δ = ￿320K3 and
τ ≤ δ/20C, so we can get a multiplicative guarantee ρ(1, i)(1−￿) ≤ dis(Si) ≤ ρ(1, i)(1+￿) .
We shall refer to the following as a configuration: An ordering of up to C permutable
segments, where each permutable segment is specified only by the weight of the segment and
big buyer respectively, each weight being a multiple of τ = δ20C . Note that the configuration
does NOT specify which buyer belongs to which segment, or the individual weights of the
buyers. This is because a configuration is specified by at most C positive integers (weight
of each segment is specified by a positive integer z < 1τ , which indicates that the weight is
zτ). We shall represent a configuration z as an ordered tuple of integers (z1, z2, z3 . . .). Note
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that there are at most ( 1τ )
O(C) = (K￿ )
O(K) distinct configurations. We say that an SPM has
configuration z if it can be decomposed into an ordering of permutable segments S1, S2 . . .
such that Si has weight at least (zi − 1)τ and at most ziτ .
For any given configuration z, the expected revenue of an SPM with configuration z can
be approximated, up to a factor of (1−δ)(1−2￿) by a linear combination of the undiscounted
contribution of the permutable segments, where the coeﬃcients of the linear combination
depend only on z. The coeﬃcients are the discount factors, which can be computed by
looking at an alternate SPM with a buyer for each segment, such that the ith buyer has
weight ziτ . This is a direct conclusion of Lemma 5.3.6 and Lemma 5.3.4. The discount
factors of each buyer in the alternate SPM can be easily computed in O(CK) time using
dynamic programming. Let Az(i) denote the discount factor of the ith buyer in the alternate
SPM corresponding to z.
For any configuration z, we compute prices for the buyers, and a division of buyers
into permutable segments S1, S2 . . . such that Si has weight at most ziτ , and
￿
iAz(i)V(Si)
is maximized (it is not necessary to include all buyers). This is precisely an instance of
VersionGAP, where each buyer is an object, the diﬀerent possible prices and the corre-
sponding success probabilities create the diﬀerent versions, and the sizes of the bins are
given by z, and the feasible subsets for an object simply being that each object can get into
at most one bin. This can be solved as per Lemma 5.3.1. The solution may not saturate
every bin, and hence may not actually belong to configuration z. However, for any two
configurations z = (z1, z2, zt) and z￿ = (z￿1, z￿2 . . . z￿t), such that zi ≤ z￿i ∀1 ≤ i ≤ t, we have
Az(i) > Az￿(i). So the SPM formed by concatenating S1, S2 . . . in that order generates
revenue at least (1 − 3￿) times the revenue of the optimal sequence that has configuration
z.
Thus our algorithm is to find an SPM for each configuration, using the algorithm for
VersionGAP, and output the best SPM among them as the solution.
5.3.2 PTAS for Computing ASPM
We now design an algorithm to compute a near-optimal SPM for constant K.
Theorem 16. There exists a PTAS for computing an optimal SPM, for any constant K.
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The running time of the algorithm is
￿
nk
￿
￿(k￿−1)O(k)
, and gives (1− ￿)-approximation.
As mention in Section 5.1, an ASPM is specified by a decision tree, with each node
containing a buyer and an oﬀer price. We extend some definitions used for SPMs to ASPMs.
The weight of a node is the success probability at this node conditioned on being reached.
A segment in an ASPM is a contiguous part of a path (that the selling process might take)
in the decision tree. A segment is called non-branching if all but possibly the last node are
non-branching. Other definitions such as weight and contribution of a segment are identical.
A permutation segment is a non-branching segment satisfying properties as defined earlier
(Definition 5.3.1). The discount factor of a node (or a segment starting at this node, or a
subtree rooted at this node) is the probability that the node is reached in the selling process.
Consider any ASPM whose tree is decomposable into D non-branching segments, each
of weight at most H. (Note that D = 1 for an SPM.) Then the entire tree of a truncated
ASPM decomposes into C = O(DH/δ) permutable segments. We shall refer to such ASPMs
as C-truncated ASPMs. A configuration for a C-truncated ASPM shall now list the weights
of at most C permutable segments and also specify a tree structure among them, i.e. the
parent segment of each segment in the decision tree. Moreover, since each path can have
no more than C segments, it is suﬃcient to specify the weights to the nearest multiple of
τ = δ/20C, to get the discount factor of each segment with suﬃcient accuracy. So there
are (C/τ)O(C) = CO(C) configurations for C-truncated ASPMs.
For each configuration, we can use VersionGAP to compute an ASPM that is at least
(1 − ￿) times the revenue of an optimal ASPM with that configuration, as before. Each
VersionGAP instance has C bins in this case. The discount factor of each permutable
segment in the configuration can be computed with suﬃcient accuracy, similar to Lemma
5.3.6. Iterating over all possible configurations, we can find a near-optimal C-truncated
ASPM. Solving VersionGAP requires time exponential in the number of bins (see Lemma
5.3.1), so the entire running time of the above algorithm is
￿
nkC
￿
￿O(C)
).
The problem is that for the above algorithm to be a PTAS, C must be a function ofK and
￿−1 only. Lemma 5.3.7 achieves this goal through a non-trivial structural characterization,
and immediately implies Theorem 16.
Lemma 5.3.7. There exists an ASPM with the following properties:
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1. Its expected revenue is at least (1−￿) times the expected revenue of the optimal ASPM.
2. The decision tree is decomposable into D = (K/￿)O(K) non-branching segments.
3. Each non-branching segment in the tree has weight at most H = (K/￿)O(1).
4. Each path in the tree consists of at most (K/￿)O(1) permutable segments.
Proof. Let us view an optimal ASPM decision tree, with expected revenue OPT as consisting
of a spine, which is the path followed if no buyer buys a copy, along with decision subtrees
hanging from many, possibly all, nodes of the spine. Note that all nodes may not be
branching nodes, so a spine need not be left by the process at the very moment that a sale
is recorded, but may branch out at a later point. Each such subtree, hanging from a node
w (say) on the spine, are optimal ASPMs for selling some ￿ < K copies to only buyers that
are do not appear in any ancestor node of w. We shall only focus on how to modify the
ASPM to have
• there are at most (K/￿)O(1) branching nodes on the spine, and
• the weight of the spine shall be at most (K/￿)O(1),
while only losing a factor of (1− c￿) in expected revenue for some constant c.
The subtrees, since they are selling less than K copies, can be transformed inductively
(when a single copy is left, the subtree is just a path and trivially satisfies the required
properties). Such a tree will satisfy the properties listed in Lemma 5.3.7 (for the last
property, note that any path can be decomposed into at most K contiguous parts, each of
which is a spines of some subtree, since leaving a spine implies a sale). Overall, the entire
transformation shall cause a loss factor of (1− cK￿). This achieves our goal, since we could
have instead started by scaling down ￿ to ￿/cK.
As a first step, we truncate the spine. For any node w, let R(w) be the expected revenue
obtained from the rest of the selling process (excluding the contribution of the buyer at w
itself), conditioned upon the selling process reaching node w. We find the earliest (i.e.
closest to the root) node w on the spine such that R(w) ≤ ￿OPT, and delete all children of
w and the subtrees under them. This only causes a loss of ￿OPT – moreover, the probability
of reaching w could have been at most ￿, so the weight of the truncated spine is at most
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K log K￿ (similar argument as Lemma 5.3.2). This immediately achieves the second property
listed above, and it remains to limit the number of branching nodes. We can now assume
that R(w) > ￿OPT for all nodes w on the spine.
For a node w, let R￿(w) denote, conditioned upon the selling process reaching w and
then have less than K items to sell after w, the expected revenue from the rest of the selling
process. Clearly, R￿(w) < R(w), since only higher revenue can be gained from the same set
of buyers if there are more copies of the item to sell. A somewhat less obvious fact is that
R￿(w) > R(w)/4K. This is because R￿(w) is the result of selling at least one copy of the
item to the same set of buyers as R(w), except that R(w) may have as many as K copies
of the item. Looking back at Section 5.2, if the number of items is decreased from K to
1 (keeping set of buyers unchanged), then the optimum of the linear program Lp-K-SPM
decreases by a factor of at most K (scaling down the variables by a factor of K gives a
feasible solution), and the optimal revenue is always within factor 1/2 of the LP optimum
(since 1− 1√
2πK
≥ 1/2 for all K). This shows that R￿(w) > ￿OPT/4K for all nodes on the
spine.
Divide the spine into segments that either consist of a single buyer, or multiple buyers
whose weights add up to no more than δ. These segments may have branching nodes
in them, and hence may not be permutable. Clearly there are at most (K/￿)O(1) such
segments, and now we shall focus on modifying each segment separately. We shall modify
subtrees hanging from nodes in the segment, so that the segment can be subdivided into
poly(K/￿) non-branching segments, thus completing the proof. Clearly we need to only
consider those segments that comprise multiple small buyers. Let us consider one such
segment, and describe the necessary modification to the tree.
Define a minimal set of pivotal nodes in the segment, that satisfies the following condi-
tion: For any node w in the segment, there is a pivotal node v that is a descendant of w,
such that R￿(v) ≥ (1− ￿)R￿(w). Since ￿4KOPT ≤ R￿(w) ≤ OPT for all nodes w, we have at
most O(￿−1 log(K/￿)) pivotal nodes. We shall make modifications to the decision tree so
that the pivotal nodes are the only branching nodes in the segment.
Let v be the pivotal node satisfying this condition for w, that is nearest to w in the
segment. Suppose that w is a branching node. We delete all children of w that are not
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part of the spine, and simply make it a non-branching node. We do this for all non-pivotal,
branching nodes in the segment. Recall that at every branching node, the choice of which
children the process follows is based only upon the number of copies of the item left. Now,
the segment has few enough branching nodes – branching nodes are a subset of pivotal nodes.
To argue a limited loss in revenue, we need to analyze the values R￿(w) in the modified
trees, let us denote them by R￿mod(w). It suﬃces to show that R
￿
mod(w) ≥ (1 − 2￿)R￿(w).
Since R￿(w1) and R￿w2 , where w1 and w2 are distinct nodes on the spine, are expectations
conditioned upon disjoint events, this implies that the expected revenue of the entire tree
falls by a factor of at most (1− 2￿) due to this modification.
To show that R￿mod(w) ≥ (1− 2￿)R￿(w), we can almost say that R￿mod(w) is at least to
R￿(v), since the branching has been deferred until node v. The only diﬀerence is that some
small buyers get executed between w and v. So if there are ￿ items left after w, there may
be less than ￿ items when v is reached in the modified tree – however, the probability of
this event is less than δ, and is independent of the history of events up to w. So, neglecting
the contribution of nodes between w and v (but taking into account their discounting eﬀect
on descendant nodes), R￿mod(w) ≥ (1 − δ)R￿(v). Since R￿(v) ≥ (1 − ￿)R￿(w), we have our
result.
Thus each segment has at most O(￿−1 log(K/￿)) branching nodes now, which implies
that the entire spine has (K/￿)O(1) branching nodes. This completes the proof.
5.4 Additional Details
5.4.1 Discretization
We explain why we can assume the following for the value distribution of each buyer: it
is discrete, and the probability mass at all points, if non-zero, is an integer multiple of
1
n2 . The assumption can only cause a loss of (1 − 1n) in the expected revenue: given an
instance, we can create a discrete distribution with the above properties, corresponding to
each value distribution, and an algorithm for computing an α-approximate SPM or ASPM
in the modified instance gives an α(1− 1n)-approximation for the original instance.
Let civ = vp˜iv be the expected revenue from buyer Bi if price v is posted to it. First, we
can simply keep only those v that are powers of (1− 1n2 ), and assume that there is probability
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mass on only these points (leave p˜iv unchanged). Next, for each such v, alter v and p˜iv so
that their product civ remains unchanged, but p˜iv changes to the closest integral multiple of
1
n2 that is greater than p˜iv. This does not change the possible choices of expected revenue
that can be obtained from a buyer upon reaching it, and their eﬀect on future buyers, i.e.
success probability, changes by 1/n2. The changes in the eﬀect on the future can add up
over n buyers to change the probability of reaching a particular buyer by at most 1/n, so
we can neglect this change.
5.4.2 A Property of Poisson Distribution
The proof of Lemma 5.2.2 uses the following property of Poisson variables.
Lemma 5.4.1. Let P be a Poisson variable with mean K, i.e. for all integers m ≥ 0,
Pr [P = m] = K
m
m!eK
. Then E[max{0,P − K}] = KK+1
K!eK
, and so E[min{P,K}] = E[P −
max{0,P−K}] = K− KK+1
K!eK
.
Proof. All we need to show is that
￿∞
m=K+1
Km(m−K)
m! =
KK+1
K! .
It is easy to show by induction that for any j ≥ 1,
KK+1
K!
−
K+j￿
m=K+1
Km(m−K)
m!
=
KK+j+1
(K + j)!
.
Since limx→∞ K
x+1
x! = 0, the proof is complete.
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Chapter 6
Market Making and Mean
Reversion
In this chapter, we analyze the factors that aﬀect the profits of a market maker for a financial
instrument. This work is done in collaboration with Michael Kearns [25].
A market maker is a firm, individual or trading strategy that always or often quotes
both a buy and a sell price for a financial instrument or commodity, hoping to make a profit
by exploiting the diﬀerence between the two prices, known as the spread. Intuitively, a
market maker wishes to buy and sell equal volumes of the instrument (or commodity), and
thus rarely or never accumulate a large net position, and profit from the diﬀerence between
the selling and buying prices.
Historically, the chief purpose of market makers has been to provide liquidity to the
market — the financial instrument can always be bought from, or sold to, the market maker
at the quoted prices. Market makers are common in foreign exchange trading, where most
trading firms oﬀer both buying and selling rates for a currency. They also play a major role
in stock exchanges, and historically exchanges have often appointed trading firms to act as
oﬃcial market makers for specific equities. NYSE designates a single market maker for each
stock, known as the specialist for that stock. In contrast, NASDAQ allows several market
makers for each stock. More recently, fast electronic trading systems have led trading firms
to behave like market makers without formally being designated so. In other words, many
trading firms attempt to buy and sell a stock simultaneously, and profit from the diﬀerence
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between buying and selling prices. We shall refer to such trading algorithms generally as
market making algorithms.
In this chapter, we analyze the profitability of market making algorithms. Market mak-
ing has existed as a trading practice for a long time, and it has also inspired significant
amount of empirical as well as theoretical research [56, 52, 62, 30, 38, 39]. Most of the theo-
retical models [52, 56, 38, 39] view market makers as dealers who single-handedly create the
market by oﬀering buying and selling prices, and there is no trading in their absence (that
is, all trades must have the market marker as one of the parties). On the other hand, much
of the empirical work has focused on analyzing the behavior of specialist market makers
in NYSE, using historical trading data from NYSE [62, 30]. In contrast, our theoretical
and empirical work studies the behavior of market making algorithms in both very general
and certain specific price time series models, where trading occurs at varying prices even
in the absence of the market maker. This view seems appropriate in modern electronic
markets, where any trading party whatsoever is free to quote on both sides of the market,
and oﬃcially designated market makers and specialists are of diminishing importance.
Market Making vs. Statistical Arbitrage Before describing our models and re-
sults, we first oﬀer some clarifying comments on the technical and historical diﬀerences
between market making and statistical arbitrage, the latter referring to the activity of using
computation-intensive quantitative modeling to design profitable automated trading strate-
gies. Such clarification is especially called for in light of the blurred distinction between
traditional market-makers and other kinds of trading activity that electronic markets have
made possible, and the fact that many quantitative hedge funds that engage in statistical
arbitrage may indeed have strategies that have market making behaviors.
Perhaps the hallmark of market making is the willingness to always quote competitive
buy and sell prices, but with the goal of minimizing directional risk. By this we mean that
the market maker is averse to acquiring a large net long or short position in a stock, since
in doing so there is the risk of large losses should the price move in the wrong direction.
Thus if a market maker begins to acquire a large net long position, it would continue to
quote a buy price, but perhaps a somewhat lower one which is less likely to get executed.
Alternatively (or in addition), the strategy might choose to lower its sell quote in order to
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increase the chances of acquiring short trades to oﬀset its net long inventory. In this sense,
pure market making strategies have no “view” or “opinion” on which direction the price
“should” move — indeed, as we shall show, the most profitable scenario for a market maker
is one in which there is virtually no overall directional movement of the stock, but rather a
large amount of non-directional volatility.
In contrast, many statistical arbitrage strategies are the opposite of market making in
that they deliberately want to make directional bets — that is, they want to acquire large
net positions because they have a prediction or model of future price movement. To give
one classic example, in the simplest form of pairs trading, one follows the prices of two
presumably related stocks, such as Microsoft and Apple. After normalizing the prices by
their historical means and variances, one waits for there to be a significant gap in their
current prices — for instance, Apple shares becoming quite expensive relative to Microsoft
shares given the historical normalization. At this point, one takes a large short position in
Apple and an oﬀsetting large long position in Microsoft. This amounts to a bet that the
prices of the two stocks will eventually return to their historical relationship: if Apple’s
share price falls and Microsoft’s rises, both positions pay oﬀ. If the gap continues to grow,
the strategy incurs a loss. If both rise or both fall without changing the gap between, there
is neither gain nor loss. The important point here is that, in contrast to market making,
the source of profitability (or loss) are directional bets rather than price volatility.
Theoretical Model and Results We first summarize our theoretical models and our
three main theoretical results. We assume there is an exogenous market where a stock can
be bought and sold at prices dictated by a given time series process. At any given point of
time, there is a single exogenous asset price at which the stock can both be bought as well as
sold. The price evolution in the market is captured by the time series. The market making
algorithm is an online decision process that can place buy and sell limit orders with some
quoted limit order prices at any time, and may also cancel these orders at any future time.
For simplicity, we assume that each order requests only one share of the stock (a trader may
place multiple orders at the same price). If at any time after placing the order and before
its cancellation, the asset price of the stock equals or exceeds (respectively, falls below) the
quoted price on a sell order (respectively, buy order), then the order gets executed at the
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quoted price, i.e. the trader pays (respectively, gains) one share and gains (respectively,
pays) money equal to the price quoted on the order. We shall refer to the net volume of the
stock held by a trader at a given point of time as inventory. Note that inventory may be
positive (net long position) or negative (net short position). To evaluate the profit made by
a market making algorithm, we shall fix a time horizon when the algorithm must liquidate
its inventory at the current asset price.
Our first and most general theoretical result is a succinct and exact characterization
of the profit obtained by a simple market-making algorithm, given any asset price time
series, in the model above. If the sum of absolute values of all local price movements
(defined below) is K, and the diﬀerence between opening and closing prices is z, we show
that the profit obtained is exactly (K − z2)/2. The positive term K can be viewed as the
product of the average volatility of the price and the duration for which the algorithm is
run. The negative term z2 captures the net change in price during the entire trading period.
Thus this characterization indicates that market making is profitable when there is a large
amount of local price movement, but only a small net change in the price. This observation
matches a common intuition among market makers, and provides a theoretical foundation
for such a belief. An unbiased random walk (or Brownian motion) provides a boundary
of profitability — the algorithm makes zero expected profit (as do all trading algorithms),
while any stochastic price process whose closing price has comparatively less variance from
the opening price makes positive expected profit. The last observation leads to our second
result.
Mean Reversion We next exhibit the benefit of obtaining a succinct and exact expression
for profit by applying it to some classes of stochastic time series that help in understanding
the circumstances under which the algorithm is profitable. We identify a natural class
of time series called mean-reverting processes whose properties make our market making
algorithm profitable in expectation. A stochastic price series is considered to be reverting
towards its long-term mean µ if the price shows a downward trend when greater than
µ and upward trend when less than µ. Prices of commodities such as oil [72, 79] and
foreign exchange rates [55] have been empirically observed to exhibit mean reversion. Mean-
reverting stochastic processes are studied as a major class of price models, as a contrast to
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stochastic processes with directional drift, or with no drift, such as Brownian motion. One
widely studied mean-reverting stochastic process is the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process [54].
Formally, our second result states that out market making algorithm has expected pos-
itive profit on any random walk that reverts towards its opening price. This result is quite
revealing — it holds if the random walk shows even the slightest mean reversion, regardless
of how complex the process may be (for instance, its evolution may depend not only on the
current price, but also on the historical prices in an arbitrary way, as well as the current
time). It identifies mean reversion as the natural property which renders market making
profitable.
Our third result shows that simple market making algorithms yield stronger profit guar-
antees for specific mean-reverting processes. As an example, we consider the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck (OU) process. If the price series follows this process, we show that a simple
market making algorithm is profitable when run for a suﬃciently long time. Moreover, the
profit grows linearly with the duration for which the algorithm is run, and the profit guar-
antees hold not only in expectation, but with high probability. We prove this by showing
that while E[K] grows linearly with time, E[z2] is upper bounded by a constant. Unlike our
second result, we do not need the assumption that the price series begins at the long-term
mean — the initial price appears in the upper bound on E[z2].
We also show an analogous result for another mean reverting process that has been
studied in the finance literature, a model studied by Schwartz [81]. In this model, the local
volatility is a linear function of price, while the OU process models volatility as a constant.
Trading Frequency: Simulations We remark that the results outlined above assume
a model where the market maker can place and cancel orders as frequently as it likes, and
in fact our algorithm does so after every change in the exogenous asset price. In practice,
however, a market maker cannot react to every change, since the asset price may change with
every trade in the market (which may or may not involve this particular market maker),
and the market maker may not be able to place new limit orders after every trade of a
rapidly traded stock. So we also analyze the profitability of our market making algorithm
when it is allowed to change its orders only after every L steps, by simulating our algorithm
on random samples from the OU process. If the price series is the OU process, we show
139
that the expected profit continues to grow linearly with time.
Other Related Work To our knowledge, no previous work has studied market making
in an exogenously specified price time series model. Most of the theoretical work, as men-
tioned before, considers a single dealer model where all trades occurred through the market
maker at its quoted prices [52, 56, 38, 39]. This includes the well-known Glosten-Milgrom
model for market making [56]. On the other hand, there has been a fair amount of work in
algorithmic trading, especially statistical arbitrage, that assumes an exogenous price time
series. The closest line of research to our work in this literature is the analysis of pair trad-
ing strategies under the assumption that the price diﬀerence between the two equities show
mean reversion (e.g. [47, 75]). As discussed before, such strategies are qualitatively very
diﬀerent from market making strategies. Moreover, most algorithmic trading work, to our
knowledge, either analyze price series given by very specific stochastic diﬀerential equations
(similar to Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 of this chapter), or empirically analyze these algorithms
against historical trading data (e.g. [53]). In contrast, we also give profit guarantees for the
weakest of mean reversion processes without assuming a specific form (Theorem 18), and
in fact derive an exact expression for arbitrary price series (Theorem 17), inspired from the
notion of worst-case analysis in theoretical computer science.
6.1 A General Characterization
We first describe our theoretical model formally. We assume that all events occur at discrete
time steps 0, 1, 2 . . . T , where T is the time horizon when the market making algorithm must
terminate. There is an asset price Pt of the stock at every time step 0 ≤ t ≤ T . Thus
P0, P1 . . . PT is the asset price time series. We assume that all prices are integral multiples
of a basic unit of money (regulations in NYSE/NASDAQ currently require prices to be
integral multiples of a penny).
A trading algorithm may place and cancel (possibly both) buy and sell orders at any of
these time steps, and each order requests a single share at a quoted limit order price Y . A
buy (respectively, sell) order at price Y placed at time t gets executed at the earliest time
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t￿ > t such that Pt￿ ≤ Y (respectively, Pt￿ ≥ Y ), provided that the order is not canceled
before t￿. Any buy order placed by our algorithms will quote a price Y < Pt, and so cannot
get executed at time t itself; the same applies to sell orders as well. If the buy (respectively,
sell) order gets executed (at some time in the future), then the algorithm pays (respectively,
earns) Y units of money due to the execution. We assume no market impact — the orders
placed by the algorithm (which may get executed) do not aﬀect the prices in the future. We
leave to future work the important topic of incorporation of market impact into our results.
The inventory held by the algorithm at time t is the number of shares held by it at
that time. The inventory is incremented upon every executed buy order, and decremented
upon every executed sell order. The initial inventory is, naturally, assumed to be zero.
At time T , the algorithm must liquidate its accumulated inventory at the current asset
price (alternatively, one may view it as the evaluation of the portfolio at time T ). If the
algorithm has inventory x (x may be negative) at time T , then it earns or pays xPT from
the liquidation. The profit obtained by the algorithm is then its net cash position (positive
or negative) after liquidation.
A trading algorithm is considered to be an online process — it makes its decisions (about
placing and canceling orders) at time t after observing the price series up to (and including)
time t. The algorithm may or may not have additional information about the price series.
Note that we assume no latency and arbitrary frequency (we relax the frequency assumption
in our simulations) — the algorithm can look at current prices and place buy and sell orders
instantaneously, and it can do so as frequently as it wishes. Again, we leave the relaxation
of these unrealistic assumptions for future work.
Market Making Algorithms The basic class of market making algorithms that we
consider is the following: At time t, the algorithm cancels all unexecuted orders, and places
new buy orders at prices Yt, Yt − 1, Yt − 2 . . . Yt −Ct and new sell orders at prices Xt, Xt +
1, Xt+2 . . . Xt+Ct, where Yt < Xt and Ct is a non-negative integer. Such ladders of prices
are set up to ensure that large sudden fluctuations in price causes a proportionally large
volume of executions. Ct is called the depth of the price ladder at time t, and intuitively, the
algorithm believes that the price fluctuation |Pt+1 − Pt| shall not exceed Ct. Unexecuted
orders are canceled and fresh orders are placed at every time step (changes are necessary
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only if Xt+1 ￿= Xt or Yt+1 ￿= Yt). Thus the algorithm is determined by the choices of Xt, Yt
and Ct for all t, and these choices may be made after observing the price movements up to
time t.
We begin by presenting our basic result for a simple market making algorithm, that sets
Xt = Pt + 1 and Yt = Pt − 1.
Theorem 17. Let P0, P1 . . . PT be an asset price time series. Let K =
￿T
t=1 |Pt − Pt−1|,
and let z = PT −P0. Suppose that |Pt+1−Pt| ≤ Dt ∀t, where Dt is known to the algorithm
at time t. If the market making algorithm, that sets Xt = Pt + 1, Yt = Pt − 1 and ladder
depth Ct = Dt, is run on this price series, then the inventory liquidated at time T is −z,
and the profit is (K − z2)/2.
Proof. Note that at any time step t > 0, at least one order gets executed if the price
changes. Moreover, the number of orders executed at time t ≥ 1 is Pt−1 − Pt (a negative
value indicates that shares were sold). The statement holds as long as |Pt−1 − Pt| ≤ Ct−1,
which is true by assumption. Thus K is equal to the total number of orders that gets
executed. Moreover, the size of inventory held by the algorithm at time t is P0 − Pt. We
shall construct disjoint pairs of all but |z| of the executed orders, such that each pair of
executions comprises an executed buy and a sell execution, and the price of the buy order
is 1 less than the price of the sell order, so that each such pair can be viewed as giving a
profit of 1.
For p > P0, we pair each sell order, priced at p, that gets executed when price increases
to p or more, with the executed buy order, priced at p−1, that gets executed at the earliest
time in the future when the price falls back to p− 1 or less (if the price ever falls to p− 1
again). Note that these pairs are disjoint, since between every rise of the price from p − 1
to p, the price must obviously fall to p − 1. Similarly, for p < P0, we pair each executed
buy order when the price decreases to p or less, with the executed sell order at the earliest
time in the future when the price increases to p+ 1 or more (if it exists).
We claim that only |z| executions remain unmatched (see Figure 6.1). If z > 0, then the
only executions that remain unmatched are the sell orders executed when the price increases
to p and never again falls below p: for each P0+z ≥ p > P0, there is one such executed order.
During liquidation at time T , these unmatched sell orders are matched by buying z shares
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Figure 6.1: Proof by picture: Matched and unmatched trades
at price PT = P0+z. The total loss during liquidation is
￿P0+z
p=P0+1
((P0+z)−p) = z(z−1)/2.
Since there are K− z paired executions, the profit obtained from them is (K− z)/2. Hence
the net profit is (K − z − z(z − 1))/2 = (K − z2)/2. A symmetric argument holds for
z < 0.
Note that it is typically reasonable to assume that |Pt+1−Pt| < C for some large enough
C, since it is unlikely that the price of a stock would change by more than a few dollars
within a few seconds. In that case, one may set Ct = C for all t.
6.2 Mean Reversion Models
In this section, we use Theorem 17 to relate profitability to mean reversion.
Definition 6.2.1. A unit-step walk is a series P0, P1 . . . PT such that |Pt+1−Pt| ≤ 1 ∀T >
t ≥ 0. A stochastic price series P0, P1 . . . PT is called a random walk if it is a unit-step walk
almost surely. We say that a random walk is unbiased if Pr [Pt+1 − Pt = 1|Pt, Pt−1 . . . P0] =
1/2, for all unit-step walks Pt . . . P0, for all T > t ≥ 0.
We say a random walk is mean-reverting towards µ if
Pr [Pt+1 − Pt = 1|Pt = x, Pt−1 . . . P0] ≥
Pr [Pt+1 − Pt = −1|Pt = x, Pt−1 . . . P0]
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for all x ≤ µ, and
Pr [Pt+1 − Pt = 1|Pt = y, Pt−1 . . . P0] ≤
Pr [Pt+1 − Pt = −1|Pt = x, Pt−1 . . . P0]
for all y ≥ µ, for all t, Pt−1, Pt−2 . . . P0 such that P0, . . . Pt is a unit-step walk, and at least
one of these inequalities for t < T is strict (i.e., it is not an unbiased random walk).
Note that all trading algorithms yield zero expected profit on an unbiased random walk.
This is because the profit Ft of the algorithm, if its inventory were liquidated at time t, is
a martingale, irrespective of the number of shares bought or sold at each time step, and so
the expected profit is E[FT] = E[F0] = 0.
Theorem 18. For any random walk P0, P1 . . . PT that is mean-reverting towards µ = P0,
the expected profit of the market making algorithm that sets Xt = Pt + 1 and Yt = Pt − 1
(any Ct ≥ 0 suﬃces) is positive.
Proof. Since the price does not change by more than 1 in a time step, the market making
algorithm need not set a ladder of prices. By Theorem 17, the expected profit is E[(K −
z2)/2]. Let Kt =
￿t
i=1 |Pi − Pi−1|, and let zt = Pt − P0. We show by induction on t
that E[Kt] ≥ E[z2t ] for all t. For t = T , this would imply positive expected profit for our
algorithm. Without loss of generality, we assume that P0 = µ = 0.
For t = 0, the statement is trivially true, since Kt = zt = 0. Suppose it is true for some
t ≥ 0, then we can show that it is true for t + 1. Let Ft denote the set of all unit-step
walks such that P0 = µ = 0. For s ∈ Ft, let α(s) = Pr [Pt+1 − Pt = 1|Pt, Pt−1 . . . P0], and
let β(s) = Pr [Pt+1 − Pt = −1|Pt, Pt−1 . . . P0]. Also, let Pr [s] denote the probability that
the first t steps of this random walk is s. Then we have
E[Kt+1] = E[Kt + |Pt+1 − Pt|]
= E[Kt] +
￿
s∈Ft
Pr [s] (α(s) + β(s))
(6.1)
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E[z2t+1] = E[P
2
t+1]
=
￿
s∈Ft
Pr [s]
￿
α(s)(Pt + 1)
2 + β(s)(Pt − 1)2
+ (1− α(s)− β(s))P 2t
￿
=
￿
s∈Ft
Pr [s]
￿
P 2t + α(s) + β(s) + 2Pt(α(s)− β(s))
￿
= E[P2t ] +
￿
s∈Ft
Pr [s] (α(s) + β(s))
+ 2
￿
s∈Ft
Pr [s]Pt(α(s)− β(s))
≤ E[Kt] +
￿
s∈Ft
Pr [s] (α(s) + β(s))
+ 2
￿
s∈Ft
Pr [s]Pt(α(s)− β(s))
(by induction hypothesis)
= E[Kt+1] + 2
￿
s∈Ft
Pr [s] Pt(α(s)− β(s))
(by Equation 6.1)
It suﬃces to show that that Pt(α(s) − β(s)) ≤ 0 for all s ∈ Ft. This follows immediately
from the definition of a mean-reverting random walk: if Pt > P0 = 0, then α(s) < β(s), and
if Pt < P0 = 0, then α(s) > β(s). Thus we have proved the induction hypothesis for t+ 1.
Finally, for the smallest t such that for some s ∈ Ft we have α(s) ￿= β(s), the inequality
in the induction hypothesis becomes strict at t + 1, i.e. E[Kt+1] > E[z2t+1], and so the
expected profit for T > t is strictly positive.
6.2.1 Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Processes
One well-studied mean-reverting process is a continuous time, real-valued stochastic process
known as the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process [54]. We denote this process by Qt. It is
usually expressed by the following stochastic diﬀerential equation:
dQt = −γ(Qt − µ)dt+ σdWt ,
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where Wt is a standard Brownian motion, and γ,σ are positive constants, and γ < 1. The
value µ is a constant around which the price fluctuates — it is called the long term mean
of the process. The coeﬃcient of dt is called drift, while that of dWt is called volatility.
Observe that the drift is negative for Pt > µ and positive for Pt < µ — this is why the
process tends to revert towards µ whenever it is far from it. γ is the rate of mean reversion.
The OU process is memoryless (distribution of Qt given Q0 is the same as distribution of
Qt+x given Qx), and given an opening value Q0, the variable Qt is known to be normally
distributed, such that
E[Qt] = µ+ (Q0 − µ)e−γt,
Var[Qt] =
σ2
2γ
(1− e−2γt)
(6.2)
Now we consider the OU process Qt as a price series in the unique model, and analyze
profitability of our algorithm. However, since the OU process is a continuous time real-
valued process, we need to define a natural restriction to a discrete integral time series that
conforms to our theoretical model. We achieve this by letting Pt to be the nearest integer
to Qt, for all non-negative integers t. The rounding is practical since in reality prices are
not allowed to be real-valued, and further, our algorithm reacts to only integral changes in
price. We shall analyze our algorithm on Pt.
A significant hindrance in applying Theorem 17 to the OU process is that the jumps
|Pt+1 − Pt| are not necessarily bounded by some constant C, so we have to put some eﬀort
into determining Ct. Since the OU process is memoryless, Equation 6.2 implies that given
Qt, Qt+1 is normally distributed with expectation µ + (Qt − µ)e−γ and variance less than
σ2/2γ, so if we set C >> σ
2
2γ
√
lnT and then set Ct = E[|Qt+1 − Qt| |Qt] + C, then the
probability that the price jump at any time exceeds the depth of the ladder is vanishing,
and such events do not contribute significantly to the expected profit if we simply stop the
algorithm when such an event occurs.
Theorem 19. Let P0, P1 . . . PT be a price series obtained from an OU process {Qt} with
long-term mean µ. Then the market making algorithm that sets Xt = Pt + 1, Yt = Pt − 1
and Ct = E[|Qt+1 −Qt| |Qt] + 10σ22γ
√
lnT yields long term expected profit Ω(σT − σ2/2γ −
(µ−Q0)2).
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Proof. It is easy to show, as outlined above, that the contribution of events where a price
jump larger than Ct occurs to the expected profit is negligible. We restrict our attention to
the event when no such large jump occurs. By Theorem 17, the profit on a sample series is
(K − z2)/2, where K =￿Tt=1 |Pt − Pt−1|, and z = PT − P0. The result follows by giving a
lower bound on E[K] and an upper bound on E[z2].
Let us derive a lower bound on E[|Qt+1 − Qt|]. Note that this quantity is equal to
E[|Q￿1 − Q￿0|
￿￿Q￿0 = Qt], where Q￿t is an identical but independent OU process. This is
because the OU process is Markov, and future prices depend only on the current price.
Since γ < 1, so Equation 6.2 implies that given Qt, Qt+1 is normally distributed with
variance greater than σ2/4, since 1−e−2γ2γ > 1/4 when γ < 1. Hence E[|Qt+1−Qt|] is at least
σ/4 (using properties of a folded normal distribution). Since Pt is obtained by rounding
Qt, we have |Pt+1 − Pt| > |Qt+1 −Qt| − 2. Thus for large enough σ (see comments at the
end of the theorem), we get that E[K] = Ω(σT).
E[z2] is approximated well enough by E[(QT − Q0)2], since |z − (QT − Q0)| < 2 for
all possible realizations. Again, Equation 6.2 implies that QT − Q0 has mean µ + (Q0 −
µ)e−γT −Q0 = (µ−Q0)(1− e−γT ) and variance σ2(1− e−2γT )/2γ. Thus, we have
E[(QT −Q0)2] = Var[QT −Q0] +E[QT −Q0]2
=
σ2(1− e−2γT )
2γ
+ (µ−Q0)2(1− e−γT )2
<
σ2
2γ
+ (µ−Q0)2
Thus, E[K] grows linearly with T , while E[z2] is bounded by a constant. This completes
the proof.
A few points worth noting about Theorem 19: our lower bound on E[K] is actually
(σ4 −2)T and σ must exceed 8 for this term to be positive and grow linearly with T . This is
just an easy way to handle the arbitrary integral rounding of Qt. Intuitively, the algorithm
typically cannot place orders with prices separated by less than a penny. Thus the volatility
needs to be suﬃcient for integral changes to occur in the price series. If the unit of money
could be made smaller, the loss due to rounding should diminish. Then σ in terms of the
new unit increases linearly, while γ remains constant (Qt becomes cQt for some scaling
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factor c). Thus for any constant σ, a suﬃciently small granularity of prices allows us to
apply Theorem 19. In fact, it is not diﬃcult to see from the above analysis that the profit
will grow linearly with time as long as the limiting variance of the process σ2/2γ is larger
than (or comparable to) the granularity of bidding (normalized to 1). If this does not hold,
then the algorithm will rarely get its orders executed, and will neither profit nor lose any
significant amount.
Moreover, in the proof of Theorem 19, one may note that z is a normal variable with
variance bounded by a constant, while the lower bound on K grows linearly with T , and
occurs with high probability. Thus the profit expression in Theorem 19 not only holds in
expectation (as is the case in Theorem 18 for general mean-reverting walks), but with high
probability. Furthermore, for even the smallest of γ, Theorem 19 says that the profit is
positive if T is large enough. Thus, even when mean reversion is weak, a suﬃciently long
time horizon can make market making profitable.
Finally, the profit expression of the OU process has a term (µ−Q0)2. While we can treat
it as a constant independent of the time horizon, we can also apply another trick to reduce
this constant loss if Q0 is far from µ. This is because Equation 6.2 tells us that the process
converges exponentially fast towards µ — in time t = γ−1 log |Q0 − µ|, |E[Qt − µ]| is down
to 1, and Var[Q0 − µ] is less than σ2/γ. Thus if the horizon T is large enough, then the
market maker would like to simply sit out until time t (if allowed by market regulations),
and then start applying our market making strategy.
6.2.2 The Schwartz Model
We now analyze another stochastic mean reversion model that has been studied in the
finance literature and was studied by Schwartz [81]. The OU process assumes that the
volatility of the price curve is a constant. Schwartz proposed a model where the volatility
is a linear function of the price:
dQt = −γQt(lnQt − lnµ)dt+ σQtdWt,
where µ is the long term mean price of the process, γ < 1, and σ < 1. Also assume that
Q0 > 0.
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We shall show that the profitability of our market making algorithm for the Schwartz
model is analogous to Theorem 19: E[K] grows linearly in T , while the expected loss due
to liquidation E[z2] is bounded by a constant, and hence the expected profit grows linearly
in T . Applying Ito’s lemma, Schwartz showed that logQt is an OU process, and so Qt has
a lognormal distribution, such that
αt = E[logQt] = (lnµ− σ
2
2γ
)(1− e−γt) + Q0e−γt,
β2t = Var[logQt] =
σ2
2γ
(1− e−2γt)
Then, by properties of lognormal distributions, we have
E[Qt] = e
αt+β2t /2, Var[Qt] = (e
β2t − 1)e2αt+β2t
Suppose the unit of price is small enough so that lnµ > σ
2
2γ (again, this is essentially
equivalent to choosing a finer granularity of placing orders). Note that shrinking the size of
a unit step by a factor c leaves both σ and γ unchanged, but inflates µ by c. Since αt and
βt are upper bounded by constants, so are E[Qt] and Var[Qt], and hence E[z2] is bounded
by a constant.
It remains to show that E[K] = Ω(T). It suﬃces to show that E[|Qt+1 −Qt|] is at least
some constant. Note that Qt is always positive, since it has a lognormal distribution. We
shall show that E[|Qt+1 − Qt|
￿￿Qt] is at least some constant, for any positive Qt. Since Qt
is a Markov process, this is equal to E[|Q￿1−Q￿0|
￿￿Q￿0 = Qt] for an identical but independent
process Q￿t. Observe that α1 ≥ (lnµ− σ22γ )(1−e−γ) > 0, if Q0 > 0. Also, we have β21 > σ2/4.
Thus
Var[Q￿1] > e
σ2/4(eσ
2/4 − 1) > σ2eσ2/4/4 .
This shows that Var[Q￿1], given Q0, is lower bounded by a constant (that depends on
σ). Since Q￿1 has a lognormal distribution, it follows that E[|Q￿1−Q￿0|] is also lower bounded
by a constant. This completes the proof for E[K] = Ω(T).
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6.3 Trading Frequency
Our price series model makes the assumption that the market maker can place fresh orders
after every change in price. In practice, however, there are many traders, and each trade
causes some change in price, and an individual trader cannot react immediately to every
change. We thus consider a more general model where the market maker places fresh orders
after every L steps. Let us consider the same market making algorithm as before, in this
infrequent order model. Thus, for every i, at time iL the algorithm places orders around
PiL in a ladder fashion as before. These orders remain unchanged (or get executed if the
requisite price is reached) until time (i+1)L, and then the algorithm cancels the unexecuted
orders and places fresh orders. We say that L is the trading frequency of the algorithm.
The profit of the algorithm can no longer be captured succinctly as before. In particular,
the profit is not exclusively determined by (nor can it be lower bounded by a function of)
the prices P0, PL, P2L . . . PiL . . . at which the algorithm refreshes its orders — it depends
on the path taken within every interval of L steps and not just the net change within this
interval. Still, some of our profit guarantees continue to hold qualitatively in this model. In
particular, we simulate the OU process and run our algorithm on this process, to analyze
how trading frequency aﬀects the profit of the algorithm. We simulate an OU process with
γ = 0.1, σ = 1 and the initial price equal to the long term mean.
First, we find that the profit still shows a trend of growing linearly with time, for
diﬀerent trading frequencies L that are still significantly smaller than the time horizon T .
We simulate the algorithm with diﬀerent time horizons T and diﬀerent trading frequencies,
and all of them show a strong linear growth (see Figure 2).
Also, the profit is expected to fall as the trading frequency increases (keeping time
horizon fixed), since the number of trades executed will clearly decrease. We find that for a
large enough horizon (T = 1000), this is indeed the case, but the decrease in profit is quite
slow, and even with trading frequency as high as 40, the expected profit is more than 80%
of the expected profit with unit trading frequency (see Figure 3).
We computed average profit by simulating each setting 10000 times, to get a very narrow
confidence interval. In fact, the standard deviation of the profit never exceeds 50 for any
of our simulations, so the confidence interval (taken as 2σ divided by the square root of
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Figure 6.2: Profit increases linearly with the time horizon, for diﬀerent trading frequencies
1, 2, 5, 10, 20.
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Figure 6.3: Mean profit decreases slowly with trading frequency (Horizon T = 1000).
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Figure 6.4: Standard deviation of profit increases quickly with trading frequency, then
stabilizes (Horizon T = 1000).
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sample size) is less than 1, while the expected profit is much higher in all the cases.
The standard deviation in the profit itself goes up sharply as the trading frequency
is increased from 1, but then quickly stabilizes (see Figure 4).The increase in variance of
profit can perhaps be explained by the increase in variance of the number of shares that are
liquidated at the end.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyzed the profitability of simple market making algorithms. Market
making algorithms are a restricted class of trading algorithms, though there is no formal
specification of the restrictions. Intuitively, the restriction is that a market maker has to
be always present in the market, wiling to buy as well as sell, and oﬀer prices that are close
to the asset price. A future direction would be to formalize such constraints, and design
optimal market making algorithms that satisfy the formal restrictions.
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Chapter 7
Summary of Results
In this chapter we revisit and summarize the results in this thesis. We briefly contrast them
with prior existing literature, to outline the specific contributions of this thesis to the area
of computational economics.
7.1 Behavioral Study of Networked Bargaining
In Chapter 2, we conducted human subject experiments on networked bargaining, and stud-
ied the eﬀects of network topology on bargaining power, the eﬃciency achieved by human
subjects, and the eﬀect of distinguishing behavioral traits such as patience or stubborn-
ness on the success of individuals. Our work was inspired by a long line of theoretical
work modeling and characterizing fair and/or rational outcomes in networked bargaining
[51, 74, 31, 83, 17, 68, 4, 34, 27, 73, 1, 2], and the conspicuous sparsity of experimental
work on the topic (except a few experiments on small networks, with no more than 6 nodes
[32, 33, 83]). We conducted our experiments on fairly large networks with 36 nodes, that
allowed us to test several hypotheses that could not have been tested with small networks,
such as the non-local eﬀects of network structural properties. Eﬃciency and eﬀects of be-
havioral traits had not been studied in the previous experiments. Further, our dataset is
several magnitudes larger than the previous experiments, so we were able to resolve most
of our hypotheses with strong statistical significance.
153
7.2 Networked Bargaining with Non-Linear Utilities
In Chapter 3, we studied networked bargaining in a game-theoretic model, and analyzed
how diminishing marginal utility among the players combine with the network topology
and aﬀect bargaining power of the nodes. Our model proposes a general method of ex-
tending any two-player cooperative bargaining solution concept (with outside options) to
a networked bargaining solution concept. We studied proportional bargaining and Nash
bargaining solution concepts extended to networks. Our model generalizes a linear utility
model proposed by Cook and Yamagishi [31] (analyzed further by Kleinberg and Tardos
[31, 4]), and can model non-linear utility functions. We showed that if players have dimin-
ishing marginal utility, it induces a rich-get-richer eﬀect. In particular, we showed that at
equilibrium, nodes with higher degree (more economic opportunities) tend to earn larger
shares on each deal, even in the absence of demand and supply constraints. In contrast, if
players had linear utility and no demand/supply constraint, then network structure has no
eﬀect on the shares. We also developed an algorithm that provably converges to equilibrium
quickly on bipartite networks, and also characterized suﬃcient conditions for the existence
of a unique equilibrium on regular networks.
7.3 Item Pricing in Combinatorial Auctions
In Chapter 4, we developed simple online item pricing strategies that provide the best
known prior-free approximation guarantee (O(log2mL)) on obtaining maximum revenue in
combinatorial auctions with m items via any truthful mechanism, with the assumption that
buyers’ valuation functions are subadditive, and that the maximum value of any item is
estimated correctly up to a factor of L. Similar results were known previously for welfare
[46, 43], but those strategies failed to provide good guarantees on revenue. A logarithmic
guarantee to revenue was also previously known for subadditive valuations, if there were
an infinite supply of each distinct item [8]. A bundle pricing mechanism, developed inde-
pendently by Dobzinski [42], achieves the same approximation guarantee as ours. Further,
for general subadditive valuations, no mechanism is known to provide a better guarantee
even with Bayesian information (constant approximation is known for two special cases, of
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unit-demand buyers [28] and budgeted additive buyers [13] respectively).
7.4 Sequential Posted Pricing in Multi-Unit Auctions
In Chapter 5, we developed eﬃciently computable sequential pricing strategies for multi-
unit auctions in a standard Bayesian setting. We showed that the ratio between the revenue
of an optimal sequential pricing scheme and Myerson’s expected-revenue-optimal auction
[76] tends to 1 as the size of the seller’s inventory increases, even if the valuation distribu-
tions are constructed adversarially. Earlier work [28] had established that the ratio is at
least (1 − 1/e) for any multi-unit auction, and also constructed an instance, with a single
item to sell, to show that the ratio can be as low as 4/5. Our main contribution was to
recognize that the instances with large gap can occur only when the seller is selling one or
at most a few items. This result was proved independently by Yan [86]. We also devel-
oped polynomial time approximation schemes for optimal sequential posted pricing, both
adaptive and non-adaptive, for multi-unit auctions. In general, analysis of adaptive policies
in complex stochastic optimization problems is quite rare. For example, approximation
scheme for adaptive policy was recently developed for stochastic knapsack [12], and no such
result is known for slightly more general problems such as the multiple knapsack problem.
7.5 Market Making and Mean Reversion
In Chapter 6, we developed a simple trading algorithm for a financial market maker, pro-
posed a price time series-based market model, and analyzed the performance of our algo-
rithm in our model to show that the trading strategy is profitable when the market price
exhibits mean reversion properties. The profit is aﬀected positively by price volatility, and
adversely aﬀected by consistent directional change in the price of the asset. Our work pi-
oneered the study of market making in price time series models, and is also the first one
to mathematically obtain a connection between mean reversion and profitability of market
making. Market making strategies have been studied previously in market models with
static demand [56, 52, 38, 39], while other classes of trading strategies, such as pair trading,
have been studied in price time series models [47, 75].
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Chapter 8
Future Research Directions
This thesis makes significant progress in the understanding of large economic systems. In
this final chapter, we describe a few work in progress, open problems and future research
directions that are closely related to the topics addressed in this thesis, and will significantly
further our understanding.
8.1 Networked Bargaining with Incomplete Information
In this work, we studied networked economic interactions with complete information (Chap-
ters 2 and 3), and single-seller-multiple-buyers models with incomplete information (Chap-
ters 4 and 5). A major direction forward is to study networked economic interactions with
incomplete information, through theoretical modeling as well as behavioral experiments.
Specifically, for every economic opportunity, a seller should know the cost, buyer should
know the valuation, but the surplus is not mutually known.
One specific theoretical model is to have multiple sellers choosing from the action space
of truthful mechanisms. Behavioral experiments can explore how a seller learns about
buyers’ (sellers’) valuations (costs), by communicating with many agents during a single
game. It will be interesting to study the structure of equilibrium in this setting, the eﬀect
of network structure on the revenue of individual sellers as well as social eﬃciency.
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8.2 Bundle Pricing for Multi-Parameter Mechanism Design
In our study of combinatorial auctions in Chapter 4, all our pricing strategies placed a
price on each item, and the price of a bundle of items was simply the sum of the prices of
items in the bundle. This simplicity is preferable because it is easy to implement, but has
its limitations on how well it can perform. Moreover, many sellers are capable of oﬀering
discounts on bundles of items. So it is important to understand how much more revenue
bundle pricing can get compared to item pricing. In particular, can bundle pricing yield
a constant approximation to revenue when buyers have subadditive valuations, even in a
Bayesian setting? It is known that item pricing cannot achieve such a result, but bundle
pricing may still achieve it.
8.3 Mechanism Design for Sellers with Non-Linear Utility
In our theoretical study of networked bargaining in Chapter 3, we analyzed the eﬀect of
diminishing marginal utility, that is, a concave utility function. However, this eﬀect is not
well-understood even for the single seller setting when buyers’ valuations are unknown to
the seller. Myerson’s optimal mechanism characterization holds true only when the seller
wishes to maximize the expected revenue. However, if the seller wishes to maximize ex-
pected utility, where utility is a non-linear function of revenue, then Myerson’s auction is
no longer optimal. Concavity and other structures in the utility function can also capture
risk aversion on the seller’s part in a Bayesian setting. Recent work by Sundarajan and Yan
[84] designs approximately optimal mechanisms for a seller with concave utility when the
buyers’ valuations are assumed to be identically and independently distributed and that
the distribution satisfies a monotone hazard rate condition. Even more recently, we have
developed (joint work with Anand Bhalgat and Sanjeev Khanna [11] – work in progress)
eﬃciently computable mechanisms, with constant approximation to optimal expected util-
ity, for multi-unit auctions and the multi-parameter setting of unit-demand buyers, which
is a special case of subadditive valuations.
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8.4 Models of Financial Markets and Optimal Strategy for
Market Makers
Our model for studying a market maker’s strategy in Chapter 6 assumed a market that
is not aﬀected by the individual trader’s actions, and also possesses suﬃcient liquidity at
the market price. A market maker is also often modeled as a single dealer in a market,
such as a foreign exchange counter at an airport. In this setting, it is common to assume
a Bayesian model, where the probability of buying (selling) is a function of the buying
(respectively, selling) price. It will be interesting to design strategies for such a dealer
that maintains limited inventory at all times, as a market maker should. The strategy can
be developed as an optimization problem given the probabilistic behavior of customers,
or as an online learning and optimization problem where the strategy must also learn the
underlying probabilistic behavior. The problem is especially interesting if the underlying
value distribution of the stock changes over time. Finally, it will be interesting to consider
models that take into account the reaction of the market, that is, the reaction of other
players, to the market maker’s actions.
Moreover, as mentioned before, the actual trading mechanism in modern equities mar-
ket is very diﬀerent from our theoretical model based on price time series. Most modern
exchanges, including NYSE and NASDAQ, operate according to what is known as the open
limit order book mechanism, where buy and sell orders must get matched to be executed.
There are few theoretical models for the evolution of such a process. It will be interesting to
create evolution models for this mechanism, and study the performance of market making
algorithms in those models.
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